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Abstract
Forty years ago, Afghan refugees began streaming into Pakistan, driven by the abuses of the Communist -led
regime throughout the 1970s. After the Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, an additional 400,000
Afghan refugees crossed borders into the neighbouring Pakistan. In the next 10 years, a massive humanitarian
crisis followed and by the end of the war in 1989, some four to five million Afghans had sought refuge in Pakistan
alone. The civil war (1989-1996), five years of Taliban rule (1996-2001) and the US ‘war on terror’ (2001-presen t )
further fuelled the refugee crisis in Pakistan. To prove alliance to the US, and partly under political pressure, the
Pakistani government launched a crackdown on Afghan refugees and started encouraging them to leave Pakistan
and return to their homeland. The Afghan refugee crisis and their forced repatriation to an unprepared and unstable
Afghanistan became a new bone of contention between the two countries and a subject of interest for media, who
were not only politicised but were also used by the State as a propaganda tool. Although the initial coverage of
the refugee movement in the 80s and the 90s continued with the government’s optimistic framing of ‘rescuing
and helping’ the neighbours, that swiftly changed from 2001-onwards. Pakistani media started to regularly blame
Afghan refugees for terrorist attacks in the country and using Pakistan as their safe haven. It became an issue of
national security for Pakistan and the media echoed this political stance. In this thesis I undertake a critical analysis
of the media coverage of the longest ongoing conflict in the country – the forced repatriation of Afghan refugees
– to examine the media framing of the conflict to answer this question: to what extent is it conflict-escalatory or
peace journalism? What drives this thesis is a deep concern that the media framing may have escalated the conflict
between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The roots of this research trace back to my experiences as a war journalist in Afgha nistan and Pakistan during
2012–2014, where I witnessed the misrepresentation of Afghanistan and Afghan refugees in reportage affect
political relations between the two countries, shape and influence public opinion and create acceptability of
stringent government and military action/policy towards Afghan refugees. State and military -induced censorship
and control influenced how media report certain conflicts of political importance (Carruthers 2011; Young and
Jesser 1997). In my thesis, I study the coverage of the refugee conflict in four major English publications, Dawn
and The Express Tribune (daily newspapers), and Newsline and Herald (news and current affairs monthly
magazines) in the years 2016– 2018 to analyse the presence and extent of conflict de-escalatory journalism. I
utilise Johan Galtung’s Peace and War Journalism Model and Jake Lynch’s analytical criteria, guided by Robert
M. Entman’s framing theory, to conduct the critical discourse analysis . An empirical content analysis of news
stories and articles serves as the foundation of the critical discourse analysis, which finds media coverage of
Afghan refugees in Pakistan to be highly dominated by war and conflict -escalatory framing, conceptualised in
this thesis under the non-peace master frame. I also find nationalistic, propaganda, polarising, emotive and ethnonationalistic language in the coverage. Only Herald demonstrates some traces of peace journalism, however they
are weak and non-frequent. Peace journalism focuses on humanising the affected and marginalised groups in a
conflict, and highlights peace initiatives and post-war development – if there is any. A peace journalism practice
focuses on the reduction and elimination of ethnic differences and emphasises non -violent responses to conflict
and war.
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My analysis shows that the frequency of including and excluding peace journalism frames in the coverage is
relative to the type, sensitivity and intensity of the event that is being reported. The frequency and extent of the
use of peace and non-peace frames is also affected by whether the story/article appeared closer to the official
repatriation deadline or not. This study argues that excluding peace journalism frames from the coverage of the
Afghan refugee repatriation may have led to conflict-escalatory reporting, where claims were presented as facts
and vice-versa, officials’ propaganda was given credibility, ethno-nationalistic narrative was promoted, and forced
repatriation was justified, despite being in violation of the non-refoulement treaty under the UN Convention on
Refugees, which Pakistan is also a signatory of. I observe emerging frames in the coverage of the conflict and
propose their wider, more frequent incorporation in peace journalism practice in the country/region. This thesis
looks at peace journalism with a wider perspective and influence, and argues that peace journalism practice can
contribute to de-escalation of a conflict, and promote official accountability and justice delivery to Afghan
refugees, and other ethnic and religious minorities .
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Chapter 1
Peace journalism – from idea to practice
1.1 Introduction
Forty years ago, Afghan refugees began streaming into Pakistan, driven by the abuses of the Communistled regime throughout the 1970s. By the end of that decade, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in
1979, more than 400,000 refugees had crossed borders into neighbouring Pakistan, and some t o other
regional countries such as Iran and India. In the next 10 years, a massive humanitarian crisis followed and
by the end of the war in 1988 some four to five million Afghans had sought refuge in Pakistan alone. During
this period, Afghans were welcomed in Pakistan through the fluid border, known as the Durand Line 1 ,
mainly due to Pakistan’s interest in gaining and holding political and military influence in Afghanistan. The
SovietAfghan war ended in 1989 with the Soviets defeated and ousted, followed by a civil war
(19891996) between the Afghan government and the rebels. In 1996, Taliban rule started and lasted for
the next five years, backed and facilitated by the Pakistani military. The political unrest led to new waves
of Afghan refugee migration to as far as Europe but primarily to Pakistan – making Pakistan the largest host
of Afghan refugees in the world. According to Amnesty International, there are more than 1.5 millio n
registered Afghan refugees and another one million unregistered Afghans in Pakistan as of 2019.

Post 2001, with the US invasion of Afghanistan and its increasing pressures on Pakistan to fight terroris m
(Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban), the Pakistani State’s stance on hosting Afghan refugees also radically
changed. To prove to their allegiance to the US in their ‘War on Terror’ (2001present), the Pakistani
government launched a crackdown on Afghan refugees and started encouraging them to leave Pakistan and
return to their homeland. One of the steps the government took to put pressure on the Afghan government
and the refugees to expedite repatriation was to restrict refugee documentation. Since 2001, any Afghan
seeking refuge in Pakistan was classified as an undocumented migrant and not a refugee. The main aim
behind this was to encourage voluntary repatriation back to Afghanistan. However, after pressure and
assistance from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Pakistani authorities
conducted the first and only registration of Afghan refugees, a process th at lasted from late 2006 to early
2007. About 2.15 million Afghans, who had previously received a legal status of “Afghan citizen
temporarily residing in Pakistan” were issued with Proof of Registration (PoR) cards (Human Rights Watch
2017). With this, Afghan refugees suddenly became a dominant component of the crisis narrative in
Pakistani politics as well as the media. To justify their policy and crackdown, the Pakistani government
claimed that the Afghan government was supporting terrorists who infiltrat ed into Pakistan disguised as
refugees. The Pakistani government also upheld the stance that since Afghan refugees did not have loyalty
with the Pakistani government or its people, they were more likely to pose a threat to the national security

1

The Durand Line is a 1,640-mile international border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. It was created in the 19th
century, when Pakistan was a British colony and part of the greater Indian subcontinent. The border was imposed by
the British to strengthen their control over the northern parts of India. It was signed between Sir M ortimer Durand, the
Indian Foreign Secretary at the time, and Afghanistan’s Amir Abdur Rahman Khan. The border runs through the
Pashtun territory, dividing it into two – half on the Afghan side and the other half on Pakistani side.
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of the country. All eyes were now on Afghan refugees, including those who were born and raised in Pakistan.
Undocumented, traumatised by war and conflict, displaced and helpless, the refugees were now being forced
by the State and harassed by police and other law enforcement agencies to pack up and leave  immediately .
During a conflict, a government’s foreign policies can become controversial. To make these policies more
acceptable to the public and minimise criticism or insurgence, the State will use the media as a potentially
powerful ally and capitalise on the power of the press to rally mass publics. If the media present an obstacle
in State policies, the government will consider keeping the media narrative under control and even impose
strict censorship through legislation. In Pakistan’s case, the already nationalistic media were very easily
politicised amid the ongoing political chaos between Pakistan and Afghanistan over the Taliban, cross border terrorism and India’s involvement in the Afghanistan -Pakistan (AfPak) relations. The Afghan
refugee crisis and their forced repatriation to an unprepared and instable Afghanistan became a new bone
of contention between the two countries and a subject of interest for the media, who not only became
politicised but were also used for State propaganda. I would also argue here that the media saw the crisis
coverage as a long-term investment in the human emotions of nationalism and regional neighbour rivalry –
sentiments that are quite prevalent among Pakistani citizens. Though the initial coverage of the refugee
movement in the ’80s and ’90s mirrored the government’s optimistic framing of “rescuing and helping” the
neighbours, that changed swiftly from 2001 onwards. Despite receiving foreign aid to host refugees, such
as from UNHCR, Pakistani media presented a picture of weak economic conditions where Afghan refugees
were becoming harder to host. The media echoed the State policy and stance, and also accused the Afghan
government of deliberately not taking any responsibility for its own people and refuted its claims of
political/economic instability and national security challenges in the country. The 9/11 terrorist attacks
prompted a renewed media interest in Afghan refugees (Wright 2002) and Afghanistan. Their images and
representations as terrorists were circulating more frequently in the global media. In Pakistan, the media
were also regularly blaming Afghan refugees for terrorist attacks in the country (Alimia 2019) and for using
Pakistan as their safe haven. In addition to being viewed as an economic burden, Afghan refugees were now
largely also represented and labelled as terrorists. The negative representation of Afghan refugees in the
Pakistani media furthered after a terrorist attack on Army Public School in Peshawa r in 2014, in which over
100 school children were fatally shot. The Pakistani government held Afghan terrorists responsible for the
massacre, and this escalated the conflict between the two neighbours. As the nation mourned the death of
over 100 young children, and the State launched an anti-Afghan refugee crackdown across the country. The
media had clearly started taking a highly conflict-escalatory approach in its coverage. All this triggered
antagonism and hate among Pakistani citizens for the refugees and the Afghan government.

There is no shortage of evidence for a conflict-escalatory approach in Pakistani media (see for examp le:
Hussain, Siraj and Mahmood 2019; Hussain 2020; Iqbal and Hussain 2017; Sadiq and Hassan 2017). Studies
on Pakistani media coverage of internal and regional conflicts have indicated significant variations vis -àvis the intensity of conflict-escalatory journalism and dominant patterns of war journalism across electronic
and print media. In most cases, as the studies suggest, such practice in media coverage further fuelled and
escalated the conflict. This made a stronger case for analysing and identifying areas of intervention for Peace

12

journalism in Pakistan. For their coverage of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, the Urdu and Englis h language
media are alike in their apathetic and deleterious representation of refugees and the Afghan government.
This has not only added to the plight of the refugees, but also harmed the peace process between the two
countries, which share mutual hostility towards each other.

Noting such significant impacts on politics and conflicts, I began wanting to understand media framing. My
thesis, therefore, revolves around two central questions: 1) how are Pakistani media framing Afghan
refugees and their repatriation? And 2) are they employing peace journalism in their coverage? Throughout
this thesis, I want to better understand the role of peace journalism as a counter-approach to conflictescalatory and war journalism, and if/how it can change the (negativ e) image of Afghan refugees. I intend
to explore emerging frames in the spectrum of peace journalism indicators, especially those that are
idiosyncratically contextual to refugee conflicts such as in Pakistan and Afghanistan. I also intend to analyse
the interpretative repertoire – the group of words that indicate the tone or theme in a text – in the discourse,
which if generated through a conflict de-escalatory approach can develop an understanding and
acknowledgement of the crisis, and empathy and a sense of justice delivery among the readers towards the
marginalised group (in this case, Afghan refugees). Through an analytical evaluation of the coverage of the
Afghan refugee crisis and repatriation from Pakistan, I explore the framing dynamics employed in the media
discourse by the seemingly progressive English-language media. I also wanted to identify the inflammato ry
interpretative repertoire incorporated in media texts that generates a frame/theme) that hinders peace
journalism practice. Through my analyses, my thesis aims at broadening the perspective on the practical
implications of peace journalism and understanding why Pakistani media are so inflammatory and
escalatory – if they are – in their coverage of Afghan refugees and their forced repatriation.

I also wanted to understand if media coverage of the Afghan refugee repatriation was solely grounded in
the notion of conflict as a news value, an aspect Lee and Maslog (2005) explored in their study of media
coverage of conflicts. They argue that presenting a conflict through its identification as the ‘other’ side or
the home side makes conflict a news value, since people’s sentiment of nationalism and patriotism increases
during a conflict or war. This led me to wonder: what role does nationalism play in coverage of a specific
conflict? Reading Knightley’s (2000) work made clear this characterisation for me. He explains that this
characterisation of sides is an identification of military triumphalist language, an action orientation and a
superficial narrative with little context, background, or historical perspective. Over time, scholars have
found traditional/conventional ways of reporting a conflict as problematic and destructive, and have urged
for contemporary ways of reporting that promote peace and stability. They have nullified the concept of
objective, factual reporting. In such traditional war/conflict reporting, “factual reporting … is a chimera”
(Lee & Maslog 2005, p. 312). More scholars (See for example: Carruthers 2000; Iggers 1998; Knightley
1975; Van Ginneken 1998) have argued that the ingredients of war – patriotism, national interest, anger,
censorship and propaganda – have often conspired to prevent de-escalatory reporting. Pedelty (1995), for
instance, specifically showed how institutional influences shaped the reporting of the civil war in El
Salvador in the 1980s by comparing two reports about the shooting down of an American military
helicopter. There needed to be a better way to report conflicts and war  for many scholars, peace journalis m
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was the answer, even though the critics of peace journalism associate notions of attachment and advocacy
to it. In the last 30 years, exceptional progress has been made in peace journalism scholarship. However,
little of this has been in non-Western conflicts covered by local media.

1.2 Why Peace journalis m matters
By peace we mean the capacity to transform conflicts with empathy, without violence
and creatively – a never-ending process: Professor Johan Galtung

In October 2012, 11 Pakistani journalists travelled to Afghanistan from Pakistan on a journalism exchange
programme2 amid high security threats. Two weeks later, three of them were invited to be part of a talk
show3 that was broadcast live on a private Afghan television channel. That night after the show, the three
Pakistani journalists were labelled, by the local media and those who commented on the show after watching
it online, as “Pakistani spies”, increasing the threats to their lives. Some even said, “Send them back to
‘porkistan’”, referring to them as pigs – an animal seen with high disgust in Islam, the country’s predominant
religion. Those three journalists had to leave the country within 48 hours. Six h ours after they took off fro m
the Kabul airport, the place was struck with a bomb blast, apparently to target the Pakistani journalists. I
was one of them. During our time in Afghanistan, we worked on stories ranging from the ongoing conflict
between the Taliban and the government, to internal and regional political instability, and the socio economic warfare over Afghan trade deals with India and Pakistan. Some of us also wrote about women,
children and food. Most wrote about war, bloodshed, and the presen ce of NATO and other international
forces in the country. Some also highlighted the ongoing political conflict and differences between the
governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Some of them took sides. But no one wrote about peace.

The role of journalists, editors and media organisations as propagandists has been essential to governments
committing war crimes and crimes against peace, and carrying out the exploitation of weaker groups,
targeted killing and genocide, among other atrocities in war and conflict (Hickman 2018). Many critical
scholars of media and communication studies have argued about the destructive role of media in reporting
war and conflicts (see for example: Hamelink 2008; Nohresdet 2009; Williams 2003). This phenomenon,
referred to as conflict-escalatory journalism, is not new. For instance, the first modern genocide, the 1915
Armenian Genocide (of the Christian minority), was incited by Ottoman Turkish nationalist newspaper
journalists (Hickman 2018). To justify violence against suspect Christian minorities, the editor of the
Turkish language daily Tanin, Hüssein Cahid, propagated a description of the Muslim ethnic Turks as the
millet-i hâkime or ethnic hegemon in the Ottoman Empire (Akçam 2006; Der Matossian 2014). Later, during

2

The 2012 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung's project 'Afghanistan-Pakistan Journalists Exchange Programme Understanding the Neighbour' aimed to break down stereotypes and bring together young journalists from Pakistan
and Afghanistan: http://www.fes-pakistan.org/media/pdf/af-pak-journalism-2013.pdf
3
The daily talk show, Ba Rewayate Digar, appears on Tolo TV. This episode featured a debate with journalists from
Afghanistan and Pakistan on topics affecting the region, including the countries’ media laws and coverage of regional
issues, government foreign policy, and the strategic deal between the two nations that was expected to be signed by
the end of 2013. Accessible here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UO09L5sfBpU
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World War II, a German radio broadcaster was charged for his involvement in crimes against peace
(Hamelink 2008). Much later, in 1994, three Rwandan journalists were imprisoned for life for inciting
communal discord and genocide (Thompson 2007) through what became known as the “hate media” or
“murder media”. Besides the fact that media and journalists can be politicised or pressured by governments
and other authorities into specific types of coverage, another reason behind conflict -escalatory journalism
is simply capitalism, or what Kempf (2002) call “the privatization of propaganda” (p. 59). Who benefits
more from a conflict  the government or the media? The Gulf War and the Bosnia conflict are examples
where journalists deliberately threw away their professional rules and standards of truth (MacAlthur 1992).
Despite being aware of their responsibilities, they chose not to “stand neutrally between good and evil, right
and wrong, the victim and the oppressor” (Bell 1997). These determinants can further amplify the news
media’s penchant for violence and propaganda, reducing the role and impact of a news media organisation
to a PR agency transmitting traditional state propaganda.

In the context of Pakistan, the government, the armed forces (Pakis tan Army), and also some major religious
institutions are the top three drivers behind conflict-escalatory journalism – using media as a mouthpiece
for propaganda. Researchers (Hussain 2014, 2016; ur Rehman & Hussain 2015; Iqbal and Hussain 2017a,
2017b) have found these three institutions to have significant influence on the media and their consequent
nationalistic, elitist and propagandist coverage. This is also observed in Hussain’s (2016) study, in which
he finds a trend of Pakistani journalists prioritising national interests and supporting the government to be
a conflict-escalatory approach. The coverage, he argues, neglects the sufferings and miseries of ordinary
tribesmen and provokes a nationalistic and antagonistic response (from the readers). The re are other factors
that determine propagandist or escalatory journalism, particularly in societies that are involved in
intractable conflicts, such as cross -border terrorism, ethnic and sectarian violence, and religious and violent
extremism. These factors generate from the roots of a society such as Pakistan, whose pillars are standing
on religious indoctrination of not only the people but also the government and its institutions This religious
indoctrination contributes to reportage where journalists prefer/choose war-oriented discourse, not only
because they are forced by the State or military to become part of the propaganda, but also because they
sometimes share the beliefs of the society to which they belong. These societal, and at times political an d
religious, beliefs further enable the society to make sense of these intractable conflicts, and can perpetuate
the same antagonistic, reduced and distorted images of a conflict held by the political and military elites
(Herman & Chomsky 1988).

News framing is a direct result of the choices that journalists and editors make. Like other choices, these
choice also have consequences. If conflict-escalatory journalism leads to escalation of conflict, antagonism,
hate and war, then arguably choosing and practicing peace journalism can contribute to the end of war and
de-escalation of conflicts, the strengthening of peace processes and the realisation of human rights. Peace
journalism requires insight into the influence of media, and the taking of respo nsibility. Peace journalis m
challenges the conventional news values that guide journalists and affect the way they select and construct
their news narratives (Hackett 2011). Unlike quintessential war or conflict-escalatory journalism, peace
journalism is transparent, explains the background in depth, explores all sides of a conflict, gives voice to

15

all parties  including rivals (Hanitzsch 2004, p. 484)  and suggests a solution to the conflict. Peace
journalism has been defined and explained in many ways, but McGoldrick and Lynch’s (2000) description
of peace journalism is the building block for my present study. They describe peace journalism as a form
of journalism that looks “at how journalists could be part of the solution rather than part of the problem”
(pp. 1920). This explanation becomes more relevant in conflict coverage, where reporting only the
numbers or a one-sided story can escalate the situation. Peace journalis m goes a step further and provides
some background and future implications of events/decisions/policies for the parties involved. The focus
on the background provides the readers with an opportunity to understand and contextualise the conflict
and the parties involved, while the suggestion of solutions and ways it can de-escalate presents the readers
with a chance to infer and decide – thus presenting a complete package. Thus, as argued above, the choice(s)
that journalists make at the start can lead to consequences that can create an understanding of the issue(s)
and construction of new meanings and realities.

This process of framing and the consequent creation of new meanings and realities is sometimes manifest
and carried out explicitly, but sometimes it may happen implicitly. For peace journalism to become a norm
and part of industry practice, it will need to be taught through training or, if it’s already being practiced,
then reinforced through an ethical framework. For instance, in his article, ‘Is peace journalism feasible?’,
Lynch (2013) presents two inspirational anecdotes in which two journalists, one from the Philippines and
the other from Lebanon, notably changed the content of their journalistic work after attending peace
journalism workshops. He writes that they succeeded in promoting and practising the model, using social
media and online journalism. In a separate study, Hussain and ur Rehman (2015) found that the personal
views of Baluchi journalists in Pakistan had made their coverage of Baluchistan’s crisis de-escalatory. They
write that these journalists were not aware of the theory and practice of the peace journalism model, but
were practising it out of ethics. While the attitudes of journalists can knowingly or unknowing enha nce the
practice and extent of peace journalism in their coverage, interestingly they can also raise the tendency of
framing towards war journalism at the same time. During my analysis, I have been mindful of the
occurrence and extent of explicit and implicit themes, also referred to as frames. Whether the media frame
is explicit or implicit depends on the kind of language and interpretative repertoire used in the story. This
can also help in gauging the effect the text can have on readers’ contextual understanding and interpretation
of the conflict and the parties involved.

Peace journalism practice brings the implicit themes of peace, people, truth and solution to the explicit level
for the broader population to comprehend easily. According to Ross (2006), media hav e the power to
facilitate mediation, reconciliation and peacekeeping processes. They can also bring various conflicting
parties into dialogue and successfully facilitate the process. Peace journalism can also disseminate
information that the parties may not have been able to exchange, such as efforts by non -governmental
organisations, personal stories from within both/all sides, etc. By this information becoming known to the
public and the stakeholders, at times some miscommunications can be resolved. That is not the case in
conflict-escalatory or war journalism, in which even when covering peace, media evidently incorporate
conflict-escalatory war frames (Shinar 2004). As noted, literature in peace and war journalism studies
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demonstrates that mainstream media are often propagandist and nationalistic, and side with the powerful
(see for example: Knightley 2004; Lynch & McGoldrick 2005; Ross 2006; Spencer 2005; Wolfsfeld 2004
as cited in Hussain 2016). Apart from State pressure and draconian regulation on media in some countries
that requires the coverage to echo/reflect the government stance, most mainstream media are generally warand conflict-centric (Wolfsfeld 2004) through their own choice. These choices include socio -cultural,
religious and capitalist/economic drivers. The more we explore and understand the characteristics of peace
journalism as a model and its developments, the more problems we will be able to identify in conflictescalatory and War Journalism.
In its literal sense, the term peace journalism is quite self-explanatory – a journalism practice that calls for
peace and facilitates the process at both the social and political levels. However, in t he practical sense, it is
a complicated process that is affected by multiple factors and has various stages of practice and extent.
According to Johan Galtung (1998), considered the father of peace journalism theory, the practice is a
counter narrative to war journalism. While peace journalism focuses on non-violent responses to war and
conflict, war journalism legitimises violence and becomes part of it. In simpler terms, peace journalism was
coined in the 1970s as a response to violence-highlighting, war-triggering and conflict-escalatory
journalism. Galtung developed the Peace Journalism Model (see Table 1.1) that presents some evaluative
criteria developed specifically for analysing media discourse on war and conflict.

Drawing from the practice of journalists doing follow-up stories after major event coverage, Galtung (1998)
famously compared war and peace journalism to sports and health journalism, respectively. He argues that,
like sports journalism, the attention in war journalism is always given to t he winning side. Peace journalism,
on the other hand, approximates health journalism, where a “good reporter” will not only explain the
patient’s anguish, but give explanatory background information about the disease, the cure and remedies
available, and possible preventive measures. War journalism, he argues, does not talk about any “preventive
measures” in a war-hit, conflict-ridden zone. This element was solely delivered by peace journalism and its
subsidiaries with several alternative names, including new journalism, post-realist journalism, solutions
journalism, advocacy journalism, conflict-analysis journalism and constructive journalism (McGoldrick &
Lynch 2000, p. 45). However, whatever its name, the advocates of this kind of journalism argue that it s
purpose and intention is the same: a strong commitment to the prevention of violence and war (Hanitzsch
2004, p. 485), and “de-escalation-oriented war coverage and solution-oriented conflict coverage” (Kemp f
2003, pp. 910).
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Table 1.1: The original Peace and War Journalism Model table devised by Galtung (1986, 1998)
PEACE/ CONFLICT JOURNALIS M

WAR/VIOLENCE JOURNALIS M

I. PEACE/CONFLICT ORIENTATED
Explore conflict formation, x parties, y goals, z
issues
General “win, win” orientation
Open space, open time; causes and outcomes
anywhere, also in history/culture
Making conflicts transparent
Giving voice to all parties, empathy,
understanding See conflict/war as problem, focus
on conflict creativity
Humanisation of all sides; more so the worse the
weapons
Proactive: prevention before any violence/war
occurs
Focus on invisible effects of violence (trauma and
glory, damage to structure/culture)

I. WAR/VIOLENCE ORIENTATED
Focus on conflict arena, 2 parties, 1 goal (win),
war General zero-sum orientation
Closed space, closed time; causes and exits in
arena, who threw the first stone
Making wars opaque/secret
“Us-them” journalism, propaganda, voice, for
“us”
See “them” as the problem, focus on who prevails
in war
Dehumanisation of “them”; more so the worse the
weapon
Reactive: waiting for violence before reporting
Focus only on visible effect of violence (killed,
wounded and material damage)

II. TRUTH ORIENTATED
Expose untruths on all sides / uncover all coverups

II. PROPAGANDA ORIENTATED
Expose “their” untruths / help “our” cover-ups/lies

III. PEOPLE ORIENTATED
Focus on suffering all over: on women, aged,
children, giving voice to voiceless
Give name to all evil-doers
Focus on people peace-makers

III. ELITE ORIENTATED
Focus on “our” suffering: on able-bodied elite
males, being their mouth-piece
Give name to their evil-doers
Focus on elite peace-makers

IV. SOLUTION ORIENTATED
Peace = non-violence + creativity
Highlight peace initiatives, also to prevent more
war
Focus on structure, culture, the peaceful society
Aftermath: resolution, reconstruction,
reconciliation

IV. VICTORY ORIENTATED
Peace = victory + ceasefire
Conceal peace initiatives before victory is at hand
Focus on treaty, institution, the controlled society
Leaving for another war, return if the old flares up
again

Galtung’s work, without a doubt, developed the basis for any peace journalism research, but it needs
expansion of its context and scope in its application. War and conflict are two different situations with
different dynamics and effects, and cannot be categorised into one group. Sometimes, a war ends but conflict
remains. This change from a state of war to post-war conflict can have detrimental effects on the politics,
economy and society in the country or region. A post-war conflict phase requires rebuilding, rehabilitation,
reconciliation and a road to peace. In this phase, not only does the political stance needs to be changed, but
the media coverage and framing also needs to aid a public debate that focuses on peace and non -violence.
A shared single model cannot address the issues with media reportage in the two phases, due to the
difference in intensity and causative effects of the war and conflict states – and also the varying
responsibilities of the media in the two situations. Such a situation needs more conscientious media coverage
of conflict, as suggested by Shinar (2007), who argues that peace journalism is a “normative mode of
responsible and conscientious media coverage of conflict, that aims at contributing to peace -making,
peacekeeping, and changing the attitudes of media owners, advertisers, professionals, and audiences towards
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war and peace” (pp. 2). Here, the pragmatic and contemporary work of Jake Lynch and McGoldrick (2005)
on peace journalism become extremely significant, running contrary to the conventional ways of covering
conflict where the focus is on winning only. They describe peace journalism as a broader, fairer and more
accurate way of framing stories. According to Lynch and McGoldrick, peace journalism is practiced “when
editors and reporters make choices – of what stories to report, and how to report them – that create
opportunities for society at large to consider and value non -violent responses to conflict” (Lynch &
McGoldrick 2005, pp. 5). They write:

Peace journalism uses the insights of conflict analysis and transformation to update the concepts
of balance, fairness and accuracy in reporting, provides a new route map tracing the connections
between journalists, their sources, the stories they cover and the consequences of th eir journalism
– the ethics of journalistic intervention  and builds an awareness of non-violence and creativity
into the practical job of everyday editing and reporting.
Lynch’s work is extensively based on Galtung’s Model of peace journalism, but applies it as a guide only.
Lynch takes Galtung’s connection between peace journalism and health reporting a step further and explains
that this theory may further explore the causes of the disease (the war or conflict) and highlight possible
preventative and healing measures (resolving conflict and finding solutions). As an extension and
development of Galtung’s four-point Peace and War Journalism Model, Lynch and McGoldrick (2005)
advanced the model to develop a Peace Journalism Manual (See Table 1.2). They elaborated on Galtung’s
model with a 17-point plan for practical peace journalism (pp. 28–31; also see: McGoldrick & Lynch 2000).
It covered many aspects of peace journalism that Galtung had not discussed in his model, such as the
political context of the country and the conflict. Later, Lynch (2006) used this manual to guide research
where he developed five-point coding analytical criteria for a critical discourse analysis of 211 reports on
the Iran nuclear crisis in 12 publications in the UK press.

Lynch developed this analytical/evaluative criteria to identify media frames. The criteria were in the form
of questions, each exclusive to the Iran nuclear crisis. He then applied them to each news story to measure
the extent of peace journalism in each text. One can see his analytical criteria as a set of research questions
that he answers by analysing each text. He looks at (1) if the journalist has given a relevant, accurate and
complete background of the conflict, (2) if the journalist has presented a fact a s “a thing known” and not as
a “claim” or an opinion, (3) if the conflict is represented as open in time and space and both sides of the
story is given, (4) if the element of bias has been nullified by giving an accurate picture of all developing
news during the conflict, especially when that may help the audience take an informed decision about both
or all parties in conflict, and finally (5) if the text frames one side as the hero and other as the enemy, the
villain or the bad side.
My methodology for this thesis is derived from Lynch’s “coding analytical criteria”. I intend to build on his
model, while keeping in mind the complexities of Pakistan’s history, geo-politics, culture and religion ,
society, language and human experiences. These factors cannot be oversimplified, and demand a region-
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centric understanding of the conflict and its coverage by media. Lynch ’s analytical criteria has been
primarily used for the analysis of western media. I would argue that its direct application to a non-western
setup or media, such as Pakistan, cannot be guaranteed to produce accurate results. The Af-Pak region has
a rich colonial history, dictatorial political systems, frequent wars/conflicts, human migration, rights
violation and limited freedom of speech and press. Media in such a non-western social setting/structure may
carry idiosyncratic media frames and thus require the development of an exclusive analytical criteria, taking
guidance from both Galtung’s and Lynch’s models.
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Table 1.2: Jake Lynch’s and Annabel McGoldrick’s 17-point dos and don’ts (Lynch &
McGoldrick 2005)
Don’ts

Dos

AVOID portraying a conflict as consisting
of only two parties
AVOID accepting stark distinctions
between “self” and “other”.
AVOID treating a conflict as if it is only
going on in the place and at the time that
violence is occurring.
AVOID assessing the merits of a violent
action or policy of violence in terms of its
visible effects only.

INSTEAD try to DISAGGREGATE the two parties into
many smaller groups
INSTEAD seek the “other” in the “self” and vice versa
INSTEAD try to trace the links and consequences for
people in other places now and in the future.
INSTEAD try to find ways of reporting on the invisible
effects,

AVOID letting parties define themselves by
simply quoting their leaders’ restatements
of familiar demands or positions.

INSTEAD enquire deeper into goals: How are people on
the ground affected by the conflict in everyday life?

AVOID concentrating always on what
divides the parties, the differences between
what they say they want.

INSTEAD try asking questions which may reveal areas
of common ground and leading your report with answers
which suggest that some goals may be shared, or at least
compatible, after all.

AVOID only reporting the violent acts and
describing “the horror”.

AVOID blaming someone for ‘starting it’.
AVOID focusing exclusively on the
suffering, fears and grievances of only one
party.
AVOID “victimising” language like
“devastated”; “defenceless”; “pathetic”;
“tragedy”
AVOID the imprecise use of emotive words
to describe what has happened to people. “

INSTEAD show how people have been blocked and
frustrated or deprived in everyday life as a way of
explaining how the conditions for violence are being
produced.
INSTEAD try looking at how s hared problems and
issues are leading to consequences which all the parties
say they never intended.
INSTEAD treat as equally newsworthy the suffering,
fears and grievances of all sides.
INSTEAD report on what has been done and could be
done by the people.
INSTEAD always be precise about what we know. Do
not minimise suffering but reserve the strongest
language for the gravest situations or you will beggar the
language and help to justify disproportionate responses
which escalate the violence

AVOID demonising labels like “terrorist”;
“extremist”; “fanatic” or “fundamentalist”.

INSTEAD, report what you know about the wrongdoing
and give as much information as you can about the
reliability of other people’s reports or descriptions of it.
INSTEAD try calling people by the names they give
themselves.

AVOID focusing exclusively on the human
rights abuses, misdemeanours and
wrongdoings of only one side.

INSTEAD try to name ALL wrongdoers and treat
equally seriously allegations made by all sides in a
conflict.

AVOID making an opinion or claim seem
like an established fact.
AVOID greeting the signing of documents
by leaders, which bring about military
victory or ceasefire, as necessarily creating
peace.
AVOID waiting for leaders on ‘our’ side to
suggest or offer solutions

INSTEAD tell your readers or your audience who said
what.

AVOID demonising adjectives like
“vicious”, “cruel”, “brutal”, “barbaric”.

INSTEAD try to report on the issues which remain and
which may still lead people to commit further acts of
violence in the future.
INSTEAD pick up and explore peace initiatives
wherever they come from.
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In addition to identifying media frames, a theoretical concept explained in detail in Chapter 2, my analytical
criteria also measure the extent of peace journalism. The ‘extent’ of peace journalism is a concept introduced
by Lee and Maslog (2005) and Lee, Maslog and Kim (2006) during their study of how much peace
journalism media in various Asian countries were practicing. They call it the “peace journalism quotient”.
While this concept is very important for the study of peace journalism and measuring how much of it is
incorporated in media coverage, at this point it is not directly relevant to my research, since I intend to map
in my thesis the presence or absence of peace journalism in the Pakistani media. The extent of this presence
is the next step, and may be important to further studies of Peace journalism in Pakistan or as an extension
of my current work. The extent of peace journalism’s presence also depends on the genre/type of media
text. This means that if the same event is covered for a news report and a magazine article, the latter will
giving the journalist more time and space for investigation, explanation and context. Major peace journalis m
studies in Pakistan have analysed daily newspapers for conflict coverage, with little to no attention given to
magazines or long-form journalism. In my thesis, I have incorporated both long -form and short-form genres
to present a clearer, more accurate picture of the overall peace journalism practice in the country’s English
media.

Although, I do not intend to draw any comparisons between the newspapers and the magazines, it is
important to acknowledge the variations in the two reporting styles. Evidence demonstrates that long-form
or “slow” journalism is the most suitable reporting style for peace-oriented conflict and crisis coverage (See
for example: Boczkowski 2010; Davies 2009; Hargreaves 2003; Lewis et. al. 2006; Phillips 2009). Longform journalism is not dictated by shorter deadlines, and instead gives maximum room for investigation, the
addition or exclusion of information, follow-ups and in-depth reporting. Some landmark examples of longform journalism are John Hersey’s 31,000-word article “Hiroshima” for The New Yorker in 1946, and
Katherine Boo’s 2012 “Behind the Beautiful Forevers”, based on three years of interviews in the slums of
Mumbai, published in The Guardian. Despite the length of these pieces, long-form journalism does not
always involve lengthy pieces of text. Instead, the stylistic focus is on investigation, narrative and story telling (Le Masurier 2015, p. 143). Greenberg (2007, pp. 141142) argues in favour of long-form
journalism, which she writes has the potential to challenge and dominate the fast news culture. Arguing that
fast, short-form journalism does nothing new, she states:

[i]n the middle is traditional print journalism, the sector that is losing readers. At the luxury end,
there should be a growing market for essays, reportage and other nonfiction writing that takes its
time to find things out, notice stories that others miss, and communicates it all to the highest
standards: ‘slow journalism’.

Similarly, Le Masurier (2015) further adds to the long-form journalism argument, stating that slow
journalism avoids sensationalism and herd reporting, and is “ethical in treatment of subjects and of
producers” (pp. 143). She states that instantaneous journalism, or what she refers to as “fast journalism”
(television, radio, daily newspapers, online media, blogs, etc) is speed -focused and has taken traffic and
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scholarly interest away from slow journalism (magazines, investigative reports, dossiers, etc). In No Time
to Think , Rosenberg and Feldman (2008) argue that short-form journalists who practice fast journalis m
generally use a hyperbolic style, and “media and inaccuracy, after a flirting through the ages, are now in a
steamy lip lock” (Rosenberg & Feldman 2008, pp. 4). They have shorter space and deadlines, and they a re
always in a hurry. If we apply the above arguments to peace journalism, we can conclude that speed can
create inaccuracy, which, as Galtung and Lynch state, is one of the biggest threats to coverage that de escalates conflict. A further reason behind my choice of both long-form and short-form journalism for
analysis is to establish the relevance of this divide between coverage by newspapers and magazines.
However, irrespective of its genre and reporting styles, as mentioned above, inaccuracy is a major threat to
peace journalism amid multiple other challenges.

1.3 Challenges for peace journalism
The biggest challenge for peace journalism, and the major critique it faces, is the question of whether Peace
journalism is “good journalism”. This in turn begs the question, what makes journalism “good”? Lynch
(2013) refers to peace journalism as “good journalism” on the basis of critical realism. Critical realism is a
philosophical approach that looks at reality as stratified and a product of what we believ e (the real), what
we observe (the actual/event that we see) and what we experience through our senses (the empirical). In the
context of peace journalism, critical realism promulgates and argues that human agency is necessary for the
reproduction and transformation of social structures (beliefobservationexperience). Peace journalis m
helps people develop a deeper understanding of issues and thus make informed choices. On the contrary, a
journalism practice that obstructs human agency may generate indifference.

Sometimes, in a conflict situation, the non-emotional, detached and mechanical characteristics of some
journalism can be detrimental to (conflict) resolution. Moreover, these characteristics also defy the basic
rules of peace journalism. According to Lynch (2013), this form of indifferent journalism becomes
traditional and mainstream “journalism-as-usual” that lacks experience and observation, and where
journalists and editors can manipulate reality if one of the three layers is missing from the
beliefobservationexperience mix. He further writes that good journalism is easily detected as it stands
out because of its unique accounts and the various distinct angles it provides for the audience. It’s these
characteristics that set ‘good journalism’ apart from mainstream journalism. However, he argues that these
perspectives do not necessarily need to be endorsed, instead “where they are unjustly excluded, it should
enable them to be seen and heard” (Lynch 2013, p. 34). “Good journalism”, therefore, represents social truth
and exposes the world as it really is in a way that usually does not come out in coverage. Lynch (2013) also
proposes a list of six characteristics that he argues enable media to function responsibly. He explains that
good journalism will:

1.

Dissolve boundaries between “us” and “them”, including in affective public responses.

2.

Devise creative ways to bring background into foreground, reach out from centre to periphery and
reconfigure processes as events.
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3.

Include a wide range of accounts of power and political process, avoiding stenography of dualistic
“jousts” between leaders of parties contesting government in its own country (who won the
debate?)

4.

Provide readers and audiences with cues and clues to prompt and equip them to develop c ritical
awareness of attempts to pass off claims as facts, or “social truths” as merely interpersonal.

5.

Contribute to the construction of discursive truth by explaining new phenomena with reference to
underlying causes and patterns.

6.

Inspire by remitting into public spheres the hopes, dreams, aspirations and actions of those
experimenting with and advocating new visions. (p. 33)

Yet, the “goodness” of journalism practice is a controversial topic among media scholars, one that separates
those whose work is focused on the ethics of objectivity in journalism (such as Hammond 2002; Loyn 2007)
from those whose works stress the importance of “journalism of attachment” (See for example: Bell 1998;
Ruigrok 2008; Ward 1998). While some media scholars argue that objectivity is essential to ethical media
practices as it adds truthfulness, accuracy, neutrality and emotional detachment to the story, others, such as
Bell (1998), argue that “good journalism” stems from advocacy and a type of activism that can facilitate a
process for the good of the masses. According to Loyn (2007), Galtung misunderstood the role and power
of journalists. He argues that journalists “are reporters, not peacemakers … we are not there to make peace”
(pp. 2). On the other hand, peace journalis m scholars argue that the practice does not exclusively promote
peace; it gives it a chance to be considered as a possible option/response (Lynch & McGoldrick 2006; Lynch
& Galtung 2010). There are also disagreements among peace journalism scholars over it s advocacy roles,
with one faction explaining it with an activism and advocacy lens (see for example Aslam 2016; Benn 2015;
Lee 2010; Peleg 2007), and the other rejecting its reduction to advocacy (Lynch & McGoldrick 2006; Kemp f
2003). To the latter, peace journalism is not advocacy, but constructive conflict coverage.

These two understandings of peace journalism, which are not far apart, need a middle ground where the gap
between journalism and peace-keeping can be narrowed down. Peleg (2007) suggests peace journalism must
become the third party that facilitates communication between the parties involved in a conflict, and between
the unaffected people and the affected groups. A start towards establishing this middle ground could be
building a consensus on the conventions of objectivity in journalism. The likes of Loyn (2007) believe that
peace journalism is inconsistent with the elements of objectivity, while Lynch and Galtung argue that, in
fact, “any selectivity against peace smells of bias” (Lynch & Galtung 2010, p. 53). But is absolute objectivity
in the public interest? In this case, peace journalism can be seen as a utilitarian concept. What is better for
the masses – the conventions of objectivity, or journalism of attachment and empathy?

Lynch and Galtung (2010) state that peace journalism is a matter of self-reflection or reflexivity by the
journalists, who have to ask themselves: What do we want? To stimulate more violence or more peace?
Therefore, peace journalism becomes a utilitarian concept as “ethics of consequences rather than the ethics
of intentions” and the “ethics of action rather than the ethics of conviction” (Lynch & Galtung 2010, pp.
60). It becomes about selectivity and reflexivity, and not about objectivity. Some media scholars ha ve even
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suggested changing the name peace journalism to something that will not raise eyebrows for its suggested
intersection with advocacy and activism. For instance, Nohrstedt and Ottosen (2015) suggest calling it
“Consequence-Ethical Reflexivity.” For the same reason, some peace journalism initiatives in the
Philippines and the UK avoided using the word “peace” in their projects, and instead used “Conflict Sensitive Reporting” and “Reporting the World”, respectively in their titles (Lynch 2013, pp. 46). Electing
ethical reflexivity over selection can sometimes put journalists in a dilemma, for instance when choosing to
report on either a bullet shot or a word spoken with love. This dilemma is, as argued by Lynch and Galtung
(2010), “not a problem of factual objectivity but of criteria objectivity” (p. 53). In this case, a shot may be
more consequential than a word. Therefore, what is needed from the media is explicitness vis -à-vis the basis
on which reporting criteria are selected and discussed  and that, as Lynch and Galtung (2010) argue, would
be a working version of objectivity.

Surprisingly, Lynch and Galtung (2010) find the current version of the practice of objectivity and balance
problematic – a practice that is believed to be one of the fundamentals of journalism since its beginning.
This is because in the current version of how journalists practice objectivity, the conventions can lead and
influence journalists, and also readers, to overvalue violent, reactive responses to conflict. This conseque ntly
creates a reality for the masses where non-violence, de-escalation, reconciliation and development are all
undervalued (Lynch & McGoldrick 2005). Sometimes, the imposition of balanced coverage conventions of
journalisms may create a bias too. Journalists are forced either by their organisation or the State to keep an
equilibrium in coverage where in fact the weaker/oppressed party in a crisis may need more empathetic
representations (to de-escalate a conflict situation or bring peace). This imposition, as argued by McGoldrick
(2006), is also in disagreement with the liberal theory of free press and freedom of expression, as journalists
lose their power to construct and shape a narrative. Instead, by trying to simplify complex issues, such as
war and conflict, these conventions of objectivity end up marginalising the perspectives of others, and thus
can be strongly misleading and misrepresenting (Lynch 2013). One may ask: How can media coverage be
balanced when the conflict itself is imbalanced, with power unevenly distributed on both/all sides?
According to Lynch and Galtung (2010), this imbalance needs to be reflected in media coverage and
journalists and editors need to be mindful that such imbalances, led and fuelled by objectivity, can create or
feed propagandas.
We understand that powerful people can have a strong influence on media coverage. What they say can
create propaganda  the deliberate and systematic attempt to shape people’s perceptions about an event or
a crisis. According to Jowett and O’Donnell (1999), these powerful elite try “to shape perceptions,
manipulate cognitions and direct behaviour to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the
propagandist” (pp. 6). If the conventions of objectivity are applied to giving them an equal or prominent
voice in media narrative, then propaganda will be generated and supported. For instance, one of the majo r
reasons that the US media failed to report the truth about the weapons of mass destruction in Iraq was the
practice of objectivity that made journalists quote “men and women with high titles” (Bagdikian 2004). The
elite, including the State, want to control media. They want the media to serve them and propagandise on
their behalf (Herman & Chomsky 2010), while the powerful elites in return finance the media.
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However, it is not only the powerful elite that can control media or influence the way stories are framed and
people are represented. Peace journalism is a complex practice that has its orientations towards peace, truth,
people and solution. It takes into account multiple variables that affect people – both journalists and readers
alike. For instance, according to Galtung (1998), peace- or conflict-orientated coverage will have to explore
conflict formation; present all the different parties (not only two parties); explain goals, causes and history;
give open time and space to explaining and understanding context; focus on structural and cultural aspects
of a conflict; and adopt a winwin approach. The part about focusing on structural and cultural aspects of a
conflict, however, lacks an important caveat. We must understand that it is not only the political structures
or events that influence media content and news framing. The socio -demographic position of the reader and
the reporter is equally crucial and cannot be ignored in the entire process of news framing – fro m
development and representation to reception and inference.

Every time a war or conflict begins between parties, the reasons are different and so are the dynamics a nd
consequences. As mentioned above, social, cultural and political factors are major influencers in not only
what leads to a conflict, but also what continues to fuel it and how it is represented in the media. In addition,
daily news routines and organisational imperatives play their part as second- and third-level influencers.
The education and geographical background of the journalist equally and inevitably play a role in the way
news is framed and people involved are represented. For instance, most Pakistani journalists are residents
of a particular state/region, and have national and state-level (called provincial-level in Pakistan) affiliations
and associations. They are members of certain national cultures, ethnicities, tribes, religious sects, privat e
or public organisations and movements that are nationally based. Therefore, they are not immune to the
biases of nationalism  especially when reporting on a group of people (in this case, Afghan refugees) who
are already seen as foreign, the “other”, dangerous and the enemy.
To understand this better, I draw upon Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) explanation of this phenomena under
the “Hierarchy of Influences” model. This model calls attention to a broader range of pressures on news
content. They argue that, among many factors that appear to have a direct influence on content, socio demographic backgrounds and personal and political beliefs indirectly shape news coverage, especially
when individuals are in a position to override institutional pressures or organisational routines (Shoemaker
& Reese 1996). This phenomenon may also have a role to play in how and why certain events related to
Afghan refugees were framed in a specific way and may answer some questions about the representational
themes incorporated in the media texts studied for this thesis. These internal social, cultural and political
influences come under extra-media-level influences, which means that these are sources of influence outside
the standard circle of factors such as State/establishment or organisational pressure. The extra-media
influences may also include information sources, advertisers, market structures and technology. However,
the strongest influence is that of ideology, as it directly shapes and reshapes values and beliefs tha t govern
what audiences, journalists and other players in the news system see as “natural” or “obvious” (Shoemaker
& Reese 1996, pp. 221). Furthermore, this serves in part to maintain the prevailing relations of power.
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When discussing extra-media influences, it is important to also realise that like the coverage, “the audience”
of war and conflict coverage is not a generalised, global audience. Like journalists, they also bring their
own backgrounds and understanding to the interpretation and context of t he news. Half a century ago,
sociologist Herbert Gans (1980) had identified a number of factors that news producers take into account in
framing the news. One of those, also consistent with contemporary peace journalism, is “audience
considerations”, which means the story’s potential to build (more) audience based on the human interest
angle it carries about peacemaking and reconciliation. This is also evident from the fact that some
international media organisations  such as BBC World, CNN International and Deutsche Welle  are aimed
at audiences in different countries, speaking different languages and having different political, social and
cultural understandings, affiliations and ideologies. One of my concerns is also the lack of attention given
to these audience considerations in Galtung’s model. But the topic and time constraints of this study limit
my scope and magnitude, and keep the audience aspect of this research out of my immediate analysis.

Returning to understanding power relations, it is important to acknowledge and understand the idiosyncratic
social, cultural and political dynamics in a politically complex region such as Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Dynamics

such as nationalism,

ethnicity, tradition, social hierarchies, attachment to certain

image/meanings, and decryption of social and political constructs are completely different from the
hegemonic western values/beliefs. These dynamics have a strong impact on shaping audience perceptions
at individual levels, and have a deep-rooted influence on journalism practice vis-à-vis media framing and
representation in any part of the world. The cultural and religious belief systems; the ethics, values and
behaviour patterns; and also the journalistic training and education in a high -context culture (such as
Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, Japan, China, and Brazil to name a few) are completely different from a lowcontext culture (such as Germany, Norway, Denmark, Canada, the US and Australia). The thought processes
at both the journalists’ and the readers’ ends, and the history that shapes these thoughts, also play a
significant role. Unlike in most western countries, in Pakistan and other countries founded on the basis of
religion, religious radicalism and ethnic/sectarian violence are a multi-dimensional construct that is taken
very seriously by religious militants in order to express and exert power.

There is a high prevalence of conflicts stemming from religious, ethnic, sectarian, tribal and race -related
issues and differences in Pakistan. Belligerent nationalism that runs through Pakistani society, fuelled and
reinforced by State (pressure) and praetorianism, also plays a significant role in how media frame political
conflicts in the region for the society. All of these conflicts have the support of the majority of the general
public, and consequently the media, who wants to show the public what they want to watch and read. In her
book ‘Making

Sense of

Pakistan’,

author Farzana

Shaikh

explains

the

relationship

that

territorial nationalism in Pakistan has with religion (Islam), tribal/ethnic affiliations, and so on, calling it
“problematic” (Shaikh 2018). For instance, the intensity of violent extremism in Pakistan increased
manifold following Pakistan’s alliance with the US against Communism in South Asia and particularly in
Afghanistan (Khan 2015). The Afghan refugees in Pakistan, who are seen as foreign to local social, cultural,
ethnic, sectarian and political beliefs, are hence the major target for these differences and pressures that not
only appear in the public debate but are also dominant in media discourse. By studying the various themes
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in media coverage of the Afghan refugee conflict, I was able to identify certain themes that were exclusive
to this conflict and the media practices/ethics in Pakistan. I was also able to develop a connection between
the high extent of ethnocentric and parochial representations of Afghan refugees in Pakistani media and
local political and cultural influence on media. Looking at peace journalism scholarship and its domination
by western studies, it is evident and therefore significant to first de-westernise the peace journalism theory
for a pertinent, pragmatic application of the models and their extended versions to non -western sociopolitical settings, such as Pakistan.

1.4 The need to de-westernise peace journalism
Peace journalism models and classifications were developed by western scholars to analyse western media
coverage of deadly conflicts in non-western countries. The models are dualistic (such as peace vs. war,
truth vs. propaganda, etc.). While the binaries of these models are visible in western media coverage of
deadly international wars and conflicts, they become rather blurred during (coverage of) national conflicts
of a high-to-low intensity nature (Hussain 2017). The ways national/local media cover these conflicts thus
also change significantly. In this situation, a western classification of the model may miss out on important
aspects and variables of a national conflict stemming from local or regional political c rises, such as the
AfPak conflict and other complicated, ongoing factors contributing to the conflict. According to Galtung’s
classiﬁcation (1998, 2007), conﬂict journalism is either war-oriented (focusing on violence, elites,
propaganda and diﬀerences between the two warring parties), or it is peace-oriented (prioritising peace,
people, truth and solution). Galtung’s revolutionary work was later extended by many researchers to adopt
war and peace variables and identify and analyse the presence or absence of peace journalism in media
coverage of conﬂicts (see for example Hussain 2015; Lee & Maslog 2005; Lynch 2013; Shinar 2009).
Lynch’s work among these scholars is the most prominent. He refined the model and developed the
analytical criteria to analyse media discourse. Among many of his works where he applied the analytical
criteria method, one of his early studies is an analysis of the British media’s coverage of the Iran nuclear
programme, and its implications on international politics/war (Lynch 2006). He later also applied the
analytical criteria method to analyse media discourse in various western countries. However, since most
under-developed countries, including Pakistan, are beset by national conﬂicts of diﬀerent natures and
intensities, the existing models of peace journalism cannot be exclusively or satisfactorily extended to them.

The above is evidenced by recent Pakistan-centric studies of conflict-escalatory and peace journalism. In
Hussain’s and ur Rehman’s (2015) analysis of media coverage of the ongoing Balochistan conﬂict, where
the national army has been ﬁghting the Baloch separatists who have been demanding provincial autonomy,
the researchers found that Pakistani journalists tended to tread a middle ground. While the results were
slightly inclined towards conflict-escalatory coverage, the journalists were neither explicitly peace-oriented
in their framing nor war/conflict-oriented. This borderline peace-oriented coverage may be the result of
pressures from the Pakistani State, praetorianism or fear of dissent. However, since most liberal left-wing ,
centre-left and centrist Pakistanis do not consider the demands of the Baloch separatists as unfair (Hussain
& ur Rehman 2015), and neither view them as the outsiders, Pakistani media did not vehemently represent
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the separatists as the “other” or depict their movement as employing violent tactics (also see: Iqbal &
Hussain 2017a). It is of high political importance, but not as high as the Afghan refugees, and therefore this
framing will not bear negative consequences for the media organisation or the journalist. Similarly, it can
be said that the State and the military allow some level of critical public opinion on this issue.

In the Afghan refugee conflict, the stakes for the State and the military are extremely high and therefore no
chances with media coverage can be taken. Due to the varying nature of the conflict and State/military
interest in it, the binaries of the universal  and rather rigid  peace journalism model can be impractical.
Neither Galtung nor Lynch always address these dichotomies between theory and practice in this region.
Hence, Hussain (2020) argues for a more plausible classiﬁcation where the conflict is graded along a
continuum from high intensity to low intensity. He argues that this will account for “the variations in the
content instead of treating all conﬂicts as static” (p. 4). This will also give room for integrating the coverage
of non-western conflicts by their national media and emerging framing trends into the international
scholarly debate and the overarching model of peace journalism.
As mentioned earlier, Lynch’s analytical criteria diversifies and modifies Galtung’s model to study some
non-western conflicts, but only as covered by western media. However, one of the most prominent scholars
arguing for such localised application of peace journalism is German media scholar Thomas Hanitzsch,
who started off by criticising the dualism and binaries in Galtung’s (1998) Peace and War Journalism
Model. Galtung’s model divides conflict coverage into binary oppositions of peace-orientated vs. warorientated, truth-orientated vs. propaganda-orientated, people-orientated vs. elite-orientated, and solutionorientated vs. victory-orientated. Hanitzsch’s (2006, 2007) main objection was that while peace journalis m
offered significant framing distinctions, it disregarded relevant sub -distinctions, the positioning of certain
elements in content and, most importantly, the interaction between these elements. Therefore, as a crit ical
response to the dualistic approach of peace journalism, Hanitzsch and his fellow authors proposed the
“actorevent framework”

(Tenenboim-Weinblatt,

Hanitzsch

& Nagar 2016).

This aimed

to

comprehensively deconstruct news narratives by adding more distinctions and analysing the representations
of the two pillars of any narrative  the actors and events of conflicts, both of which add context to reporting.
The authors applied this framework to the Israeli coverage [Haaretz, Israel Hayom, and Ynet] of the Israeli–
Palestinian conflict, Iran’s nuclear program, and the Syrian civil war – all occurring in de-westernised
contexts. They find four types of narratives in the media coverage.

Context is crucial to the practice of peace journalism. Ignoring context not only directly affects the way a
conflict is reported in media, but also how the coverage is received by readers. Context can be of two types
– the context of the conflict (political) and the context of the region (historical, socio-cultural,
geographical/regional and economic). Context gives a holistic picture of the conflict dynamics, one which
comprises background information, history and historical development, and the perspectives, interests and
goals of all involved parties, and their relationships with each other (Lynch 2007). For example, a peace
journalism story about Af–Pak relations and the regional conflict around refugees will not highlight the
Afghan president’s or Pakistani authorities’ negative remarks about each other. It will present them as facts,
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but also focus on the context in which they were made. In addition, it will focus on the attempts made by
both sides towards a peaceful resolution of the political conflict and the refugee crisis. It will not base its
frame around the failures or insouciance of any/both governments in reaching mutual peace. An
understanding of the history of the conflict and its recent background develops context among the readers.
Without this understanding, a journalist is more likely to misrepresent and create meanings that are distorted
from reality. Blasi (2004) states that journalists and other media writers should have solid knowledge of the
political, economic and historical contexts of conflicts; the interests and goals of involved parties; the type
of conflict; and the methods of resolution. Without background information, context and an alternative
narrative/measure, there are strong chances that violence will be deemed as the easiest response to a conflict
(McGoldrick 2006). She further elaborates (p. 4):

Without some exploration of underlying causes, violence can be left to appear, by default,
as the only response that ‘makes sense.’ Wars remain opaque, in the sense that we are given
no means to see through the violence to problems that lie beneath. It therefore makes no
sense to hear from anyone wanting those problems to be addressed and set right as a
contribution to ending or avoiding violence.
Fahmy and Eakin (2014) write that shallow media coverage of a conflict  where background, context and
explanation of roots and causes are missing  makes it difficult to achieve a peaceful resolution. For
instance, in the context of my research, if an article on Af–Pak relations and the refugee conflict deprives
the readers of background information on the political and military involvement of Pakistan in Afghan
politics and their (the Pakistani army’s) role in the post-Soviet War phase before the Taliban rule, the
journalist may not only misinform readers, but may also create an environment that hampers informed
decision-making and interpretation. In such cases, the readers’ ability to reach a balanced understanding of
the conflict, and the people involved, is likely to be influenced.

The analytical criteria developed for this thesis, and discussed in the next chapter, also evaluated the
presence of context in each story. Understanding and prioritising context in media coverage is significant
for the decentralisation and decolonisation of ideas and concepts – such as of peace journalism. Wodak and
Busch (2004) note that there has been a shift of paradigm when studying media texts to focus more on the
localisation of meaning within social, political and cultural contexts in what they re ferred to as a
“decentralisation” of media text (Wodak & Busch 2004, p. 106). The rationale for my study emerges from
the same need to de-colonise peace journalism studies from western scholarship, and also from western media-centric analysis – thus a Pakistan-centric analysis of media discourse. To understand the context of
the events that shaped the history and present of Pakistan, I was mindful of the socio -political history of
Pakistan and the political relations it shares with Afghanistan. These factors not only continue to be strong
driving forces in how the future of media, politics and society may look in the country, but also how events
and crises shared by the two countries are represented in the media and how the coverage is reflected in
public debate and policy.
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In my study, I have based my discourse analysis on the Galtung’s model and Lynch’s analytical criteria,
since these have been tried and tested and widely applied. This also allowed me to extend and adapt their
work to fit the AfPak conflict over the repatriation of Afghan refugees. The gap in Galtung’s model and
the flexibility in Lynch’s analytical criteria also gave me the freedom and opportunity to identify new,
emerging frames that are exclusive to the coverage of Afghan refugees, an d all under the main classification
of peace journalism. For instance, I noted that a part of the coverage of the conflict over three years lies in
a grey area: it is neither entirely peace-oriented, nor explicitly war-oriented. To cover this grey area I created
the predominant, but more inclusive, binaries of peace framing and non-peace framing as the master frames
– concepts explained and discussed in detail in Chapter 2, where I argue that all conflict coverage cannot
be categorised as simply or directly peace or war journalism.

1.5 Pakistani media and peace journalis m
Twenty-four hours after Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Malala Yousafzai survived a targeted attack by the
Taliban in the Swat Valley of Pakistan, stories about a courageous 14-year-old girl who survived bullets to
the head started flooding the media. From a “passive object of the news media” (Mufti 2014), she overnight
became a hero of the nation, even a brand – the “Brand Malala” (Grayson 2013). The Pakistani mainstream
English media, perceived as progressive and liberal in their ideas and framing, responded by echoing the
popular western news leads. The alternative Urdu language media, however, responded on a different note.
The glorification of the brave young girl who was shot on her way b ack from school soon changed into
doubts and apprehension about her intention, agenda and backing. Soon, a large section of Pakistani
populists crossed the threshold into suspecting Malala as “being used – rather, misused – in the West by
portraying a wrong image of Pakistan as a violent and anti-women society” (Craig & Mehsud 2013). The
entire mainstream media narrative that was applauding her for her courage to speak dissolved into the
stances taken in alternative media, mostly Urdu language. For most of Pakistan, Malala soon became an
“agent” of the west – a media image and a public perception that still persists.
This paradigm shift in Malala’s coverage is not exclusive to her case. The Pakistani media have previously
shifted their position from a liberal stance to a conservative one on many issues of national and global
importance, such as the Afghan refugee intake, the role and investment of China in Pakistan, and peace
deals with India over the ongoing Kashmir conflict. The media industry plays a cruc ial role in influencing
the Pakistani population’s perceptions on politics and many social and national issues, and inhabits an
essential place in the society. Pakistan has a multi-lingual mediascape but the popular mainstream media
operate in English and Urdu  the country’s national and official languages, respectively. The Urdu media
enjoy a greater readership because it is the language the majority of the population speak and understand.
However, the growing use of digital media and adoption of the Internet and information technology has
transformed media consumption trends in the country. English media – seemingly progressive, less
nationalistic and freer than alternative media – are now easier to access, and mostly free of charge or with
extremely low subscription charges. Easier and more frequent access also means more reliance on English
media, leading to an expanding competition between the two. Besides, the Urdu language media have a
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reputation for sensationalism, which has created a clear demarcation between the two mediums (Adnan et
al. 2020). Apart from wide digital access, English media also claim to be progressive and to present a tolerant
view on issues such as minorities, religion and women. However, their criticism of political regimes and
praetorianism has ended them in a confrontation with the State and the military establishment in the form
of censorship and dissent legislation, funding cuts and, at times, attacks on journalists. In some instances,
big English media organisations had to adhere to State directions and succumb to the pressure, but at other
times they continued to report the truth.

My reason for selecting four English publications in Pakistan stems from my curiosity to analyse news
framing in what are referred to as “progress ive” media publications and that have a wide online and offline
readership. I chose two daily newspapers  Dawn and The Express Tribune, referred to as ET henceforth in
my thesis  and two monthly current affairs magazines  Newsline and Herald. These publications are
among the top four largest publications, both online and in print, based on circulation and readership.
Despite their ranking in the country, all these publications other than Dawn have not been academically
analysed to this degree. I do not intend to draw any comparisons between the newspapers and the magazines.
In fact, the two genres gave me an overall insight into the framing strategies incorporated in the coverage
of the conflict in both long-form and short-form journalism. More importantly, I could also map a snapshot
of the presence and absence of peace journalism practice and emerging frames in the coverage of Afghan
refugees on both a daily and monthly basis.

In Pakistan, these four publications differ greatly in their ideological identity and readership (based on age
group, education level, political dogma and religious inclinations, etc.). They also enjoy varying reputation
vis-à-vis relations with the State and the military establishment. For instance, Dawn, the flagship of
the Dawn Media Group, is Pakistan's oldest (1947present), leading and most widely read English-language
newspaper, with a daily (weekday) circulation of over 138,000 copies. Seemingly very progressive, Dawn
is considered the publication of the educated and the elite in Pakistan. It has been caught up in a few majo r
controversies in the last decade. These include State-imposed censorships and circulation bans, attacks on
its journalists and senior editors’ freedom of speech (including adding some names to the country’s Exit
Control List 4 ), and the cutting of government funds. In July 2018, BBC invited Hameed Haroon, CEO of
the Dawn Media Group, to their current-affairs talk show ‘HARDtalk’ with host Stephen Sackur, a few
weeks before Pakistan’s general elections . In the interview, Hameed accused the security/military
establishment of interfering in politics and favouring Imran Khan  former cricketer-turned-politician and
now the prime minister of Pakistan  and his political party, Pakistan Tehreek -e-Insaf. Hameed, who is also
the president of the All Pakistan Newspapers Society, also accused the powerful military of an
“unprecedented assault” on the freedom of the press. The interview was no t received well by the State or
the military establishment, and the newspaper, among a few others, faced censorship and intimidation by
the State. This gave a further push to Dawn’s popularity and its image as a left, liberal publication.

4

The Exit Control List (ECL) is a list of Pakistani citizens who are “wanted criminals and individuals under
investigation”.
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Several years prior to this, in May 2011, the newspaper had caught national and global attention when the
Group signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Australian editor, publisher, activist, and
WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange. The MoU gave Dawn the exclusive rights in Pakistan to publish first of
all the secret US diplomatic cables related to political and other developments in the country. The US
diplomatic cables leak, also widely known as Cablegate, saw the release of classified cables that ha d been
sent to the U.S. State Department by 274 of its consulates, embassies, and diplomatic missions around the
world, including Pakistan. Dawn now had access to this classified information. In May 2011, freelance
journalist, analyst and media development specialist Adnan Rehmat wrote for Dawn that the WikiLeaks
cables revealed to the Pakistani nation a new face of the army. The leaks “confirm that the government in
general and the army in particular have a formal policy of deceiving the public on national security issues.
This raises the serious question of legitimacy of the security policy and foreign policies and the actions of
the state” (Rehmat 2011). On 24 March 2016, Dawn became the first Pakistani newspaper to oppose the
resumption of the death penalty in Pakistan, again finding itself locking horns with the State. The State and
military pressure on Dawn continued and in 2019, the government revoked its advertising in the newspaper,
as well as its sister TV channel, Dawn News, turning the newspaper, which had retained its reputation as
one of the country’s independent and progressive media outlets, into the face of a national crisis (Ali 2019).

Unlike Dawn, ET is only 10 years old. It is the first internationally affiliated newspaper in Pakistan, a
flagship of The International Herald Tribune and partners with The International New York Times as their
global edition. ET is owned by its mother company, Lakson Group of companies, and is a flagship
publication of the Daily Express Media Group. According to its publisher, Bilal Lakhani, as of 2012 it had
the widest online readership in the country, both nationally and internationally. The About Us section on its
website reads “… our mission is to defend the liberal values and egalitarian traditions we believe in, and
which deserve to be upheld in writing that is both informative and insightful.” Its former editor, Kamal
Siddiqi, told me that the newspaper’s editorial stance identifies with social liberalism, and its readership is
generally on the mainstream left of Pakistani political and social opinion. He said it catered to the “modern
face” of Pakistan, where it was time that people started discussing ideas from the relentless rise of religious
extremism to gay rights (personal communication, July 2017). The newspaper has been a target of criticis m
by the right-wing in Pakistan, who see its policies and language as very progressive and liberal  in other
words, detrimental to the conservative culture of Pakistan. In August and December 2013, its head offic e in
Karachi was attacked by militant terrorists, believed to be the Pakistani Taliban, who used improvised
bombs and heavy, indiscriminate firing. Several employees were injured in two attacks, four months apart.
In December 2015, the newspaper’s regional office in Sargodha city was attacked with an improvised
explosive device. According to Boone (2014), it was the newspaper’s liberal-mindedness in a market
dominated by conservative-inclined papers that became the cause of a blatant display of power by the
Pakistani Taliban.

Given the liberal and progressive reputation of the two newspapers vis -à-vis human rights, security issues
in the country and freedom of speech, I wanted to explore if the newspapers also adhered to this public
image in coverage of the Afghan refugees and their forced repatriation from Pakistan. In addition to the
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two newspapers, I also analysed articles in Herald and Newsline magazines. Among the two monthly
current affairs magazines, Herald (1970present), also owned by Dawn Media Group and identifies itself
as a left-of-centre, progressive publication that is published for the educated middle to upper classes.
According to one of its senior editors, with whom I exchanged emails in 2018, the magazine has an
independent political position that favours no political party or group. Herald has an official circulation of
48,000 copies a month and is read by a broad audience, primarily students, academics, policymakers, not for-profit organisations and civil society members, political party leadership, diplomats and foreigners. In
short, the editor said, “anyone wanting to read about Pakistan’s socio -political landscape through the lens
of long-form journalism” (personal communication, October 2018). It is, however, pro-democracy, prowomen, pro-religious freedom, and so on. According to Herald’s editor (personal communication, October
2018), the publication has focused on covering war and conflict through the perspective of human rights,
highlighting the plight of victims and displaced persons:

We have never advocated any unconditional military operation, have always condemned violenc e
in any form – whether by the state or non-state elements – and called for upholding constitutional
values and freedoms even in special circumstances … Herald prides itself on freedom of speech.
We do not ever ask or imply to any writer to self-censor. Article 19 of the Constitution grants
“complete” freedom of speech subject to “reasonable restrictions”. Herald understands these
reasonable restrictions and interprets them independently without any direction and imposition
from authorities, within or outs ide the Dawn Media Group … Herald is completely independent
of the Dawn newspaper. It is not bound to follow any editorial line that Dawn might be taking,
neither is it bound to repeat or remove topics that Dawn may be covering.

Herald has never been at the centre of any controversy with the State, but since it shared its mother company
with Dawn, the magazine has had to bear the brunt of the many conflicts between the State/military and
Dawn newspaper. In July 2019, Herald went completely online and stopped its print publications after
government funding cuts to the Group.

Newsline was launched in 1989 and has since been covering a myriad of issues from powerful business
groups to corrupt politicians, from extremist religious groups to ruthless mafias. Run on what its editor-inchief, Rehana Hakim, calls a “shoestring budget” by a journalists’ cooperative, the magazine’s About Us
section states the desire “to present the truth of Pakistan” as its core value. According to Rehana Hakim,
the magazine gives voice to the voiceless, speaks for the oppressed and the suppressed, looks ‘sacre d cows’
in the eye, writes without fear or favour, stands steadfast in the face of threat and adversity, and has braved
many a storm. Like Herald, Newsline has not been part of any political or social controversy, but has lately
found itself in ‘financial constraints’ due to budget and funding cuts. Newsline has published articles by
some of the most senior journalists and analysts in Pakistan – including those who have been very vocal in
their criticism of the Pakistani military establishment, such as scho lar of war and military studies Ayesha
Siddiqa, and Pakistani peace and human rights advocate, and veteran communist, Ibn Abdur Rehman,
famously known as I.A. Rehman.
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My decision to select these four major English-language publications in Pakistan was bas ed on four criteria:
that they must cover the dynamics of English media, and be independent, widely -read (print and online) and
established. However, since my main objective is to evaluate the coverage of the Afghan refugee repatriation
conflict on indicators of War and Peace journalism, I ensured that the four publications were regularly
published news and current affairs publications that largely cover politics and society. I was curious to
explore how their values were demonstrated in their coverage of t his specific conflict, and if these
publications were as democratic, progressive, tolerant and liberal in their representation and framing when
it comes to a politically sensitive issue such as the Afghan refugee repatriation and its impact on the relation s
between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Though created as a democratic state, Pakistan grew into a security state due to the direct and indirect
influence of its military in the country’s politics (Haqqani 2005; Siddiqa 2006). Pakistan is a transitional
democracy whose media system reflects many aspects of Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) Polarized Pluralis m
Model. In this model, media are integrated into party politics, but there remains a strong role for the state
amid a weak history of commercial media development (Hallin & Mancini 2004). To further understand the
dynamics and the political economy of Pakistani media and their relationship with peace journalism,
understanding the influence of and Pakistan’s relation with praetorianism is crucial. Pakistani media have
been a prime casualty of nationalism and attacks on freedom of speech, where the military establishment
has clearly demarcated no-go areas for journalists and no one can violate these guidelines (Rehman 2020).
Recent studies of ongoing conﬂicts in the region show that the military establishment in Pakistan is
unwelcoming of any critical coverage of its role and influence in the conflicts with India, Afghanistan and
Taliban, and in Balochistan (see for example: Hussain & Lynch 2019; Iqbal & Hussain 2018; Hussain 2015).
In these cases, the media become more of a mouthpiece of either the State or the military and mostly
reproduce information rather than investigating. In other conflicts, such as the ethnic conflict in Karachi,
sectarian violence or religious extremism against minorities, where the military is not involved directly or
at all, there has been relatively free and open coverage that can be categorised as Peace journalism (See for
example: Agha & Hussain 2017; Hussain & ur Rehman 2015; Rawan & Hussain 2017).
Yet, despite multiple studies on conﬂict-escalatory and de-escalatory journalism in Pakistan over the last
decade, mostly using a preliminary peace journalism classiﬁcation framework (See for example: Hussain
2014, 2015, 2016, 2017; Hussain & Lynch 2019; Hussain & Munawar 2017; Iqbal & Hussain 2017, 2018;
Rawan & Hussain 2017; Siraj & Hussain 2012), the Afghan refugee conflict remains unexamined despite
its length, intensity and impact. Besides, current work does not categorise conflicts acc ording to their
intensity and impact – a gap first identified by Hussain (2020).

Conflict-centric/conflict-relevant coverage keeps the various levels of escalatory and de -escalatory
attributes in mind and will result in a more effective application of th e peace journalism model and an
exclusively developed analytical criteria. In addition to this, my personal experience as a journalist, both in
Pakistan and Afghanistan, also helped me significantly to identify the gaps in contemporary research and
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develop a pragmatic conflict-centric/conflict-relevant approach to peace journalism in Pakistan. My aim is
also to contribute to the pool of scholarship that is more open towards and accepting of emerging trends and
frames in media coverage in Pakistan – a country marred by deadly conﬂicts where peace-oriented media is
needed the most (Iqbal & Hussain 2017a, 2018). Hussain’s proposed approach for a conflictcentric/conflict-relevant framework is crucial to peace journalism in Pakistan, both for its analysis and
practice. After reading his proposal (Hussain 2020), it can be argued that three variables are crucial to the
analysis and practice of peace journalism: 1) the understanding of the nature and intensity of the conflict, 2)
the parties involved and active in the conflict at that time, and 3) the phase the conflict is in at the time of
the analysis or coverage. As I applied these three arguments to my research, I began to see how it changed
the dynamics of my analysis and helped me develop a methodology that bes t suited my case studies.

To put this into context: we understand that although Pakistan is part of multiple ongoing conflicts with
three of its four neighbouring countries (Afghanistan over Afghan refugees and cross -border terrorism; Iran
over sectarian tensions around Sunni and Shia Muslims since the 1980s; and India over the disputed territory
of Kashmir), it is not in a state of war. Therefore, there are some aspects of the Galtung’s model that cannot
be applied to media coverage of a conflict in Pakistan, for instance the model’s ‘winwin’ orientation.
Unlike a war, a conflict can last for decades, such as the Afghan refugee conflict. Another example is the
pro-democracy movement in Senegal, West Africa that started in 1974 against the post -colonial elite forces.
On one side are the opposition political groups, religious and community leaders, journalists and media
organisations and students, and the other side is the Socialist Party (PS) that rules the country on the colonial
model. Civic mobilisation fuelled by growing dissatisfaction led to a conflict that has been ongoing for over
40 years now. Such ongoing situations may have no winners or losers – only parties/sides that become active
or passive during different phases of the conflict. Some armed conflicts are violent, such as the ongoing
Afghanistan conflict where the Afghan government and the US military are fighting against Taliban
insurgents and Islamic State (IS) militants.

However, not every conflict is a violent conflict. There have been many long civil resistance and rights
movements across the world that were non-violent. For example, the US Civil Rights Movement in the
1950s and 1960s, the pro-democracy movement in Zimbabwe led by opposition parties and civil society
since 1998 and still ongoing, and Egypt’s “Facebook Revolution”, called the Kefayaa, and the struggle for
democracy and good governance from 2008 to 2011. Nonetheless, they are still conflicts that affect people
economically and socially.

It is understandable that national media report non-violent conflicts differently than mainstream violent
conflicts or wars. When the conflict is in its passive phase, which means there is temporary silence fro m
both or all parties, the media coverage can become passive or repetitive vis -à-vis updates, information, etc.
Such a temporary situation, which can last for years, creates what Martin Luther King Jr. referred to as a
state of negative peace – a state where there is an absence of war or a manifest/active conflict, but continued
exploitation, injustices, inequalities and discrimination against weaker groups impede the peace and
rehabilitation process. In one of the letters that Martin Luther King Jr. wrote to his fellow clergymen fro m
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the Birmingham City Jail, dated 16 April 1963, he mentioned negative and positive peace, describing a
“negative peace which is the absence of tension to a positive peace which is the presence of justice” (King
1986, p. 296). One can then argue that a state of negative peace is the time that Peace journalism is most
needed.

Robert Malley (2019), president and CEO of the International Crisis Group, writes that there is always a
window between intense flare-ups to set in motion a peace process aimed at ending a decades -long war or
conflict. During my analysis, I also noted the type and extent of media framing in the “quiet” phases of the
conflict as I intended to also document any changes in the interpretative repertoire during that time. In
addition to the type of framing in quiet phases, I also noted the consistency and frequency of coverage to
see if there were important events that were ignored or under-reported. I borrow this angle of analysis fro m
Galtung’s and Ruge’s (1965) historic work in which they stress the need fo r reform to violence-escalatory
narratives in media through a peace journalism orientation. Through their 12-point ‘policy implications ’,
they propose a framework focused on the background and context of the conflict and call for the
deconstruction of complex and ambiguous events for the news readers. However, among many other points
that later developed into Galtung’s Model of Peace and War Journalism, one point that they stressed  and
I found very important  was the “continuity factor” by writing follow-up reports on the conflict. These
follow-ups continue the information dissemination and keep the readers involved and updated on any de escalatory development that might aid peace and dialogue, or an escalation that needs attention.

1.6 Conclusion
Alongside shifts in world politics, public law and policy, and society and cultures, and the advent and mass
use of technology, the general public’s understanding of how these work, individually or together, is also
shifting. Likewise, media practices have evolved over time. Peace journalism is also ever evolving. New
concepts have emerged and different angles have developed as offshoots of the original. For instance, citizen
journalism  where the power to report and make news “go viral” has been transferred from organisations
into the hands of citizens  now shares the information-dissemination role and power to bring change,
alongside mainstream media. Citizen journalism puts public interest in the hands of the public but, like
many other forms of journalism, it is not necessarily always ethical. Peace journalism is unarguably an
ethical form of media practice and in the public interest. By identifying and proposing new/emerging frames
that are relevant to the conflict and Pakistani socio-political set up, my thesis fills the gap that is created by
the need for the growth of peace journalism classifications and definitions in the Pakistani context – both in
practice and research.

The need for peace reporting in a conflict is crucial and places a lot of responsibility on the journalists.
Kempf (2002) writes that if journalists claim to be aware of their responsibilities and are aware of the power
and influence they have, “they must not continue to paint the world in the same colors of black and white
as the warlords do” (p. 71). However, the step from conflict-escalatory or war journalism to peace journalis m
is not a rapid one. Taking journalistic responsibility does not automatically mean replacing one form of
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propaganda (conflict-based) with another (peace propaganda). Peace journalism in conflict coverag e is a
strategy and implies dispelling antagonisms between the binary constructs “good” and “evil”, “us” and
“them” or “other”. Especially in the context of Pakistan, peace journalism can be seen as focusing on finding
the middle ground – meeting half-way between the dualism of the conventional models  not in the sense
of neutrality, but rather inclusivity. In order to counterbalance the dynamics of conflict escalation and to
add to the constructive transformation of conflicts, more than “being neutral” is required  it further needs
the abandonment of a military and war-like framework in media coverage. Kempf (2002) argues that
journalists can only take responsibility when they have a better understanding of the conflict and that none
of the parties involved is the source of ultimate truth. In other words, this can be read as: peace journalism.
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Chapter 2
Theoretical frameworks and methodology
2.1 Media and representation: Understanding frames and framing
On 6 January 2021, a violent mob stormed the Capitol in Washington and vandalised the government
building. Angry at the election being ‘stolen’, these pro-Trump supporters wanted to overturn his 2020 US
presidential election results. World media, and more specifically the US media, were quick to report the
Capitol attack by a ‘pro-Trump mob’, ‘Trump supporters’, and ‘pro-Trump rioters’. However, not a single
media organisation referred to them as terrorists, radicals, extremists or white supremacists. Many of these
attackers were armed, some were arrested and some even died in the violent commotion. However, media
organisations steered away from using the words ‘political violence’ or ‘violent rioting’ for the attack. The
two improvised explosive devices that were found in the building were continuously referred to as
‘suspicious packages’ The closest any local media organisation got was to indirectly refer to them as
traitors, as American constitutional law and Anglo-American legal history scholar Carlton F.W. Larson
wrote for The Washington Post, “So what would our nation’s founders have thought about this conduct?
The answer is pretty clear  they would have denounced it as treason.” Larson’s was an opinion piece,
which means that the writer held the sole responsibility of the words he used for the event or any person
involved in the attack – an attack referred by global media as an attack on American democracy.

While observing the coverage, mainly by the US media, two questions came to my mind: 1) How wou ld
the Western media framed the storming of the Capitol had it happened in another country? And 2) what is
it that the US media are implying vis -à-vis the attackers? I concluded that the way the attack was framed in
local media focused only on the disgruntled Trump supporters, who were incited by Trump – who
eventually faced a suspension of his Twitter and Facebook social media accounts for provoking and inciting
the mob to take to the roads. Clearly, there was some information that was intentionally select ed for
inclusion in coverage, and some for omission. This process is called media framing (Gitlin 1980, 2003),
and is based on the idea that media present/frame events and people in a specific way that is determined by
several organisational and external factors. The concept was coined in the 1980s and later developed as
framing theory, and forms the core theoretical framework of my thesis.

Media frames can be explored through two angles: what they are and what they do. To understand the
process of framing better, it is important to first explore what frames are. In the simplest terms, frames are
tools within the texts used to portray events, people, situations, etc. These frames are generated by the
absence or presence of certain elements that indicate some form of representation or portrayal. The elements
can be visual, verbal or textual. They can be present as certain words, groups of words, or expressions, also
called the interpretative repertoire – patterned features of discourse. They are a unit of analysis that allows
researchers to identify themes, patterns and consistencies in text and begin to connect these with wider
contexts and social formations (Gill 2009; Wetherell 1998; Wetherell & Potter 1988). It is common for
these elements to be present as either stereotypes (in the form of images or use of language) or simple facts.
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They may be are explicit in the [news] text or implicit, hidden frames in the form of indicative terms.
Another significant angle from which to look at frames is through wh at they do. We understand that
journalists and editors use or incorporate certain frames in the text (the process of media framing) in
multiple ways. However, irrespective of how they are present in the text, frames can thematically create
and reinforce the imagined or constructed social realities in the minds of the audiences. Among the earliest
scholars who defined frames in the context of what they do is Todd Gitlin (1980), who writes that news
media use frames to be “replete with metaphors, catchphrases , and other symbolic devices that provide a
shorthand way of suggesting the underlying story line” (p. 158). Thus, he argues that the interpretative
commentary that surrounds the text is more important that the informational content in the text.
The execution of these hidden frames is called media framing. Gitlin (1980) refers to this as “principles of
selection, emphasis and presentation composed of little tacit theories about what exists, what happens and
what matters” (p. 6). His work focused on news coverage of political radicals during the 1960s. He argues
that the representation of their ideas and activities was systematically demeaning, and further that these
representations made it almost impossible for them to achieve their objectives. Gitlin’s wo rk was later
extended by William A. Gamson (1989), who redefined frames as central organising ideas, an approach
similar to his predecessor Gaye Tuchman (1978). Gamson argues that facts have no intrinsic meaning and
that they “take on their meaning by being embedded in a frame or story line that organizes then and gives
them coherence” (p. 157). He suggests that journalists intentionally select certain ideas for emphasis while
ignoring others – an idea that was later reintroduced by Entman (1993), who highlighted the
operationalisation aspect of frames. This is where he extended the understanding of “what they do” to the
already established discussion and literature on “what they are”. Entman argues that though not directly
measurable, frames can be used to define problems, make moral judgements and support remedies. He
states that selection and salience happen at conscious levels (see also: Liebler and Bendix 1996; Chyi &
McCombs 2004), as frames help us “select some aspects of a perceived reality” before we use them in our
communicating texts “in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation,
moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (Entman 1993, p. 52).

Reese (2001, 2007) agrees with Entman on the organising aspect of frames and writes that framing is an
organising principle or overarching way of understanding social reality. However, Entman’s theory of
selection and salience at conscious levels attracted some criticism from scholars who ob jected to the
element of bias in such conscious -level framing. One of them was Lakoff (2010), who extended the
definition and understanding of frames to a process that happens in unconscious structures, which he claims
are “physically realized in neural circuits in the brain” (p. 71). He argues that frames are activated on an
unconscious level, since people’s reasoning is also developed on an unconscious level, socio -culturally.

Like peace journalism, issues such as bias and objectivity also divided the s cholars of framing theory, with
one side defining framing as an unconscious decision and the other referring to the process that happens at
a conscious level. However, it is important to note that framing has been described as a “bridging concept”
between cognition and culture (Gamson et al. 1992, p. 384). I find myself partially inclined towards both,
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but agreeing more with the latter group – framing is conscious, but fed overtime by politics and culture.
This is not only because of my 10 years of experience in field and desk journalism, but also because of the
evidence in scholarship that shows that framing is a result of the choices journalists and editors make
consciously.

All news stories have a certain approach (to framing). Journalists begin to conc eptualise frames as soon as
they decide what to write on, and thus complete objectivity is not possible. Further additions are often made
by the editors before the story gets published. Although this may not be true for every story ever reported,
overall a journalist’s choice of topic, political affiliation and ideological background is significantly
reflected in their selection of news subject (Aalberg et al. 2013; Soroka et al. 2013). This is also evidenced
in some other studies, where scholars have established a connection between reporters and some factors
that may influence their choice of sources (see for example: Armstrong 2004; Berkowitz 2009; Owens
2008). These studies also explain why and how reporters choose certain sources for a particular story. He
writes that the choices the reporters make have implications because these choices largely influence a
story’s frames, which build its content and message. These frames, as discussed in the previous chapter, are
understandably generated and affected by socio-political, cultural, economic and religious determinants.
These factors [may] increase the complexities for journalists, especially when they have to frame a conflict,
and represent the involved parties in a certain way. These determinants, together with other editorial
denominators, directly influence journalists’ process of conceptualising frames (see for example: Cooper
2002; Gans 1979; Shoemaker and Reese 1996; Snow and Benford 1992; Tuchman 1978).
Recently, scholars have added a fourth denominating factor to the list  journalism training. Training
journalists for peace reporting will best bridge the cognitive, constructivist, and critical aspects of this
framing paradigm. In addition to the conceptualisation and decision-making process, journalists’ training
is a crucial part of not only their professional development, but also of their understanding and practicing
of the emerging trends in contemporary conflict de-escalatory journalism, such as peace journalism.
Journalism training shapes how they understand an event in a conflict or the conflict itself, how they frame
their stories through certain lexical choices and what sources they use. It also comprises how they refer to
the subject(s) and object(s) in their stories, what approach they take to presenting the entire event and what
suggestions they make. Aslam (2010) has written extensively about media perspectives in conflict
resolution and has developed a strong case for the integration of conflict resolution in journalistic training.
These factors, individually or altogether, may have radical impacts on readers, especially those who are not
familiar with the background of the conflict or the event that is being covered in the story. For a reader to
take an informed decision on an issue or a conflict, it should be mandatory for journalists to practice what
I call informed journalism. This means being well informed on all aspects of the conflict they are covering
and the implications of their stories on the readers.

Frames also shape the messages that are conveyed to the readers (Nelson et al. 1997). For this reason,
political leaders also invest a great deal of time and resources to promote official frames to media
(Wolfsfeld, Frosh and Awabdy 2008). In the case of war or conflict coverage, journalists and media
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organisations are either given frames by the political establishment or they generate and use their own
special frames, mostly exclusive to the situation, to shape people’s reasoning, construct opinion and, in
other cases, raise awareness and develop understanding around issues in distinct ways (Gamson 1992;
Iyengar 1991; Nelson and Kinder 1996). This is evidenced by how the Israeli and Palestinian media covered
the terrorist attack at Pat Junction, in which 19 people were killed. Media on both sides reinforced national
hatred for the other side, placing the other country’s leadership on the defensive. Researchers studied how
the media in both countries framed the attack, and found high indicators concerning the level of
emotionalism associated with the broadcasts (Wolfsfeld, Frosh and Awabdy 2008, p. 407). They argue that
these framing routines are permanent and influence every news story that is constructed. Separately,
Boesman et al. (2005), who studied the journalist-centred approach to the frame-building process of Belgian
Syria fighters, argue that frames are activated in the journalist’s mind to “define the situation, to indicate
what the problem is, and to allocate roles to the main actors in the story, as the victim, hero, or villain” (p.
303). They concluded that frame-building is a dynamic process, solely driven by the journalistic dealings
with sources and news values. The examples above help provide a better understanding of how journalists
construct culturally acceptable news of violent conflict.

Frames help journalists organise their facts and opinions in articles and news stories. However, they are not
always explicit or, as Entman argues, easily measurable. A story can have one frame or a schemata of
interpretation, and may stress specific elements of the event or conflict that is being covered. For instance,
poverty may be framed in a way that either makes the poor responsible for their state or holds the authorities
and government responsible (Iyengar 1991). Frames change the meaning of the entire message. Without
understanding the theoretical concept of framing, media text cannot be interpreted or analysed. The
contextual understanding of the way journalists frame their stories in conflict coverage is crucial to my
research, as it identifies their choices in telling people’s stories, representing groups, taking sides, selecting
information and making suggestions for non-violent responses to war and conflict.

2.2 Conducting frame analysis – two models
Frame analysis is both a theoretical paradigm and a methodological process. In my research, it informed
the analytical criteria I developed  guided by Jake Lynch’s frame analysis method, I demarcated a line
between peace-oriented and conflict-escalatory media coverage. Frames serve multiple objectives  they
are neither uni-purpose nor one-directional. D’Angelo (2002) lists four objectives of frame analysis that
suggest framing studies is both cognitive and discursive: to identify themes, investigate conditions, examin e
how frames interact with prior knowledge and examine how news frames social-level processes (p. 873).
The application of frame analysis in my research served more than one purpose. First, it helped me with the
identification of themes in news stories and articles, and second, it showed me how frames interact with
prior knowledge to create new knowledge (emerging frames).
As noted earlier, I analysed the frames in media text through Entman’s framing theory – a deliberate,
considered and conscious process of selecting and highlighting certain information, and ignoring or
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omitting other information. However, Entman’s theory finds its roots in Canadian -American sociologist
Erving Goffman’s (1974) model of framing, in which he explains the deconstruction of the rhetorical and
ideological underpinnings of news. Considered as the original formulation of frame analysis, Goffman’s
work is widely quoted by media and social scientists studying media texts and the use of language with an
interpretivist approach. His definition of frames focuses on the organisational side, as he explains in his
book Frame analysis: an essay on the organization of experience (Goffman 1974). He argues that the
definitions of a situation “are built up in accordance with principles of organization which govern events
[…] and our subjective involvement in them; frame is the word I use to refer to such of these basic elements
as I am able to identify” (p. 10). However, unlike Entman’s theory, Goffman’s frames work at an
unconscious level, where they are adopted by writers and journalists as a set of organisational principles.
For Goffman, frames are not manufactured consciously during a communicative process , rather
unconsciously adopted during the processes (also see: Koenig 2004).
For almost two decades, Goffman’s ideas and explanation of frames remained the most dominant in media
research until Entman (1993) expanded the idea, arguing that the “fractured paradigm” (p. 51) needed to be
clarified and synthesised. Entman redefined frames as the central single theme (or multiple themes) within
a media text. He argues that the study of frames can be an incoherent process due to the complexities of
news, especially in war and conflict coverage. He classifies frames as procedural and subst antive (Entman
2004, p. 5), with procedural frames having a narrow focus, while substantive frames 1) define effects or
conditions as problematic, 2) identify causes, 3) convey a moral judgement, and 4) endorse remedies or
improvements. With these characteristics in mind, it is justified to argue that peace journalism requires
journalists to largely incorporate substantive frames in their stories. However, since brief news stories may
not always allow a journalist to incorporate substantive frames due to time limitations (such as the urgency
to break news) and word count, it may be present more frequently in long -form journalism. This gives longform journalism an added advantage over short-form, as journalists can capitalise on the flexibilit ies around
word count and deadlines, and thus frames can be better incorporated in such texts. This may add clarity to
the meaning and interpretation of the texts.

Frames are created and facilitated by (conscious) language use. The lexical choices that reporters and
writers make are indicative of the ideas that are packed into the story as information packages. These ideas
contribute to news narratives and the construction of social realities, representations, images and identities.
Therefore, one can argue that the potential of effective framing lies in an effective communicativ e
processes. Communication, as we know, is not static, but rather a dynamic process that involves frame building (how frames emerge) and frame-setting (the interplay between media frames and audience
predispositions). As information packages, if they are to remain viable, frames have the task of constructing
meaning over time by incorporating new events into their interpretation (Gamson and Modigliani 1989).
Therefore, I adopted Entman’s theory as the fundamental framework for this thesis to analyse the themes
that journalists use in their work. In peace Journalism these themes need not only to identify the causes of
the conflict, but also to endorse remedies and improvements for conflict resolutio n and peacebuilding, and
to facilitate justice delivery. However, as mentioned earlier, at the start of this complex process is a simple
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thing: language choice. To understand and analyse discourse is to infer meaning from the language used. It
is not only meaning that develops through certain language use; language also adds context to the text.
Thus, the two factors in language – meaning and context – help analyse discourse.

2.3 Understanding and analysing discourse through frames
Analysing discourse through frames incorporates the intent of the “sender” of the message (Gitlin 1980,
p.158). From the headline, the lead and the sources quoted in the text, to any interviews featured, all suggest
a storyline that the journalist or editor may have meant to take. In many texts, there is more than one frame
suggested. In those cases, one needs to ask the question about the prominence of certain frames  also called
dominant frames  in media text. When Johan Galtung was asked to define peace Journalism in the shortest,
simplest form, he said it was “to ask two questions: what is the conflict about, and what could be the
solutions?” (Fischer 2008). Adding to this definition, Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) write that peace
journalism is about choices that editors and reporters make. These choices, together with description of the
conflict and suggested solutions, make up the frames in a story. Frames that appear frequently become
dominant frames, studied and analysed extensively by media discourse scholars. This also helps us
understand the function of frames in discourse, which itself serves a function.
In media, discourse is manufactured (O’Keeffe 2011) and its function is to develop/construct meaning,
context and interactions between the text and an audience. This function-construction paradigm can have a
continuum from interpersonal to broader levels (Wetherell & Potter 1988) based on the interpretative
repertoire, also called the analytical unit of discourse, and defined by Potter and Wethere ll (1995) as
“discernible clusters of terms, descriptions and figures of speech” (p. 89). For example, explaining ethnic
stereotypes and how they are a threat to harmony is the function of discourse at the interpersonal level,
while arguing for a systematic social integration of diverse ethnicities in the community under a fair system
of political governance is its function at the broader level.

According to Wetherell and Potter (1988), discourse can be analysed better once the following four
interconnected concepts are understood: function, construction, variation and the analytical unit. An analyst
must seek what the frame does (function), how it has been generated (construction), how many different
types there are (variation) and what it is made of (analytical unit). According to Talja (1999), ‘analytical
unit’ is a term synonymous with interpretative repertoire and serves as the basis for the construction of
social realities.

Social realities are constructed through utterances, which form the analytical unit of a frame. Utterances
carry subtle messages that are not always explicit and require interpretation. As mentioned earlier, the cues
are sometimes easy to identify as they “emerge as explicitly meant speech acts” (Wetherell and Potter 1988,
p. 169), but sometimes they may be ambiguous and inexplicit or implicit. Wetherell and Potter (1988) argue
that the meaning of an utterance is “not a straightforward matter of external reference but depends on the
local and broader discursive systems in which the utterance is embedded” (p. 169).
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When speakers speak or writers write, it is common that they have a certain desired response they hope to
get from their listeners or readers. Their objective then becomes more than simple information transfer
(locution). In this state, their desired intention might be to make the listener/reader act in a certain way
(illocution). The more important or controversial the message is, the more strategically journalists will word
their articles. The language and references they use are shaped by their cultural and social experiences, and
the context they are used in. It is important not to underestimate the lexical choices that journalists make,
as these choices are more strategic than accidental. Journalism is a deliberate p rocess that facilitates the
social construction of meanings. This function becomes even more vital and impactful in coverage of
conflict, especially in terms of the selection, linking and ordering of terms that in return develop a discourse.

To analyse discourse is to develop a hypothesis about the purpose and consequence of language (Wetherell
and Potter 1988). Through my examination of the presence of peace journalism in Pakistani English media,
I aimed to identify the purpose and consequence of languag e used to report on Afghan refugees in Pakistan
and the process of their forced repatriation from Pakistan. I unpacked the ideological underpinnings in the
analytical unit, which were socially constituted and had direct interrelations with socio -cultural and political
forces (Fairclough 1992; Teo 2000). In simpler terms, unpacking the analytical unit, or the interpretative
repertoire, helped me construe meanings from the text by interpreting the writer’s selection of lexicons.
This consequently brought clarity vis-a-vis the purpose, function, construction and variation of discourse.

The four concepts discussed above help discourse analysts identify and critically analyse media frames used
in the text, by paying attention to the elements (indicators and des criptors) that are used and reused. In
addition to this, it also helps identify any new expressions or terms (or frames) that are introduced to the
readers as either a counter-narrative or an extension of the dominant narrative in media discourse. This
thesis incorporates framing theory and the critical discourse analysis (CDA)  a combination of theoretical
approaches used frequently by scholars to develop a research methodology to study media text. My research
is a CDA of media coverage through an examination of dominant frames.

Analysis of media frames in discourse focuses on four empirical goals: 1) to identify thematic units in text;
2) to investigate the antecedent conditions that produce frames; 3) to examine how news frames activate,
and interact with, an individual’s prior knowledge to affect interpretations, recall of information, decision
making, and evaluations; and 4) to examine how news frames shape social-level processes, such as public
opinion and policy issue debates (D’Angelo 2002, p. 873). My main focus was to identify the thematic units
in each media text; however, I also partially covered the other three goals. I examined the causes that lead
to journalists framing their stories in a certain way; I also highlighted the journalist’s prior knowledge and
its effect on information/end-influence on public opinion. This was an interpretative approach – an approach
that examines certain aspects of an issue or an event and looks deeply at the text by “exploring images,
stereotypes, metaphors, actors and messages” (Matthes 2009, p. 349).
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Frame analysis is a multimodal research process with three distinct approaches used frequently by analysts
of media discourse, all three rooted in the qualitative methodological paradigm. One is the linguistic
approach that looks at thematic units by analysing the selection, placement, and structure of specific words
and sentences in a text (see for example: Entman 1991; Esser and D’Angelo 2003; Pan and Kosicki 1993).
Instead of looking at the tone or theme in the entire article, each paragraph is treated as the analytical unit
and, through specific words, the basic idea is identified as the building block of the frame (Entman 1993).
A major advantage of this approach is the systematic and thorough analysis of news texts. However, the
inordinate complexity of this method (Esser and D’Angelo 2003, p. 624) makes a standardised frame
analysis with large text samples rather difficult to accomplish.

The second is the hermeneutic approach, which identifies frames by lin king them to broader cultural
elements (Boni 2002; Coleman and Dysart 2005; Downs 2002; Haller and Ralph 2001; Hanson 1995;
Tucker 1998). In the hermeneutic approach, though it is difficult to tell how the analyst extracted the frame
from the material, frames are described in depth. Scholars have expressed their concern about the inherent
subjectivity of the hermeneutic approach (Simon 2001; Tankard 2001). Nonetheless, studies based on this
approach are exceptionally thorough in their discussion of media frames and also inform readers of any
emergent frames (Mathes and Kohring 2008).

The third is the manual holistic approach. A merger of the linguistic and hermeneutic approaches, the
manual holistic approach is based on generating a number of working frames through manual content
analysis of media text. They are then coded as holistic variables (see for example: Akhavan-Majid and
Ramaprasad 1998; Meyer 1995; Simon and Xenos 2000; Segvic 2005). Once the frames are defined, they
are coded in the analysis. However, as with the hermeneutic approach, it remains unclear how researchers
extract these frame definitions. Like most studies mentioned above, there is no criterion for what and how
many frames are found. Mathes and Kohring (2008) have a solution for this problem. According to them,
the assessment of frames will fall into a methodological ‘black box’ without naming a criteria for their
identification. Therefore, considering the complexities of certain issues, such as terrorism or health care,
allowing the researcher to observe the emergence of new frames requires a new coder schema to b e
generated for every research undertaking. The solution lies in the development of an exclusive analytical
criteria, which for my thesis was developed using Galtung’s Peace and War Journalism Model (explained
in detail below).

The manual holistic approach allowed me to undertake analysis of thematic units and identify a link
between cultural elements and frames. The analytical criteria supported this identification process. I studied
the structure and nature of frames, devoting myself to their assessment and description (see for example:
D’Angelo 2002; Entman 1993; McCombs, Lopez-Escobar and Llamas 2000; Reese 2007; Scheufele 1999;
Weaver 2007), and also paid attention to the general news content (Greenberg 2000; Weaver 2007). This
combination is a common methodological trend in frames analysis in both inductive and deductive studies.
For instance, D’Angelo et al. (2005) conducted a content analysis of 267 campaign articles published
between Labor Day and Election Day in The New York Times. They categorised articles by identifying them
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as using either a strategy frame or an issue frame, and discovered that the stories that contained a salient
“Policy Issues” topic tended to be issue framed, while those with significant “Politics and Process” topic
tended to be strategy framed. On the other hand, Greenberg (2000) based his study on how frames are
constructed and projected overall. In one of the very few studies conducted around opinion discourse
(editorials, op-ed articles and guest columns), Greenberg tried to develop a theoretical understanding around
what is written on opinion pages about the arrivals of “illegal” Chinese migrants to Canada by boats in
1999. Using this as a case study for his research, Greenberg conducted a critical analysis of the importan ce
of opinion discourse and its contribution to the social construction of the concept of “other”. Both these
methods dominate the area of media representations of refugees. Hence, in my thesis, I combined their
standardised analysis of structure, nature and overall tone to identify the orientation of the text (towards or
away from peace).

In war and conflict coverage, scholars operationalise frame analysis in two ways. They either study frames
individually as unit of analysis, or they study frames as a d iscourse unit with multiple frames in one text
(see for example: Carpenter 2007; Dimitrova and Strömbäck 2005; Kerbel, Apee & Ross 2000). Among
these, I found Dimitrova’s and Strömbäck’s study particularly relevant to my study. They conducted a
content analysis of newspaper articles to categorise them into military conflict frames and anti-war or peaceoriented frames. Their study investigates the framing of the 2003 Iraq War in two elite newspapers in
Sweden and the US. They discovered that military conflict frames were more common in the US war
coverage while the responsibility and anti-war protest frames were more common in the Swedish war
coverage. A similar analysis of media discourse was conducted by Winter (2010), who examined coverage
of Afghanistan in Canada’s largest and seemingly most progressive daily newspaper. His case study was
an eight-part special report published in March 2006, in which he analysed the frames, language and
background information provided in the series. Because of the complexities of media coverage in war and
conflict, and the abstract attribute of frames (as argued by Entman), the approach of studying frames as
units was best suited to my case study. This allowed me an in -depth observation of the function-construction
element of each frame, and also the context it was used in, since some articles had more than one frame.

2.4 Putting peace in the frame: framing theory and peace journalism
Theoretically, peace journalism is supported by framing theory (Lee and Maslog 2005). They are both
grounded in the argument that every news story or an article has a specific frame that represents or
constructs some form of reality for the readers. If we remind ourselves of the various definitions of framing ,
we can clearly see that the nature and function of frames and framing well suit peace journalism, chiefly
because of their overlapping ideas of social construction and the representation of (social) realities. Peace
journalism’s agenda is to provide context and background development, fair representations, equity in
offering a platform for voice, de-escalation of conflict, and non-violent solutions to war and conflict. In the
last two decades, framing theory has replaced the agenda-setting theory and become the most applied
research approach in the field of media and communication (see for example: Bryant and Miron 2004;
Schweinsberg, Darcy and Cheng 2017). The concept of framing has been referred to as second -level agenda
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setting (see for example: Jasperson et al. 1998; McCombs 1994; McCombs and Bell 1996; Shaw, Weaver
& McCombs 1997). At this level, as Lee and Maslog (2005) argue, framing illustrates how the media tell
us how to think about something. Framing activates specific thoughts and ideas among news audiences (see
for example: Iyengar 1991; McLeod and Detenber 1999; Price, Tewksbury and Powers 1997; Sotirovic
2000), and peace journalism depends on framing to pass on ideas fundamental to its practice, such as peace,
conflict de-escalation, non-violence, humanity, and justice and solutions.

Several studies have incorporated framing theory into their analysis of war reporting, identified dominant
frames and proposed emerging frames. Most of these studies are informed by Galtung’s (1986, 1998) Peace
and War Journalism Model, in which he views peace and war as two competing frames in the coverage o f
a conflict. For instance, Gamson (1992) identified four frames used in the framing of the Arab Israeli
conflict: strategic interests, feuding neighbours, Arab intransigence, and Israeli expansionism. Wolfsfeld
(1997a) found drama frames in media’s coverage of the Middle East conflict, and concluded that these
frames accorded the extremists from both sides more than their due share of airtime, while drowning out
voices calling for peace. In a study of state and military censorship during conflict coverage , Carruthers
(2011) suggested that mass media become willing accomplices in wartime propaganda and may even play
a role in instigating the conflict. Pfau et al. (2004) found that the coverage of the 2003 war on Iraq was
framed more favourably towards the US military. Richardson (2005) also used framing theory in his study
exploring the influence newspaper editorial framing can have on a reader. He concluded that the way
editorials are framed can activate distinct social identities and perceptions among read ers, in a politically
meaningful way, “priming their applicability to the task at hand” (p. 503). Additionally, Fong (2009) also
used the approach for content analysis of news items from Sin Chew Daily – a highly circulated Chinese
newspaper in Malaysia – to investigate the coverage of the keris wielding incident of 20075 , seen as a racial
controversy of the time by media and the government. She found that the newspaper had framed the incident
in a way that the wielding incident was not given much publicity and thus might not be viewed as important
by readers.

Aslam (2010) argues along the same lines and notes that the way journalists cover and frame stories can
have a considerable impact on how a conflict plays out. If, through conflict -escalatory journalism, media
frames can serve the interests of warmongers, disseminate disinformation and manipulate public sentiment
(Aslam 2010), then through peace journalism, media frames can bridge differences, promote peace and
harmony, and reflect diversity. The frame(s) journalists choose to adopt in their stories and the way these
frames are presented to the reader with a specific lexical selection can define problems, diagnose causes,
make moral judgments, and suggest remedies (Entman 1993). Along the same lines, Fong (2009) maintains
that a peace journalist concentrates on peace initiatives by taking the advocacy interpretive approach, which
means toning down ethnic and religious differences; suggesting conflict resolution and reconstruction;
preventing further conflict; and creating empathy and understanding. When applied together, peace

5

The keris is a M alay/Indonesian dagger and symbolises M alay tradition. Wielding the keris, which includes
unsheathing and kissing it, is a means to motivate M alays and was introduced by the United M alays National
Organisation Youth general assembly in 2005. In 2007, Education M inister Datuk Seri Hishammuddin Hussein
wielded the keris at the start of the assembly, and faced backlash from members for promoting violence.
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journalism focuses on accuracy and fairness in the way stories are framed, drawing insights into conflict
analysis, while framing theory critically and theoretically supports any critical analysis of media discourse.

Understandably, discourse shapes social perceptions. The complexity of discourse requires an in -depth
process of analysis to deduce meaning and effect. Unlike a quantitative content analysis that reflects the
apparent meanings in communicative texts (see for example: Berelson 1952; Deacon 2007), CDA works
on an interpretative level and helps researchers deduce meanings, tones, indications and constructed social
realties (Brown et al. 1983; Van Dijk 1997a, 1997b; Cameron 2001). My research incorporates the CDA
approach, varyingly used by van Dijk and Fairclough, because it is more than an investigation of semiotic
data. It is an interpretative study of context in language use, the framing of messages and ideas, and the
construction of social realities and representations. As a methodological process, CDA plays an important
role in the “relationship between the text and its social conditions, ideologies and power-relations” (Titscher
et al. 2000, p. 146).

2.5 Critical Discourse Analysis
Critical Discourse Analysis is a more refined form of content analysis. It helps researchers understand text
linguistically and analytically. As Wood and Kroger (2000) suggest, it is an inductive process that “involves
moving from the concrete to the abstract” (p. 34). This means that in addition to the “what” of content
analysis, it answers the “why” and “how”, thus unpacking the wider context. CDA emerged as one of the
dominant methodologies in the study of text in the 1990s, after a c ollective effort and individual
contributions by scholars Teun van Dijk, Norman Fairclough, Gunther Kress, Theo Leeuwen and Ruth
Wodak. These scholars argue that CDA becomes relevant for the analysis of the social dimension of
discourse, “namely socially s ituated interactions, and more global, societal structures,” (Van Dijk 1999, p.
460). Van Dijk (1988, p. 25) presents two dimensions to CDA – a textual one and a contextual one. He
explains that:

Textual dimensions account for the structures of discourse at various levels of description.
Contextual dimensions relate these structural descriptions to various properties of the context, such
as cognitive processes and representations or sociocultural factors.

Applying CDA to media coverage of Afghan refugees not only facilitated my identifying the structure,
combination and sequence of frames in the text, it also helped me identify the components of frames. It
allowed me to unpack the underlying conceptions or propositions that informed each text, and how mu ltiple
frames in a story were interconnected.

To study media discourse, or any other data corpus, from a CDA perspective it is important to keep the
concepts of rhetoric, language and context in mind. These develop a link between the explained and the
understood/interpreted. Wodak (2006) argues that without context, a study of language would fail to
develop insight into a social process. I would argue that any analytical study that includes an interpretive
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approach, such as CDA, has its roots in the interlinking concepts of explanation and understanding  what
is being explained and what is being understood/interpreted.

This contemplative theoretical attitude towards the connection between explanation and understanding has
had been a normative one from antiquity to the current times. Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology is
probably one of the most influential philosophical works of the century that reiterates the difference
between this theoretical attitude (the explaining) and a “relative-natural Weltanschauung”, which literally
means “worldview” or understanding. Though Husserl’s work on phenomenology is ground -breaking and
exceptionally respected, my methodology is primarily based on van Dijk’s approach to CDA. I also take
notes from Fairclough’s and Wodak’s works on CDA. Their approach is essentially based on “critical dialectical concept” (Weiss and Wodak 2003, p. 2), which is the ability to critically interpret the same idea
or discourse from different points of view and perspectives by two or more than t wo people. The term
“critical thinking” has itself been interpreted in different ways. As a dialectic it is in particular a Hegelian Marxist approach, which involves perceiving things as developing and changing. Pavlidis (2010) writes
that it was the critical-dialectic approach that Karl Marx applied in his study of capitalist society, “which
allowed him to discover real - concrete social contradictions, and to use them and the prospect of their
resolution as the foundations of his communist social ideal” (Pavlidis 2010, p. 85). Fairclough and Wodak
(1997, p. 258) refer to this as dialectics , and argue that CDA treats language as a social practice, where
context has special and crucial value. They write:

Describing discourse as a social practice implies a dialectical relationship between a particular
discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s), which frame it. The
discursive event is shaped by them, but it also shapes them. That is, discourse is socially
constitutive as well as socially conditioned – it constitutes situations, objects of knowledge and
the social identities of relationships between people and groups of people. It is constitutive both
in the sense that it helps to sustain and reproduce the social status quo, a nd in the sense that it
contributes to transforming it. Since discourse is so socially consequential, it gives rise to
important issues of power. Discursive practices may have major ideological effects – that is, they
can help produce and reproduce unequal power relations between (for instance) social classes,
women and men, and ethnic/cultural majorities and minorities through the ways in which they
represent things and position people.

This applies particularly to the context of my research study, where reporting (the discursive event) is highly
influenced and framed by situations (such as in war, conflict or peace), institutions (such as media
organisations, government, establishment authorities, political power structures) and social structures (such
as religion and beliefs, social values and ethics, ethnicity, language, traditions and family structures). The
discourse that is produced and reproduced consequently has what Fairlcough and Wodak refer to as “major
ideological effects”. To understand the cause and development of these ideological effects that produce
power relations, it is necessary to study and analyse the discourses that represent those affected and involved
in the conflict. For instance, in my case study, the way media coverage aids, affects or influences Pakistan’s
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 and its public’s  developing social apprehensions regarding Afghan refugees is reflective of the power
relations between the refugees, the Pakistani citizens and the government.
There are various strategies of text interpretation and analysis. One of them is “playing with text” (Wood
and Kroger 2000). This includes replacing some words in the story or changing the sequence of some words
to see if this changes the meaning. For example, if “a compliment comes after rather than before a request”
(p. 93). As media stories are influenced by the journalist’s contextual understanding, socio -cultural and
political knowledge, and other associations, similarly CDA is relative to the researcher’s background,
understanding, and stance. Therefore, no one text can be analysed or interpreted identically by two
researchers. Wood and Kroger (2000) explain this phenomenon as drawing on one’s knowledge. The first
step, they state, is the process of generating patterns, interpretatio ns, and so forth. However, the critical
feature of CDA is how analysts justify their identification of patterns and how they ground their
interpretations.

Since the start of the twenty-first century, media practices and content have become increasingly d iverse
and prolific, transcending their conventional primary function of disseminating news and information. The
ecology of world media has been revolutionised, creating a diverse and complex mediasphere (Hartley
1996; Hartley and McKee 2000). Where once it was relatively easy to differentiate news, politics,
entertainment and marketing, content has now undergone a “discursive integration” (Baym 2005), meaning
“discourses of news, politics, entertainment, and marketing have grown deeply inseparable; the lan guages
and practices of each have lost their distinctiveness and are being melded into previously unimagined
combinations” (p. 262). News categories and functions have thus become more complex and harder to
isolate, and readers may now need more clarification of what a reporter is talking about (Reese and Lee
2012). Similarly, studying content is not as simple as it was in the pre-digital era. Since CDA can take
various forms to explore the meaning and interpretation of media content, it can create a “symbo lic
environment, with its own internal coherence as a system of representation” (Reese and Lee 2012, p. 20).

2.6 Theory meets method: developing the analytical criteria
Entman’s framing theory informed the CDA in this thesis. As noted above, I used the manual holistic
approach to framing analysis to develop an analytical criteria  a set of questions  for each of the four
orientations in Galtung’s model of Peace and War Journalism. Through the analytical criteria, I identified
the dominant frame in each media text and categorised it as either peace-oriented or war-oriented according
to Galtung’s model. However, as discussed earlier, because of the duality in the model (either peace or war
journalism), I ran the risk of wrongly categorising a large number of texts that contained either both or
neither of the orientations, or an alternative, emerging frame.
To avoid this problem I grouped the frames on the basis of frame elements  a process widely followed in
cluster analysis. A cluster analysis of these elements revealed the frame (Kohring and Matthes 2002). The
aim of this “clustering” was to group articles and news stories on the basis of the orientation patterns they
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carry. There will always be a huge difference between two clusters, but very low differences within a cluster
(Matthes and Kohring 2008). These clusters, interpreted as media frames, became my master-frames  that
is, frames with a wider cultural resonance than issue-specific frames  and I call them peace frames and
non-peace frames, based on Martin Luther King Jr.’s concept of positive and negative peace. Master frames
are “flexible and inclusive collective action frames” (Stevens, Aarts and Dewulf 2019).

The idea behind master frames finds its roots in research into social movements. Snow and Benford (1992)
define master frames as a function of linguistic codes that “punctuates and syntactically connects patterns
or happenings in the world” (p. 138). A news story can have more than one frame embedded in it. These
distinct dominant themes, or issue-specific frames, can be traced to a generic, collective frame called a
master frame (also referred to as parent frame in some framing studies). Issue-specific dominant frames are
an accenting device within the master frames. The master frames serve the same purpose [as any frames]
but at a macro level and comprise the dominant, issue-specific frames. I developed several dominant and
emerging frames from these master frames (discussed in chapters 3, 4 and 5).

I established the two clusters because the absence of war is not peace, and vice -versa. A text that is not
highlighting peace was not necessarily propagating war. Similarly, any media text that could not be
categorised as war journalism or having war or conflict-escalatory orientation in coverage could not be was
grouped as peace journalism. Clustering texts under master frames provided flexibility to the process of
identifying dominant frames  something not provided by Galtung’s model. Many scholars have previously
used master frames in their study of media discourse, especially those focused on contemporary global
issues, such as war and conflict or environment journalism (see for example: Conrad and Oleart 2017;
Coticchia and Catanzaro 2020; Polina et al. 2020).

I began the clustering of texts under the master frames by developing a matrix for the initial selection or
rejection of news stories and articles. All the articles and news stories were published between 1 January
2016 and 31 December 2018. I chose 2016 because it was the year the Pakistani government announced
the first official deadline for repatriation. I extended the analysis over three years to reduce margins of error
in interpreting media discourse and to analyse what I would call the “bigger and wider picture” for greater
accuracy in findings. The four publications that I study in my thesis are available both in print and online.
To avoid risk of human error in accessing all relevant news stories and article in the four publications, I
accessed the content through the Factiva online database using the keywords “Afghan*” and “Afghan
refugees*”. After trying multiple other keywords, such as Af-Pak, Pak-Afghan, and repatriation, I noted
that some of the stories were not relevant to my topic. Using “Afghan*” and “Afghan refugees*” as
keywords provided access to all the stories and articles that had been published that year and that were
directly covering the Afghan refugee conflict. A total of 1,489 news stories (626 in 2016, 419 in 2017 and
444 in 2018), and 61 magazine articles (35 in 2016, 15 in 2017 and 11 in 2018) met the search criteria (See
Appendix 1 shows a sample of the media corpus inventory). I have interchangeably used the words ‘the
journalist’, ‘the story/article’ and/or ‘the publication’ when referring to the texts in the analysis, since it
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varies who makes the ultimate decision on the news copy – either individual journalists, or their editors, or
in case of highly sensitive reports, their bosses/media owner.

These news stories and articles became the final media corpus for my thesis. After the initial selection was
complete and I had a complete list of all media text, I started the process of identifying the dominant frame
in each text by passing it through the analytical criteria. The analytical criteria were a set of
questions/elements under each of the four peace orientations in Galtung’s model  peace, truth, people and
solution  also referred to as dominant frames. For each element present, I marked the text as Y (yes). If
the element was missing, the text was marked as N (no) (See: Appendix 2). The more the Ys a text
contained, the clearer the dominant frame was and the more peace-oriented it was identified as, since it
meant and thus clustered as a peace frame. On the other hand, more Ns qualified the text as a non-peace
frame. In other words, the dominant frames were measured based on the presence and absence of a certain
criterion. Where an additional frame was identified that did not fall under any of the four major orientations,
the text was marked as A (alternative frame). These alternative frames have been proposed as emerging
frames and discussed in the Discussion chapter (chapter 5). The number of Ys and Ns also determined the
extent of peace and non-peace framing in the text.

The elements/questions (See: Appendix 1) of the analytical criteria were developed individually for each
of the four contrasting orientations/dominant frames, according to Galtung’s (1986, 1998) classification of
Peace and War Journalism: peace/war (PCOC), truth/propaganda (TPOC), people/elites (PEOC) and
solutions/victory (SVOC) (See Table 1.1 in Chapter 1).

The peace-oriented frame investigates the reasons for and formation of the conflict. The history,
background and causes of the conflict are central to this frame and play an important role in the audience’s
understanding of the issue, and the construction of meanings and new realities. This frame makes conflicts
transparent and ensures all sides of the stories are included in the coverage to allow readers to make
informed decision about the conflict. It is preventative and focuses on the invisible effects of violence that
can be long-term; for instance trauma, and emotional, social and cultural damage.

The truth-oriented frame focuses on truth and accuracy. Central to this frame is a focu s on exposing the
truth from all sides so that no information is left hidden, covered up or tampered with. It also attempts to
disclose any present political or bureaucratic cover-ups that may influence truthful reporting and coverage
of a conflict and its impact.

The people-oriented frame focuses on the humanisation of the oppressed and marginalised classes/groups.
It not only tells the stories of those affected by the conflict, but also of those who are working to make
peace and help those suffering in the conflict. This frame gives voice to the voiceless and those who are
seldom or rarely heard in the media. The people-oriented frame presents to the readers the stories of those
who lack representations, and focuses on women, children, senior citizens an d people with disabilities or
those needing care in any form, irrespective of their religious beliefs and state or cultural belonging. It also
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names the wrongdoers and those fuelling a conflict. It challenges the status -quo and elitist supremacy, and
focuses on the “common people”.

The solutions-oriented frame, as the name suggests, focuses on non -violent solutions to a conflict. It
suggests resolution and also strategies to stop a conflict from further escalating. It focuses on freedom and
non-violence, and building a society for peace. It not only suggests initiatives for freedom, but also postwar and post-conflict rehabilitation, reconstruction and reconciliation. Over the last decade, scholars of
media framing and peace journalism have used these frame orientations and applied a combination of
framing theory and the Peace and War Journalism Model to distinguish various forms of peace journalis m
and war journalism frames (see for example: Lee et al. 2006; Lee and Maslog 2005; Lynch 2008; Siraj and
Hussain 2012; Hussain and Munawar 2017).

The central question here is what informs these frames? Frames in a news story can be effectively
determined with the help of an evaluative or analytical criteria, based on questions or frame elements. The
answers to the questions in the analytical criteria will inform the frame(s), which in turn will inform the
CDA process. An analytical criteria can be applied collectively or individually to the media corpus. This
means either a common analytical criterion for all frames (such as a simple presence or absence evaluation
of the frame), or a separate analytical criterion for each frame (such as developing questions that are
idiosyncratic to the elements of each frame). I used the latter approach as this guaranteed a more thorough
and in-depth analysis of the text, and more accurate findings. The analytical criteria approach was first
operationalised by Lynch (2006), who applied the Peace Journalism Manual (Lynch and McGoldrick 2000)
to guide his research. He developed a five-point coding analytical criteria for a CDA of 211 media reports
on the Iran nuclear crisis from 12 publications in the UK press. He developed the criteria in the form of
questions, based on the elements of each frame. These questions were exclusive to t he Iran nuclear crisis.
Lynch refers to this method of incorporating the framing theory and CDA as the “coding analytical criteria”
or frame analysis method. Each question in the criteria is answered after analysing the text. In this particular
study, he sets out five questions:

1) Has the journalist given a relevant, accurate and complete background of the conflict?
2) Has the journalist presented a fact as “a thing known” and not as a “claim” or an opinion?
3) Has the conflict been represented as open in time and space and both sides of the story given?
4) Has the element of bias been nullified by giving an accurate picture of all developing news during the
conflict, especially news that may help the audience make an informed decision about both or a ll parties in
conflict?
5) Do the text frames present one side as the hero and other as the enemy, the villain or the bad side?
Taking guidance from Lynch’s (2006) approach, I developed a multiple-point coding analytical criteria
separately for each dominant frame/orientation. The analytical criteria offered a significant step towards
understanding the context in which the news story and article had been framed. The questions for each
frame are guided equally by Galtung’s classic Peace and War Journalism Model, and the major research
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question of my thesis: What is the Pakistani media’s orientation in the coverage of the Afghan refugee
repatriation conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan? In addition to the main question for this thesis, the
following supporting research questions also informed the analysis and the findings:

1.

How is this conflict, and any substitute issues arising from the conflict, represented and reported?

2.

How are the affected people represented/referred to in the text? Are the people suffering in the
conflict humanised (through storytelling)?

3.

Is the text suggesting peaceful and non-violent solutions to the conflict between the parties, the
contrary or nothing at all?

4.

Is the focus of media coverage on justice (peace journalism) or on provoking insecurities and hate
among the host society for the refugees, further fuelling the conflict (war and conflict journalism)?

The analytical criteria comprised 12 questions altogether for the four frames/classifications in Galtung’s
Peace and War Journalism Model. Due to overlapping elements in some frames, I initially struggled with
generating questions that were distinct and would represent each frame individually. However, after
consulting studies that had applied this method (Abdul-Nabi 2017; Galava 2018; Hackett 2017; Lynch
2014) for frame analysis, I developed a thorough analytical criteria that ensured that all parts of the model
and the Afghan refugee conflict were covered.

The first frame is the peace-orientation frame (PCOC) and has four points/questions for evaluation.
According to Galtung, and later in the extension and development of his work by Jake Lynch, one of the
fundamental elements of peace-oriented coverage is reporting not only the “now” but also the “past” of the
event: the circumstances leading to the conflict and/or leading to the escalation of the conflict. The peace orientation frame reports the history/culture that made the conflict, and its root cause(s)  it also gives
context. To understand the ongoing conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan, readers require information
on the history of the relationship and factors that have affected bilateral relationships. Significantly, readers
need to be aware of the role of the Pakistani government, its army and the intelligence in the ouster of the
Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1979, and Pakistani support for the American and Afghan governments
in the training and growth of the Islamic jihadists (freedom fighters), who later became the Taliban. Thus,
the first analytical criterion in measuring the extent of the Peace/Conflict frame is:
1-

Does the story/article give background information on the AfPak conflict, their historical and
current political relationship, and also (briefly) the reasons behind the Afghan refugee crisis in
Pakistan?

Beyond this background, another important element of peace journalism is that there is equal representation
of all sides. This means that all parties in the conflict are given a voice. This becomes even more significant
in war and conflict coverage where an imbalance can not only lead to social injustices and propaganda, but
also strip a weaker party of their right to be represented and heard. For instance, a study of the coverage by
the BBC and ITV of the different periods of the Second Intifada revealed that Israeli views and perspectives
dominated the coverage of the event on British TV news (Philo and Berry 2004), fuelling the conflict by
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reinforcing hate and shaping viewer perceptions against the Palestinians. Conversely, Al Jazeera was
proactive in keeping balance in its coverage of the Afghan war. Miles (2010) writes that when the US
administration asked Sheikh Hamad, the Emir of Qatar, to “tone down Al-Jazeera reporting” during the war
in Afghanistan, he said that Qatar did not intervene in the channel, and that the network had given both US
and Afghan officials equal airtime since the attacks. The Qatari Emir said:

We are balanced and objective and never interfere in the news. We give all opposing
views. Bin Laden is a party to the conflict, and his opinions must be heard (Miles 2010).

A balanced coverage can generate empathy for the marginalised, only possible if the people in need of
empathy are heard. Galtung’s Peace and War Model also emphasises how central empathy and
understanding are to peace journalism. Thus, the second analytical criterion in measuring the extent of
implementing the Peace/Conflict frame was :
2-

Does the story/article give voice to both the Pakistani and Afghan people/refugees and authorities,
providing a more balanced coverage?

Proactive reporting in terms of avoiding a situation that could fuel the conflict is crucial to peace journalis m
and is also emphasised in Galtung’s model (under the peace-orientation classification). It is important to
ensure that further conflict is not triggered and that non -violent and peaceful solutions to conflicts are
suggested in media coverage. In his ‘10 Commandments of Peace Journalism’, Tehranian (2002) argues
that it is possible for media representation of conflict to become part of the solution if “they employ the
creative tensions in any human conflict to seek common ground and nonviolent solutions” (p. 80). Thus,
the third analytical criterion in assessing the Peace/Conflict frame was:
3-

Is the news report/article suggesting peaceful and non-violent solutions to the conflict between the
two countries over repatriation of Afghan refugees (plausible regional peace and harmony between
the governments and the people of the two countries), the contrary, or nothing at all?

War, conflict and other violence has both visible and invisible effects on the society involved. While media
are quick to report the visible effects, the invisible effects of violence, such as trauma, and damage to social
structure or culture are often ignored in coverage. The fourth and final criterion for this frame was hence
based on the invisible effects of the refugee conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Living as a refugee
in a developing country with multiple internal conflicts and economic crisis poses multiple layers of danger
and threat, lack of government support, and social and physical vulnerability. The fourth criterion was
developed to examine the function of invisibility and the coordinated avoidance by media of giving
attention and representation to vulnerable groups. Through this, I noted suggestions for the facilitation and
rehabilitation of the Afghan refugees in the host country.
4-

How are the issues of Afghan refugees in Pakistan  vis-à-vis arrival, challenges, settlement and
repatriation  framed in the text? Does it urge for their facilitation and rehabilitation, or instead
stress their forced and quick repatriation on s et deadlines?
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The second frame/classification in Galtung’s model is truth -orientation. I developed a three-point criteria
for this frame based on the elements of “facts and figures”, “propaganda busting” and “human rights
violation”. The way media frame an event during a conflict can significantly affect the capacity of a social
movement to mobilise the people (Fadaee 2020). During conflicts, information can change in terms of facts
and intensity during communication transfer, causing misinformation or pro paganda. The concept of
propaganda cannot be easily defined, but for some time, most scholars agree on the point that propaganda
is not necessarily true or false (see for example: Becker 1949; Bernays 1972; Cunningham 1992, 2002).
After all, there is a tendency for truth to also be used for unethical ends (Cunningham 1992) and for true
information to be propagandised. Media have the potential to manipulate reality that “extends beyond the
content itself into perceptions of resonance and the provenance of th e propaganda” (Milton 2020, p. 2).

It is vital to ensure that readers are presented with a true, unexaggerated picture of reality, and that
propaganda and any information fabrication are dispelled. Truth is one of the basic elements of peace
journalism. It is the readers’ right to receive accurate information that enables them to decode propaganda
and distinguish between “facts and claims” (Lynch and McGoldrick 2005, 2013, 2016; Lynch 2013, 2014).
In order to examine whether media and authorities (using media) were reporting only part of the
information, distorting facts, and/or manipulating realty for propaganda, it was important to evaluate the
element of truth in the framing. Hence the first and second analytical criteria for the truth -orientated frame
were:
1-

Does the news report/article demonstrate evidence about any of the sides in the conflict with facts
and figures, where needed?

2-

Does the news report/article generate or dispel propaganda around Afghan refugees or the Afghan
government?

In addition to distorted or exaggerated reporting, propaganda also amplifies uncertainty, which is already
prevalent in a war and conflict situation. Propaganda also generates ambiguity about the role of the elite,
and the future of peace and resolution process. This idea is referred to as “fog and friction” and is reflected
in media coverage of sensitive and controversial issues such as refugees and repatriation. The legendary
war correspondent Marie Colvin, who lost an eye during the Sri Lankan war, says it ’s like “trying to find
the truth in a sandstorm of propaganda” (Colvin 2010). In her Remembrance Day keynote speech, she said,
“Mutilated bodies. Women weeping for children and husbands. Men for their wives, mothers, children …
Our mission is to report these horrors of war with accuracy and without prejudice” (Colvin 2010).
Downman and Ubayasiri (2017) state that the “fog and friction” of war is not confined to the battlefield
only, but also often permeates into a wide range of humanitarian crises, inclu ding refugee migration out of
war zones. Therefore, the third analytical criteria for the truth-orientated frame was based on the reporting
of human rights violations in the conflict. For instance, in February 2017, the serving Interior Minister of
Pakistan announced in a press conference that it had been “established that Afghan refugees had been used
as facilitators” in recent terrorist attacks in two big cities of Pakistan. His statement was not well received
by the Afghan government and Afghan refugees in Pakistan. It also raised doubts about refugees in
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Pakistan, where the public and media raised questions on the government’s plan to continue hosting them
rather than forcing them back to Afghanistan. Such information, even if factual or an unverified claim, can
raise the likelihood of human rights violations in the handling and treatment of vulnerable groups. Hence,
the third analytical criteria for the truth-orientated frame was:
3-

Does the news report/article mention any human rights violations committe d by the Pakistani
authorities or by the border forces against Afghan refugees in Pakistan or those crossing the
border?

This leads to the third classification, people-oriented coverage, which assesses media focus on the
vulnerable in the conflict. It requires journalists to tell people’s stories, humanising them as subjects, and
bring them to the reader’s attention. It highlights their emotions and situations, their unions and separations,
and their gains and losses. It also tells happy stories, where th ey are represented as people with families and
loved ones, and can share stories of their achievements and dreams. They must not be framed as objects of
political conflicts.
Humanising refugees can be seen as the opposite of “othering” – a postcolonial concept based on Edward
Said’s Orientalism (1979). Said describes “othering” as a western practice where certain people and groups
of people, mostly non-western, are marginalised, made into stereotypes and stripped of agency by the west.
One of the ways journalism can bring the social existence of marginalised groups into the limelight is by
humanising them. This can be done by putting names to their faces and telling their stories. Considerable
recent research has focused on the humanitarian discourse and th e discourses of suffering within the
political domain (see for example: Gale 2004; Spencer 2015; Waters 2015). Likewise, my research also
focuses on humanitarian discourse by analysing media discourse and treating it as a social/structural
institution of ideological formation. Ruiz and Emery (2001) write that Afghan refugees have experienced
harassment and violence in Pakistan primarily at the hands of the authorities, further marginalising them.
People-oriented coverage in peace journalism does not marginalise the voices of vulnerable groups (AbdulNabi 2017). Rather it ensures that media coverage includes some aspect of people -oriented reporting, such
as a focus on their suffering and challenges. Hence, the first analytical criterion for people -orientated frame
was:
1-

Does the news report/article report the marginalisation of the Afghan refugee groups: their
sufferings, challenges and the atrocities they face?

A people-oriented frame will highlight the suffering of people of all ages and focus on the ills d irected
towards them. It will also mention any peacemakers working towards peacebuilding and the rehabilitation,
facilitation and support of these vulnerable, marginalised groups of ordinary people. Fekete (2010) looks at
dehumanisation from a race-related angle. He argues that dehumanisation reinforces xeno-racist discourses
that are likely to justify their prosecution, just as black people were enslaved and dehumanised under
colonialism. Such a journalism of dehumanisation creates an environment that esca lates conflicts and
causes apathy. Fekete (2010) argues that negative portrayal of refugees and asylum seekers gives rise to
xeno-racist sentiments and anti-refugee discourse. If we believe that the opposite of this may have the
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opposite effect in the long term, then there is a strong case for humanising the coverage of refugees and
conflict. My second analytical criterion for the people-orientated frame stemmed from Fekete’s argument,
and was:
2-

Does the news report/article mention any racist/ethnocentric s tatements/comments about the
Afghan refugees in Pakistan?

Under Galtung’s model, humanisation is another important element of the people -oriented criteria. It stems
from empathy and offers a promising route towards justice delivery. Humanisation of refu gees does not
only mean telling their stories (such as under the “suffering and challenges” criteria in the people -oriented
frame). It extends further, to personalising and individualising their stories and calling for justice. It looks
at how the story/article has built or developed a connection between the reader and the subject. For instance,
according to the Constitution of Pakistan, a 1951 law gives children born to refugees in Pakistan the right
to citizenship – a law that is largely unknown to the public and almost never raised in the media discourse.
Speaking from my personal experience as a journalist in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, I was unaware of
this law until I reviewed academic literature and Pakistani refugee law documents for this research . Thus it
became even more important for me to note if the news stories or articles mentioned this law, especially if
discussing the granting of citizenship to the Pakistani-born children of Afghan refugees. The third analytical
criterion in measuring the extent of implementing a people-oriented frame was:
3-

How are Afghan refugees referred to/represented in the text? Could the way they are framed trigger
empathy/sympathy and thoughtfulness among the readers for the people suffering in the conflict?

The fourth dominant frame stems from Galtung’s fourth and final classification: a solution -orientated
frame. Incorporating this frame in coverage means that the journalist does not stop reporting the related
events in the post-conflict phase. Rather, with follow-up reporting, the media must highlight resolution and
solutions in the hope of contributing to a peaceful future. This is particularly important in long conflicts
and those which have remerged over time, such as the Afghan refugee conflict between Pakistan and
Afghanistan. This conflict has two major underlying causes that serve as fuel. First is the political
competition on both sides, where one country is trying to win against the other and emerge as the stronger
country in the region and closer to the US. Second is the economic marginalisation that Pakistan faces in
terms of trade with India, who is now favouring Afghanistan over Pakistan for import and export. Pakistan,
in return, keeps Afghan refugees economically deprived, stating the country’s poor ec onomy as one of the
reasons.

Demarest and Langer (2018) argue that when conflicts have factors such as these as their underlying root
causes, it can create or fuel a further divide on the basis of ethnic and/or religious identities. When
politicians and the media don’t educate people on the differences in ethnicity and religion, but rather
represent them as the cause of the conflict, this has serious implications for people’s perceptions of the
possibility and feasibility of peaceful conflict resolution and coexistence. In ethnically diverse societies,
such as Pakistan, media may contribute to exacerbating inter-group tensions and violent conflict, as well as
promote national unity and stability. For example, in Nigeria, newspapers helped to shape public o pinion
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towards independence in 1960, and played a powerful role in criticizing authoritarianism and corruption
under previous civilian as well as military regimes (Adebanwi 2002; Ekwelie 1979, 1986). Though Nigerian
media often demonstrate themselves to be strong supporters of democracy and accountability, they have
also played a more dubious role in the country by reinforcing ethnic and religious divisions (Demarest and
Langer 2018), further escalating crises. The solution-oriented frame avoids reinforcement of conflictescalatory ideas or divisions. Since it is focused on finding a solution and on post -conflict developments, it
“dedicates particular attention to peace initiatives and reports on post -war developments” (Hanitzsch 2004,
p. 487). Keeping this knowledge at the forefront and applying it to my case study, my first analytical
criterion for the solution-orientated frame was:
1-

Does the news report/article mention any attempts/successes at peacemaking and reconciliation
between the two countries?

This criterion also stemmed from the important role of media as a watchdog of society and politics, and has
the power to make suggestions for solutions, peacemaking and non -violent responses to war and conflict.
Wolfsfeld (1997) claims that media played a significant role in changing Israeli people’s perception of the
1993 peace negotiations between Israel and Palestine. Israel had recognised the Palestine Liberation
Organisation (PLO) and had agreed to withdraw from Gaza and Jericho. Many Israelis were opp osed to
giving back sections of the West Bank, which they considered integral parts of the Land of Israel. The peace
deal was very important for Israel as the PLO had agreed to halt all terrorist activities against Israel. The
Rabin government did not want opposition from the people and thus capitalised on news media, using it as
a crucial tool for mobilising Israeli public opinion in favour of the peace process (Wolfsfeld 1997).

Unfortunately, what the government did not realise was that the press had often served as a significant
obstacle to the promotion of peace within Israel, because of the contradiction between the logic of a peace
process and the professional routines of journalists (Wolfsfeld 1997, p. 53). The media environment is as
crucial for de-escalating a conflict as is the political environment; most of the time they are inter-dependent.
Wolfsfeld (2004) argues that the media environment could change their reporting style from victory oriented to solution-oriented if the political environment also demands peace. Several studies have shown
how political elites have influenced the media (see for example: Mandelzis 2007; Herman and Chomsky
1988; Wolfsfeld, Khouri and Peri 2002; Gans 2004; Shoemaker and Reese 1996; Wolfsfeld 1997; Lynch
2003). I discuss the politicisation of media and the role of Pakistani state and military establishment in
detail later in this thesis. Keeping this in mind, I generated my second analytical criterion for the solution orientated frame around the aspect of government’s influence on people, and its interest in shaping or
controlling a media narrative. I wanted to explore the extent of the politicisation of local media in the
PakistanAfghanistan conflict, and whether media were playing a part in suggesting peacemaking both to
the people and to government. Since the conflict is ongoing, the coverage could not be treated as postconflict, and thus the focus of this criterion was on identifying any suggestions for ending the conflict
through peace:
2-

Does the news report/article suggest resolution and reconstruction strategies, independent of the
State and military, for a peaceful end to the refugee conflict?
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I found that selecting one criterion and measuring the difference in its frequency during the three years
under study was more practical than measuring the whole frame. Every frame was measured through its
own analytical criteria. An analytical criterion could be mentioned once or multiple times in one news
story/article. The most mentioned analytical criterion in each frame was selected to represent that frame.
For instance, assuming that “violations committed by the Pakistani border force” was the most mentioned
criterion among the analytical criteria of the truth-orientated frame, then this criterion represented the Truth
frame itself. The frame with the most criteria mentions became the dominant frame for that text, and later
categorised as one of the master frames.

2.7 Conclusion
As noted, the components of my analytical criteria were derived from 1) Galtung’s peace journalis m
orientations: peace, truth, people and solution, and 2) the socio -political context of the conflict. Unlike the
conventional coverage of what, where, when, who, why and how, referred to as “the 5Ws and 1H” in
journalism practice, peace journalism depends on the insights of conflict analysis and transformation. For
peace journalism, the “conflict dynamics” – the context, background, history and perspectives of all
involved parties, their interests, goals and relationships – are significant. (Lynch 2007). For instance, while
reporting a bomb blast or a suicide bombing, a peace journalism news story would not focus specifically
on the death and destruction caused by the incident. It would not blame parties without investigation or
even mention names that may have nothing to do with the event. It would instead, “probe why the bombers
did it, what was the process leading up to it, what were their grievances and motivations” (Lynch 2008).

There are multiple factors that contributed to developing this specific methodology for my thesis. In
addition to an impressive body of theoretical justifications and empirical studies on media representations
that emerged in the last decade and demonstrated the success of this method in the CDA of conflict
coverage, some factors exclusive to war and conflict coverage also became the foundation of my research.
These include the complexities of framing war and conflict that Entman mentions in his works, multiple
causal interpretations (Entman 1993; Galtung 1986, 1998), personal agendas through the promotion and
imposition of specific solutions by journalists (Kempf 2016), the specifications of story type/genre (Lee
and Maslog 2005), and the governmental influence and politicisation of journalists in conflicts (Lynch
2003a, 2003b). Considering all these factors, a qualitative, critical analysis of media discourse was best
suited to my case study.
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Chapter 3
Critical Discourse Analysis (I): Unpacking frames in the coverage of
Dawn and ET
3.1 Introduction
In September 2018, Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan announced that he would grant citizenship to
Afghan refugees and their children who were born and raised in Pakistan. According to the UN statistics,
this meant that around 1.5 million Afghan refugees, stranded stateless in a host country for over 40 years,
were going to get Pakistani citizenship. The Guardian’s Islamabad correspondent, Memphis Barker (2018),
reported that the pledge could have marked a reversal of decades of hostility towards Afghan re fugees in
particular, who were often blamed for producing or shielding terrorists and living on the margins of
Pakistani society. Barker (2018) reports that Imran Khan made the pledge at a public event, saying:

Afghans whose children have been raised and born in Pakistan will be granted citizenship
inshallah (God willing) because this is the established practice in countries around the world. They
are humans. How come we have deprived them and have not arranged for offering them a national
identification card and passport for 30 years, 40 years?

However, within a few days Imran Khan backtracked, dropping his promise to grant Afghan refugees
citizenship, and the debate that never started, ended. In the few days between the announcement and the
reversal, there was an increase in tension-intensifying and conflict-escalatory media reporting. Media
coverage of the announcement and what the decision could mean for Pakistani citizens was charged with
nationalism and antagonism. Media across the country opposed the PM’s proposal and highlighted an
“untrustworthy” and “enemy” image of Afghan refugees. In the Pakistani public discourse, Afghan refugees
are often linked to terrorism, Islamist extremism, narcotics, crime, smuggling and counterfeiting (Gu l
2019). In the few days between the proposal to grant citizenships and the prime minister’s reversal,
Pakistani media reflected the general public sentiments, and reinforced the negative representations
attached to Afghan refugees.

This is just one example. Pakistani media overall is heavily dominated by conflict-escalatory framing in
their coverage of Afghan refugees and their ongoing forced repatriation to Afghanistan. I applied the
analytical criteria, developed from Galtung’s Peace and War Journalism Model, to 1,489 news stories about
Afghan refugees that were published in Dawn and ET during the years 2016, 2017 and 2018. I distilled
three recurrent themes under the dominant classifications in Galtung’s model. I call them frames, too, since
these were recurrent patterns of representation that dominated the coverage. These three patterns appeared
more often than just passing references or as interpretative repertoire, and contributed significantly to more
than a single criterion, thus emerging as three dominant frames in their own right. These frames are: the
terrorist frame (Afghan refugee as the terrorist or facilitating terrorism indirectly), the enemy frame (Afghan
refugee as the enemy of the State and a threat to national security), and the blame frame (Afghanistan as
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the bad neighbour causing a standoff between the two countries over the peace process). All three of these
dominant frames fall under the Galtunic classifications of war and/or peace orientations in media coverage.
They emerge from the socio-political context in coverage and are, therefore, exclusively applicable to the
conflict of the Afghan refugee crisis in Pakistan and the consequent conflict between Pakistan and
Afghanistan.

I found Pakistani media to be highly politicised. Though the government is democratically elected, there is
significant interference and control by the military establishment. After former president General Pervez
Musharraf’s government ended in 2008, the military establishment had been infiltrating into media houses.
The military has been primarily counter-arguing that democracy has given nothing to the country (Farooq
2018). In the context of my case study, the media echo the ideological stance of the Pakistani State and its
military establishment regarding 1) the Taliban, 2) hosting three million Afghan refugees since the ’90s,
and 3) Pakistan’s role as an ally to US in the War on Terror. This politicisation of Pakistani media
contributes to the conflict-escalatory media framing of the refugee conflict. Since media are a sig nificant
arbitrator of what constitutes debate in the public sphere (Borquez 1993) and can influence the flow and
content of public discourse, the varying conflict-escalatory framing affects Pakistani reader sentiment
towards Afghan refugees, and their perception of the refugee crisis, its origins and its implications. A 2012
study of the role of current affairs media in influencing public political opinion and awareness in Pakistan
reveals that 96% of viewers use information from the media to increase their political knowledge, shape
their opinion and generate awareness (Yousuf 2012). Non-peace framing in the media has adverse impacts
on the peace dialogue between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and a (possible) mutual solution to the refugee
crisis.

The forced repatriation of Afghan refugees has been a key irritant between the two neighbouring countries
and a reason for their failure to reach stable relations since the end of the Soviet Afghan War in 1989 and
the start of the Taliban government in the mid-1990s (Akbar 2015; Weinbaum & Harder 2008). For nearly
40 years, the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan have been in an ongoing conflict with each other
over the movement, resettlement, rehabilitation and now (forced) repatriation of nearly three millio n
documented and undocumented Afghan refugees in Pakistan. The two countries have come to a political
standoff over this issue multiple times in the last four decades. Afghanistan has blamed Pakistan for pushing
refugees back into a politically and economically unstable Afghanistan, while Pakistan has accused
Afghanistan for not taking responsibility for its own people despite billions of dollars in international aid.
Pakistan has also accused Afghanistan of failing to control terrorist movement into Pakistan from
Afghanistan. The political misunderstandings and accusations have greatly affected their relationship.

They have also consequently demonstrated a ripple effect on the geo -politics and economic trade in the
South Asian region, especially with India recently becoming a major trade partner with Afghanistan,
pushing Pakistan into the background. Sethi (2020) examines this relationship between Pakistan,
Afghanistan and India through the metaphor of a see-saw, “where an improvement in the relationship with
one of them comes with a trade-off with the other” (p. 1). The 18th-century Prussian military strategist,
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Carl von Clausewitz, observed that “war is nothing more than the continuation of politics by other means”
(Brown 2003). Today, this war is fought through media, and as Hussain and Munawar (2017, p. 38) observe,
this puts media in a central position in a conflict, between conflicting parties. They state:
In today’s world, the media hold a central position in the overall outcome of a conflict given its
power to shape public opinion and steer policy support for humanitarian crises. When faced with
a conflict, either the media take a side with the conflicting parties and contribute to escalation, or
the media stay neutral and independent and contribute to a peaceful resolution of a conflict by not
alleviating possible violence.

In the context of my case study, the conflicting parties are the Pakistani State and the military establishment
on one side, with Afghanistan and Afghan refugees on the other. In Pakistan, media coverage of the conflict
between these parties has been significantly controlled by the military. Though the Pakistani military and
the State have always cited security as the reason for media regulation and control, it is their strategic
interests in Afghanistan and close ties with the Taliban (Hasnat 2009) that lead them to control the media
discourse, and consequently the public narrative.

Media in Pakistan are highly politicised. Over time, politicisation has added a nationalistic angle to media
coverage, especially of Afghan refugees. This has also affected the way news has been framed, with certain
claims presented as facts and certain facts as claims. Changing the nature of information from claims to
facts and vice-versa is a characteristic of conflict-escalatory journalism (Lynch 2014a). This has led to the
creation of problematic and inaccurate discursive practices in media discourse that present and represent
Afghan refugees, and Afghanistan in general, as the “enemy” that cannot be made peace with. Based on the
media framing of Afghan refugees in Dawn and ET, I make four arguments: 1) all Afghan refugees in
Pakistan are incorporated, regardless of their residency status, gender, age or vulnerability, into (media)
discourses of deviancy that stem from and are based on notions of the “other”; 2) these (mis)representations,
stemming from the conflict-escalatory framing in Pakistani media, actively contribute to the production,
reinforcement and reshaping of structural and systemic anti-Afghan sentiments; 3) the problematised
framing of the Afghan refugees and the issues around their arrival, (forced) repatriation and settlement in
Pakistan is legitimising the collective insecurities and uncertainties of the host country and increasing
anxiety around the free movement of Afghan refugees; and 4) media are politicise d and anti-Afghanrefugee nationalistic coverage is frequent, thus escalating the crisis within Pakistan and the conflict over
refugees with Afghanistan.

When the Taliban took over the Afghan government in the 1990s, the Pakistani media regularly and wid ely
covered the PakAfghan political conflict. One of the major reasons for this wide coverage was Pakistan’s
strategic interest in gaining political influence in Afghanistan. In the ’80s, the Pakistani government, headed
by a military dictator at the time, had trained the Taliban for the US to fight the Soviets. When the Taliban
took power, the affected Afghans saw Pakistan as their nearest safe haven, as they knew that Taliban would
never fight their “old friend”. The 1990s saw a huge refugee movement int o Pakistan, making Afghan
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refugees a hot topic in media narratives. However, after some time, these narratives started to change against
the refugees.

The way Pakistani media have reported the Afghan refugee crisis in Pakistan has contributed to the political
escalations between Islamabad and Kabul over the last two decades. Pakistani media have often used an
overly patriotic and, at times, aggressive tone when reporting the perceived national interests of Afghanistan
and Pakistan. In addition, the inflammatory reporting also constructed negative images of the refugees, and
led to their association with terrorism. I wanted to explore if there was a consistency in these negative
images in the reportage, or if they were episodic. Therefore, I included all newspaper stories about Afghan
refugees published in the two newspapers in the three years (2016 to 2018). These stories also covered their
repatriation and the related conflict caused between the Afghan and Pakistani governments. Analysing
reportage over three years not only allowed me to identify framing patterns over a longer period of time,
but also helped me identify their frequency and extent. I was also able to identify some emerging frames,
which were used infrequently but show promising effects as counter-narrative to conflict-escalatory
framing (discussed in detail in Chapter 5).

In this chapter, I have categorised all three dominant frames distilled during the CDA under the non-peace
master frame. Despite finding some peace framing in news stories, there was not enough to counter the
dominant non-peace, conflict-escalatory and war-oriented narrative in the coverage of Afghan refugees and
their forced repatriation from Pakistan. As noted in the previous chapter, this framework allowed me to
undertake an in-depth critical analysis to understand reportage as a political and communicative action,
which results in negative or positive changes in media representations, public perceptions, treatment and
socio-political relationships. Negative changes result from conflict-escalatory framing and include
dangerous effects such as pro-war attitudes, conflict, anti-Afghan refugee sentiments, stereotypical
labelling, marginalisation and stigmatisation, and lack of/difficult access to health, education and oth er
public facilities.

This can also affect the general public attitude and behaviour towards refuges, especially from sections of
the populace who are nationalists and become emotionally engaged with inflammatory media content.
Readers can become selective in their engagement with media text that exclusively conforms to their
political and social beliefs. Positive changes include anti-war (conflict de-escalatory) proposals, such as
petitioning the government to extend repatriation deadlines or offer resid ence or citizenship opportunities
to Pakistani-born Afghan refugees, to lobby for making residence status and other documentation processes
accessible and harassment-free, to advocate for better living conditions at refugee camps, access to health
and education facilities, and to humanise refugee issues by calling for rehabilitation and resettlement.

3.2 The Afghan refugee as “terrorist”
One of the dominant frames in media coverage was the terrorist frame. This frame directly labelled Afghan
refugees as “terrorists” or as indirectly facilitating terrorism in Pakistan. I categorised this frame under the
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“truth vs. propaganda” classification in the Peace and War Journalism Model (See Table 1.1), falling under
propaganda-oriented coverage. Pakistani media have no shortage of propaganda-based claims about the
terrorist image of Afghan refugees and Afghans in general. These claims are often based on unverified
prerogatives, and are fed by either the State or the military establishment, or both. It is thus plau sible to
argue that the reinforcement of the “terrorist” image by the media further feeds propaganda. These images,
when established, serve as a barrier in associating new, harmless images with the Afghan refugees, or as
van Selm (2003) states, an image of “people just like us” (p. 266).

Positive media images of Afghan refugees are a rarity, not only in Pakistan, but also in global media.
Ironically, Steve McCurry’s globally famous 1985 portrait of a young, green-eyed girl, ‘The Afghan Girl’,
is the only positive image that comes to mind. Yet, in Pakistan, even The Afghan Girl is highly ostracised
in the public and media sphere, because of the short-lived espionage allegations Pakistani authorities had
put against her. In 2016, she was arrested from a refugee camp in Pakistan over possessing fake identity
documents. The arrest and the consequent espionage allegations clouded the Pakistani media for weeks
after her arrest. Although the spying allegations were soon dismissed, th e way media had framed her arrest
created an image of Afghan refugees that was linked with espionage, lying, cheating and danger. The media
were politicised once again, resulting in propagandist framing that spoke for the government and the
military. The Afghan Girl was repatriated to Afghanistan without delay.
The terrorist frame is one way of “othering” and dehumanising Afghan refugees in Pakistan and includes
a subtle but significant re-casting of Afghan refugee identity. It is evident, for example, in news stories
calling Afghan refugees suspected of terrorist activities “home-born terrorists”, “Afghani traitors”, or
“illegal refugees” rather than simply “Afghan refugees” or “terrorism suspects”. This labelling, repeatedly
using certain words, implies that Afghan refugees are not authentic refuge seekers or temporary residents,
but a dangerous threat. Analysis of selected media texts revealed that both the studied newspapers had
repeatedly used the words “terrorists”, “dangerous” and “security threat” for Afghan refugees. These
representations emerge from “non-peace”, conflict-escalatory framing and also contribute to inaccuracy in
journalism, where some claims are promoted as facts, such the reputation of the Afghan refugee as terrorist.

Within the terrorist frame, I found three major ways that Afghan refugees were directly or indirectly
referred to as terrorists. First, through a recurrent coverage and highlighting of their alleged recruitment by
the Islamic State (IS) global militant group to conduct terrorist activities in Pakistan. Second, by taking an
ultra-sceptical angle in reporting the refugees’ use of the Torkham Border (one of the two major checkpoints
on the Durand Line), by repeatedly calling it “porous”, a “terrorist entry point” and “dan gerous”. A large
number of stories referred to the inward movement of refugees at the Torkham border as a “potential threat
to national security” and called either for its episodic closure or for further tightening of security through
the deployment of more security personnel. The third way the terrorist frame was incorporated in the stories
was by not providing sources of information about Afghan refugees when suggesting their connection with
terrorism. While the third angle is not necessarily a framing an gle, it creates a propaganda-oriented frame
that lacks or misses credible sources of information, and by journalists instead making claims in their
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coverage that reinforces the terrorist image of refugees. As Galtung’s model demonstrates, peace journalism
gives high importance to sources of truth-oriented coverage of a war/conflict. The use of the terrorist angle
in framing feeds the non-peace master frame against the spirit of peace journalism.

3.2.1 Islamic State “recruiting” Afghan refugees
In January 2016, Pakistani security agencies launched a crackdown against IS terrorist organisations
operating in Pakistan. Afghan refugees had been repeatedly linked to IS by both Dawn and ET. Over the
three years under study, both referred to Afghan refugees’ alleged recruitment by IS. For instance, a Dawn
news story, titled “Agencies hunt brothers ‘recruiting for IS’ in Islamabad” (Dawn, 5 January 2016)
reported on the Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) statement that IS was trying to recruit from Afghan
refugee camps in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) 6
to take part in jihad in Pakistan. While the recruitment warning mentioned both Afghan refugees and FATA
residents, the Dawn story only noted CTD’s directions to law enforcement agencies to “keep an eye on
Afghan refugees”. In another news story, Sheerazi (Dawn, 12 February 2017) wrote about the “IS threat in
Afghanistan”, stating that militant IS groups and other elements had their eyes on Afghan refugees in
Pakistan, in addition to benefiting from “poppy cultivation and narcotics business”. In a story, “Avenging
terror”, Akram (Dawn, 19 February 2017) stated, “What Pakistan continues to face today are externally
supported terrorists,” and “recent terrorist acts are being executed on directions from hostile powers and
from sanctuaries in Afghanistan. We shall defend and respond.” Multiple stories suggested that the solution
was in speedy repatriation of the millions of Afghan refugees as “a component of ‘defensive’ measures”
(see for example: Akram 2017, Haider 2017; ET, 2 April 2018).

By May 2017, IS was increasing its foothold in Afghanistan and was a common threat for both countries
(Mehmood 2017), but my analysis shows that any references to IS recruiting Pakistani nationals were
missing from the corpus, focusing readers’ attention on Afghan refugees only. In fact, there were stories
rejecting any IS presence in Pakistan or the recruiting Pakis tani citizens, as evidenced in Zafar (2017, 2018).
This selective reporting is yet again demonstrating Entman’s theory in which he discusses the selection,
salience and omission aspects of framing. According to Entman (1993), frames “select some aspects of a
perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text ” (p. 52)  for instance, by omitting
Fata residents from the CTD’s warning in the story “Agencies hunt brothers ‘recruiting for IS’ in
Islamabad” (Dawn, 5 January 2016) and reports on (any) involvement of Pakistani citizens in IS-led
terrorist activities or recruitment. Instead, the news stories directed and maintained the readers’ attention
towards Afghan refugees and their possible recruitment by IS. This could increase the uncertaint y around
their presence in the country because, at the same time, US allies in the Middle East were facing IS
disruptions and attacks in Syria and neighbouring countries. In many stories, the Afghan refugees in
Pakistan have been compared to Syrian rebels, backed by an array of anti-government proxies, posing a
security threat to Israel and other US allies in the region (for example: “The shadowy world of proxy wars”

6

FATA is a semi-autonomous tribal region in north-western Pakistan that was merged with neighbouring province
KP in 2018 and came under direct control of the Federal government.
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– ET, 6 January 2016). Such framing falls under “truth/propaganda-oriented coverage” (TPOC) in
Galtung’s Peace and War Journalism Model, and demonstrates characteristics of propaganda -oriented
framing where the focus in on “exposing” and exaggerating the other side’s story, while covering up one’s
own lies and actions.

Such framing is incomplete, misinformed and based on unbalanced reporting in which the narrative of the
minority group is excluded to give space to “realities” constructed on information provided by/aligned with
the State and military establishment. Entman’s argument about the selection and omission process in text
is also reflected in Machin and Mayr’s (2012) work in which they argue that media choices aim to suppress
certain meanings and focus on others. They argue that these choices are never “neutral” as journalists select
them based on the way they wish to signpost what kind of person they are representing and the person’s
connection to an action. Since “language is an available set of options” (Machin and May r 2012, p. 32),
describing refugees as “terrorists” while excluding their refuge and rehabilitation demands reflects a lexical
choice made by journalists and editors. Such selections can implicitly legitimise and delegitimise social
actors, participants or actions. Machin and Mayr (2012) contend that using functional terms can make these
groups appear more “legitimate” than using generic terms. For instance, in this context, using Afghan
refugees or asylum seekers will be considered functional, while generic terms are, for example,
undocumented/illegal Afghan refugees, Afghan terrorists, IS-backed Afghan refugees, etc. Therefore, given
the context of AfPak rivalry and conflict (especially after the SovietAfghan war and Taliban rule in
Afghanistan), referring to Afghan refugees as terrorists or IS-backed without highlighting their legitimat e
demands and rights under the United Nations (UN) Refugee Convention gives the impression that they and
their cross-border movement are causing a threat to national and p ublic security in Pakistan. Such framin g
also demonstrated depersonalisation and collectivism. I observed words and phrases that gave more
importance to certain elements/statements than others, concealed important issues for the Pakistani side,
reduced empathy from the refugees and dehumanised them as large groups. These words and phrases
attached fear, insecurity and illegitimacy to refugee representations.
The media’s association of refugees with illegitimacy, fear, danger and insecurity can be tra ced back to
their historical image and reputation as warriors and fighters. I found that a large number of news stories
(71%) politicised Afghan refugees as the “other” under the terrorist frame. These stories legitimised the
public fear and insecurity ass ociated with the refugees’ alleged involvement in terrorist activities in
Pakistan. I noted that this type of framing was based on an established image of Afghans as dangerous,
evidenced for instance in cases where they were referred to as “warriors, terro rists, gun-toting, triggerhappy people” (for example in “Redrawing of Durand Line to be catastrophic” – Dawn, 21 April 2016).
These words and phrases also echoed their international image, where they are seen as a security concern,
dangerous, and “dusty desert fighters” (van Selm 2003, p. 268).
According to Pakistani historian Razia Sultana (“Redrawing of Durand Line to be catastrophic” – Dawn,
21 April 2016), this “tough” image of the Pashtun or the Afghan, and their reputation as warriors and martial
people, is not new to the world. It was adopted by and used as part of journalistic coverage and academic
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scholarship first during The Great Game 7 , and later during the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the
US between 1979 and 1989. For instance, David Kilcullen (2009), considered to be one of the most
influential theorists behind the counterinsurgency doctrine on the Iraq and Afghan Wars, argues that
Afghans are “certainly not averse to killing, but what they really love is the fight” (p. 235). Narratives such
as Sultana’s and Kilcullen’s reinforce the image of Afghans as a lawless and unruly people who like to
fight, kill and terrorise. This is further fuelled by the fact that most Afghan insurgents fled to the Pakistani
highlands and mountainous regions to build themselves sanctuaries from where they have been reported to
control movements of their people in Pakistan and across the Durand Line. The bord er is already
disregarded by militants and religious activists, making this region a refuge and safe -haven for members of
Al-Qaeda and its Pakistani offshoots after the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001.

Existing literature demonstrates that the media can either lead or follow public opinion (See for examp le
Shanahan et al. 2008; Soroka & Wlezien 2010). For instance, in the time of the 2015 Paris Massacre, where
three suicide bombers struck outside a concert hall, a major football stadium, and restaurant s and bars
simultaneously, uncertainty about the involvement of Syrian and other Middle -Eastern refugees in terrorism
in the US was on the rise. This uncertainty further intensified when two years later three French National
Police officers were shot on the Champs-Élysées. Some American politician tried to assuage these fears
and convince the public that Syrian refugees were safe to let in to the country (Ginesta, Ordeix and Rom
2017), but other leaders chose to play on these fears, issuing Islamophobic sta tements.

Wing and McGonigal (2015) acknowledge the impact such statements had on members of society, noting
that this broad-brush Islamophobia was intended to shape people’s view of Syrian refugees as “enemies at
the gate”. The authors argue there were many other steps IS would have to take to infiltrate the country.
Likewise, IS would have to do a lot more than “recruiting” Afghan refugees to create political and social
instability in the region. Afghan refugees have been living in Pakistan since the early ’90s after fleeing the
war and post-war conflicts under the Taliban rule in Afghanistan. A majority sought refuge in Pakistan for
their own and their families’ survival. Going into IS employment in another country would not be any
different or less painful than working for the Taliban in their own country, which they had refused to accept
already. However, fear-mongering and inflammatory coverage of the Afghan refugee conflict by Pakistani
media deprives readers of any non-judgmental inference, and can have the effect of turning public opinion
against them. In my case study, problematic preconceived notions about refugees have contributed to media
coverage that represents them as terrorists or allegedly recruited by IS. This has established them as a grou p
that Pakistanis (should) fear and feel threatened by.

Incomplete coverage of important issues or events in multiple stories resulted in Afghan refugees being
referred to as “terrorists” or their allies. Expecting the pure and complete truth from media would be naive
(Kempf 2007), and this isn’t what Galtung (2002) or Lynch (2007) are arguing. In fact, according to Kemp f
(2007), what peace journalism criticises about the media is their systematic concealme nt of specific facts.

7

The Great Game was a p olitical and diplomatic confrontation between the United Kingdom and the Russian Empire
over Afghanistan and neighbouring territories for most of the 19th century.
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When this happens, the construction of reality on a factual foundation always remains incomplete. For
example, for at least a week after former American president Barack Obama forecasted decades of
instability and turmoil for both Pakistan and Afghanistan, front page news stories in both Dawn and ET
mentioned the alleged IS recruitments of Afghan refugees in Pakistan (for example: “Pakistan among states
that will face turmoil for decades: Obama” – Dawn, 14 January 2016; “Obama’s reminder” – Dawn, 16
January 2016; “Aziz hits back at Obama over negative Pakistan forecast” – ET, 19 January 2016). The
journalists not only derived their own conclusions from a presidential address, reflecting incomplete and
inaccurate coverage, their stories also had the potential to sow panic and uncertainty among Pakistani
readers, and also the refugees. The placement of the stories on the front page also indicates the journalists’
interpretation of the importance of Obama’s address.

I would argue that this adds to the degree of insecurity in accepting the refugees into the host country,
especially because most still visit home and have connections in Afghanistan that most Pakistani citizens
are unaware of, thus triggering suspicion. A large number of refug ees continue to cross the Durand Line
frequently for trade, business and/or meeting family members stuck/separated in Afghanistan. To make
matters worse, the chief of the Haqqani Network – the deadliest of all Afghan Taliban factions – announced
in early April 2016 that the Network was instrumental in winning the allegiance of top (Afghan) dissidents
in Pakistan for Mullah Akhtar Mansoor, former head of the Afghan Taliban. This news was covered by
media across Pakistan, creating a panic among locals about the potential hiring of Afghan refugees by the
Network. The national media had received an audio recording of the speech by Sirajuddin Haqqani, the
head of the Haqqani Network and second-in-command in the Taliban hierarchy. ET covered Sirajuddin’s
speech extensively in a front page report (“Haqqanis helped Taliban chief win back dissidents” – ET, 11
April 2016), stating that the Taliban leader was dog whistling to the Afghan refugees to join jihad. The
news story quoted Sirajuddin as saying: “If we are waging jihad for martyrdom and can live as refugees,
we should also accept leadership. There were some misunderstandings, but all leaders are loyal to the
system”. The story continues: “… He [Sirajuddin] did not mention peace talks and only emphasised unity
and fighting”. This, coupled with Obama’s unsettling statement about the political turmoil in Pakistan and
Afghanistan, further triggered the already tense environment between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

During this time, the two countries were already experiencing unstable relations in the aftermath of two
terrorist attacks – one on Bacha Khan University in Charsadda, KP in January 2016, and the other in
December 2014 on schoolchildren at the Army Public School (APS) in Peshawar. The Bacha Khan
University attack left 21 students dead, while the APS massacre killed at point -blank over a hundred young
children and several school teachers. The images of blood -soaked classroom floors and piles of young
bodies had left the nation shaken and mourning for months. The onus of both these major terrorist attacks
was partially put on Afghan refugees residing in Pakistan, accusing them of facilitating the Tehrik -e-Taliban
Pakistan (TTP) (“A shift from hard to soft targets” – ET, 22 February 2016). In the story, the journalist
Sohail Tajik calls Afghan refugees “grasshoppers”, who were “roaming … and facilitating the attackers”.
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The maltreatment of Afghan refugees peaked following the APS attack (Zaidi 2015). Given the way the
attack was framed by the media, I would argue that the major reason behind the mistreatment was the use
of the terrorist frame at a time of such high sensitivity, when the nation was still mourning the merciless
killing of so many young children. In contrast, peace journalism adapts its coverage to the stages of conflict,
and this was a time when media coverage needed the most careful use of frames. In times of conflict, it is
dangerous for audiences to be hardened in their positions, especially those that can lead to vio lent responses.
However, the media coverage of this event activated the opposite reaction from the people and the State. A
special crackdown was launched by the Pakistan Muslim LeagueNawaz government under the National
Action Plan (NAP) to arrest the perpetrators. Though the plan was presented as counterterrorism, some
political analysts argued it targeted Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Within the first few months after its
launch, around 100, 216 Afghan refugees in the Punjab province along were geo -tagged and biometrically
verified (“Biometric registration of over 100,216 Afghan refugees carried out” – Dawn, 1 October 2016).
While TTP had taken responsibility for the attack, media across the country reported that Afghanistan was
providing safe haven to the TTP terrorists, and that was bringing Afghanistan’s war to Pakistan (“Who
wants peace in Pakistan?” – Dawn, 24 January 2016). Sympathetic views towards refugees soon shifted,
with possible consequences for ongoing attempts at promoting reconciliation between Pakistan and
Afghanistan or a mutual action to eliminate TTP cross -border infiltration. The story also noted that “terrorist
and criminal violence has been dramatically reduced” in Pakistan after the implementation of NAP – a
subtle hint in favour of the operation against Afghan refugees, and its results.

When media have vested interest in a conflict (Putnam and Shoemaker 2007), then fear-mongering becomes
inevitable. Due to this targeted coverage, media consumers start developing a collective “othering”  in this
case of Afghan refugees – Ain solidarity with the media. As argued by Praxmarer (2016), solidarity with
media can be very selective, and in the face of a conflict, it can lean towards the State. Media, once again,
tend to become politicised and take up a nationalistic approach. In analysing the reportage for this thesis,
including follow-up reporting, I observed that the one-sided coverage by both newspapers intensified the
opposition to and othering of Afghan refugees by the general public. For instance, a large number of news
stories (36%) posed the rhetorical question of whether Afghan refugees were innocent bystanders or
terrorists. Almost half of the stories demanded that the government block the entry of potential terrorists
(46%).
On 22 September 2018, ET published a story quoting analysts and university professors in the country’s
capital stating that issuing passports to Afghans born in Pakistan posed “threats to Pakistan’s national
security” (“For many Afghan refugees ‘home’ is an unfamiliar land” – ET, 22 September 2018). The story
also stated that some of the refugees fell into the trap of terrorist elements or may “get involved into antiPakistan activities”. Unsurprisingly, this report corroborated a 2016 Gallup opinion poll, which revealed
that 90% of Pakistani citizens supported blocking Afghans without visas from entering the country in order
to help counterterrorism efforts. The Gallup survey was also extensively covered by all major English
language print, online and TV media in Pakistan. As a result, in less than a year, Pakistan deployed 180,000
troops on its western borders (“Who wants peace in Pakistan?” – Dawn, 24 January 2016) to chase out any
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TTP movement into the country, and news media framed it as a decisive operation. Pakistan -based Afghan
diplomats expressed their concerns over such misrepresentations and accusations and started push ing for
peace between the two countries before matters escalated in the aftermath of the two terrorist attacks in KP.
However, despite a call for peace negotiations and Pakistan’s better treatment of Afghan refugees by then
newly appointed Afghan Consul General, Dr Abdullah Waheed Poyan, my analysis of media texts (2016)
show there was no decrease in representing Afghan refugees as terrorists. Instead, within a week of Poyan’s
friendly press statement, over 40,000 security personnel were deployed across KP for local by-elections
with a special ban on the entry of Afghan refugees into the provincial capital (“40,000 personnel to ensure
security in KP local govt by-polls” – Dawn 20 February 2016), despite the fact that the city serves as home
to the majority of Afghan refugees.
The representation of Afghan refugees as “dangerous” reinforced their image as terrorist just as the public
were already bombarded with anti-Afghan framing in media. When manifested in daily media coverage,
these representations become part of the readers’ collective idea of an Afghan refugee, who is now to be
feared, avoided and gotten rid of. However, almost none of the news stories had any (solid) evidence that
Afghan refugees were promoting or facilitating terrorism or unrest in their host country. This, according to
Lynch (2013), is not a characteristic of “good” journalism. He argues that responsible journalism provides
its readers and audiences “with cues and clues to prompt and equip them to develop critical awareness of
attempts to pass off claims as facts, or ‘social truths’ as merely interpersonal” (Lynch 2013, p. 34). With
both ET and Dawn failing to offer these cues and clues, any sympathies from the readers for Afghan
refugees could be hard to elicit, especially with the constant and frequent reinforcement of their image in a
negative light.

An example is the coverage by the media of the repatriation deadline extension of May 2016. Just a month
before the June 2016 repatriation deadline, the Afghan government officially requested Pakistan to give a
four-year extension to 1.5 million registered Afghan refugees to legalise their stay in Pa kistan. The
government of Pakistan, lacking a clear policy and strategy, agreed to a six-month extension only under the
anti-terrorism NAP (which also deals with the issue of Afghan refugees). Media reported this in a tone of
fear and panic-mongering, highlighting security threats and potential “costs” of letting the refugees
overstay, one more time.

In addition to the KP province, news stories also blamed Afghan refugees for terrorist activities in
Pakistan’s Balochistan province. For instance, a story titled, “Six Afghan 'spies' nabbed from Balochistan,
says home minister” (ET, 26 May 2016 ) stated, “People of Balochistan are paying the price of sheltering
Afghan refugees … We can’t tolerate this hospitality as Afghan migrants are now involved in killin g
innocent Baloch people”. A Dawn story on the next day called Afghans in Pakistan “Afghan spies involved
in subversive activities” (“Six Afghan spy agency men held in Balochistan” – Dawn, 27 May 2016). It
stated that these “spies were paid Rs80,000 per bombing, and received a much higher sum of Rs250,000
for carrying out a targeted attack on an individual” (as of January 2020, 80,000 and 250,000 Pakistani
rupees are equal to about A$600 and A$2,000, respectively). In both stories, attention is diverted from a
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fact (six men arrested) to a claim (Afghan refugees need to leave). When reporters/editors attach a statement
or a demand to a fact, the attention of the reader is consciously redirected from the centre to the margins or
from one element to another – an idea I borrowed from Entman’s (1993) work on media framing. According
to Entman, the presence of some aspects of a reality is as significant as the absence of it, especially in
political communication, as frames can draw attention to some elements and obs cure others. In other news
stories on the same event and those like it, the attention of the readers and audience is drawn from the
Taliban presence in Pakistan to the illegitimacy of US drone attacks on Pakistani soil and its potential
impact on the Afghan peace process, and to the costs of sheltering Afghan refugees.

3.2.2 The “porous” Torkham border dilemma
On 1 June 2016, overnight, the Pakistani authorities imposed a stringent new restriction that required
everyone entering Pakistan from Afghanistan at the Torkham crossing to hold a valid passport and a
Pakistani visa. According to the BBC’s Ilyas Khan (BBC, 2 June 2016), many at the border were unaware
of the change and were only informed on arrival. According to the Pakistani authorities, the new rule, later
applied to other crossing points as well, aimed to limit the movement of militants. However, those most
affected by this sudden new restriction were an estimated one million Afghan refugees in Pakistan, who
had undocumented status and were too poor to afford a passport or a visa.

The Torkham border is the main border point between Pakistan and Afghanistan used for cross-border
movement. At least 10,000 to 15,000 people cross the border at this checkpoint every day for trade, medical
and personal reasons (with and without permits). Altogether, Pakistan has 535 border posts on the Durand
Line. The Chaman border and the Kurram Agency border are the second - and third-largest checkpoints
respectively, and are used for cross -border movement. The long and porous border is already a notorious
source of tension between the two countries. The new travel restriction on Torkham saw further
deterioration in relations between Islamabad and Kabul (Yar 2019).

Media coverage of the new border restrictions also reflected this political tension. There were frequent
mentions of the Torkham border in news stories, in particular about a growing perception in Pakistan that
terrorists were infiltrating into the country from Afghanistan in the guise of refugees. Both Dawn and ET
justified the government’s decision and I found recurrent references to the use of the border by “Afghan
terrorists”, “dangerous elements” and “miscreants”. Both newspapers suggested that Afghan “terrorists”
used the Torkham border as a safe route to enter Pakistan – a cost Pakistan was bearing to let refugees move
freely across borders. A majority of the news stories stating that most terrorists were Afghan refugees or
had disguised as refugees and were living in refugee camps also stated that these groups were making their
way into Pakistan mainly through Torkham border. Over half of the stories in the corpus (56%) suggested
that Pakistan needed to urgently stop all movement into the country at the Torkham border. Pakistan closed
the borders many times in 2016 and 2017 to control security situations that would get worse every time
there was a major refugee movement into Pakistan. A number of news stories highlighted the link between
Afghan refugees, terrorism and cross -border movement and how barricading the border was “in the national

73

interest”. The reader is constantly reminded that unregulated cross-border movements provide opportunity
for terrorists and militants to infiltrate (“Afghan refugees may be allowed to stay on till 2018” –
ET, 4 December 2016), and that terrorists in the subcontinent, including those associated with the Al Qaeda,
usually use this route to enter and exit Pakistan (Baloch 2016). Some news stories also remind the readers
of the cost of not closing the border, for example, “Pakistan has paid a heavy cost for being neighbour of
Afghanistan ... Now the terrorists take advantage of the porous border, use the Afghan soil and conduct
attacks on Pakistan (Bajaur 2017).

I noted that most news stories (67%) that reported the Torkham border restrictions or cross -border
movement used the word “porous” for the check point. The porosity of t he border due to the limited
presence of law-enforcement personnel has been an established fact on both sides of the Durand Line (Safi
2016; Brookes 2017; Yar 2019) since its demarcation in 1893. However, the way the word “porous” has
been used in the stories implies its misuse by Afghan terrorists and the threat this porosity causes to the
national security of Pakistan. There were more mentions of its porosity in the two newspapers in 2016 than
in 2017 or 2018. In 2017, one of the main tasks that Pakistan took on was to make the porous PakAfghan
border secure by installing a 2,450-kilo met re barbed-wire border at Torkham. Though the decision was
political and had been under consideration for a few years, the government’s public announcement was
accelerated by the negative media framing of the use of the border, the consequent rise in anti-Afghan
refugee sentiments across the country, and pressure from the military establishment on the State. Dawn
reported that the fenced border would not only regulate the movement of people, it “will also che ck
infiltration of militants from across the border” (Khan G.Q 2017).

Within the first few days, the installation of the fenced border caused several disputes at the border point
where border management was failing. It also received the disapproval of Afghan authorities because,
theoretically, the installation violated the Easement Rights of Divided Tribes (ERDT) along the Durand
Line, an understanding that had been reached between the British Raj and Afghanistan that allowed tribes
straddling the border to move freely. After the barbed wire was installed, the Pakistani government extended
the ERDT to the Shinwari tribe, which is settled on both sides of the border, but only to within 20 kilometres
of the border. This made the crisis even more convoluted as the refugee status of an individual ceases if
they cross into their country of nationality. This only added to the complications as Afghan refugees in
Pakistan hold a PoR card, which loses authenticity upon return if taken across the border. Many Afghan
refugees are separated from their families, who are forced to live in Afghanistan. Most of these travel across
the border to temporarily unite with their families, sometimes for as long as a few hours, and on other
instances people living near the borders access medical facilities in Pakistani cities near the border. A huge
number of Afghan nationals also make trips to and from Pakistan for trade and small business. However, it
was found in this analysis that media coverage did not include these human -angle stories, and thus was
incomplete reporting. This created a social debate in Pakistan, where anti-Afghan groups started expressing
their security concerns and blamed the government for allowing cross -border movement and not pushing
for permanent repatriation.
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The media and government’s main attention in the three years under my study remained on the Torkham
border. However, after some news reports also mentioned skirmishes on the Chaman and Kuram Agency
borders between Pakistani security officers and Afghan refugees, the Pakistani government was quick to
close the other two border points to block cross -border movement. Media later reported this step as
“necessary border management” and “cross -border management” (Khan G.Q. 2017; Khan I.A 2017).
Around the same time, the National Security Committee (NSC), the apex body for civilmilit ary
coordination on national security, also announced a review of developments related to border management
and the repatriation of Afghan refugees (“Top security body alarmed at LoC violations by India” – Dawn,
30 September 2017). This was covered by both the newspapers as feature stories. The incessant reference
to the border being used by Afghan terrorists and refugees increased in the coverage at this time. Such overreferencing is problematic as it has the tendency to create inaccurate images of innocent people, grouped
under the blanket definition of “terrorists”, saturated with negative connotations and language. This also
triggered the “coerced exodus” (Human Rights Watch 2017) of a large number of Afghan refugees who
were forced to leave Pakistan unprepared – some given only two days or a week’s notice (Bjelica 2016).
The Pakistani government was very clear about its harsh policy vis -à-vis movement on Torkham border
and its plans on tightening border security (Farmer & Mehsud 2020).
Over one-third of the news stories (38%) echoed the Pakistani government’s stance on stricter border
restrictions and building a fence – most of these stories were from the 2016 corpus (19%). There is reason
to believe that a pro-fence media framing may have led to the installation of the fence at the border  a
project that started in 2017. As of July 2020, the Pakistani military’s information wing revealed that 800
miles of the $450 million fence had been completed and more than 1,000 border forts built – a project that
has been taken much more seriously by the Pakistani government than resettling its internally displaced
people (IDPs), who have been displaced by the violent conflict and Pakist ani military operations 8 in KP
since 2009.

The frequent references to the Torkham border as a safe route for terrorists from Afghanistan and/or
disguised as Afghan refugees further contributes to their representation as terrorists and dangerous. These
labels contribute to a culture of dehumanisation and demonisation. For instance, Bjelica (2016) writes that
amid the border restrictions and forced repatriation conflict, more and more Pakistani security forces
personnel and local citizens had started calling Afghan refugees “sons of Hindus” (p. 7), referring to them
being allegedly funded and facilitated by Indian intelligence agencies to spread terrorism in Pakistan. These
labels were then picked up by media and either reinforced or made into new tags.
To understand the deep impact of this type of framing that creates labels or tags, I refer to Sheehan’s (2013)
work on challenging the terrorist tag in the media. He writes that terrorism, like other policy issues, could

As part of its alliance with the US-led “War on Terror”, the Pakistani military carried out two major military
operations  Operation Black Thunderstorm in 2009 and Operation Zarb-e-Azb in 2014  against various militant
groups, including the TTP in the northern tribal areas of KP. According to the UN, the insurgency and the security
operations displaced over 2.5 million nationals.
8
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be said to have a culture, evoking a belief set and packages such as “security and terrorist designation” (p.
233). While media can potentially draw on more than one package/frame (Gamson & Modigliani 1989), in
the case of Afghan refugees they stuck to only a few (such as terrorist, dangerous , threat). The culture of
labelling, if reinforced, can be detrimental to not only the refugees, but also to the overall political conflict
between the two countries. The media’s persistent reference to terrorist movement into Pakistan through
the Torkham border stigmatises Afghan refugees as dangerous groups or terrorists and makes it hard for
them to be accepted as harmless and genuine refuge seekers in the host country. If this continues, it will
create more obstacles for Afghan refugees and make it hard er for future Pakistani governments and
generations to remove this tag, as argued by Sheehan (2013), who states that “for a group tagged with the
label of terrorist, the obstacles to gaining what they might consider adequate or appropriate coverage would
be further magniﬁed by the stigma of the terrorist label” (p. 235).

I found that neither Dawn nor ET used any positive language in the coverage of the Torkham border
restrictions or the fence. There is no coverage that highlights the safety, security and economic needs of
Afghan refugees connected to the Torkham border, such as crossing for safety, trading needs for small
businesses, reunion with family. Instead, the coverage treats militants and refugees alike, and presents the
fence as a projection of hard power by the Pakistani government  a reporting style that is disadvantageous
to diplomacy with Afghanistan. It also ignores the lives of Pashtun tribes who have functionally lived near
the border for generations and treated it as fluid. The newspapers could have taken a peace-oriented
approach in some stories by stressing the importance of and need for facilitated and regulated cross -border
movement instead of calling for temporary/permanent closures or aggressive border-management
strategies. This approach to framing could have been conflict de-escalatory, but is entirely missing from
the coverage. By focusing only on the terrorism angle of the border, both newspapers take a subjective
predisposition. Like Galtung, Lynch, Shabbir and other proponents of peace journalism, I also see peace
framing as the solution to this problematic framing of the Torkham border reporting, and the discourses of
exaggeration, labelling and stereotyping that it has generated.

3.2.3 Missing/elite sources for terrorism claims
In March 2016, a bomb blast ripped through a bus carrying government employees in KP’s provincial
capital, Peshawar. The special assistant to the chief minister was quick to hold a press conference and put
the blame on Afghan refugees. The Pakistani readers were most likely still registering media narratives on
the alleged recruitment of Afghan refugees by IS and their alleged facilitation of TTP-led attack on Bacha
Khan University, when they were hit with more news of a terrorist attack. Yet again, it was linked to
“Afghan perpetrators”. ET’s front page story the following day reported that “all masterminds [of these
attacks] were in Afghanistan” (“Bloodied Peshawar turns into battleground of blame” – ET, 17 March
2016). What is common in the coverage of the incident by both newspapers is that sources were either
missing or political and military elite were quoted as the primary or only source(s). My analysis revealed
that just over half of the stories (51%) lacked solid evidence of Afghan (refugee) involvement in the
bombing, while almost half of them (46%) drew heavily on elites as their sources, such as politicians,
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opposition leaders and military establishment. The use of political and military elite as sources became
more evident in follow-up stories of terrorist attacks where the allegations were explicitly directed towards
Afghan refugees. This reveals the strange, unexplored dynamics of the relationships between the media,
public opinion, and political discourse in Pakistan. Carmichael and Brulle (2017) argue that political
discourse and the focus on elites are believed to impact public opinion via their influence on the media. By
using political or military elites as their primary sources, media are progressing the political agenda, either
by choice or through being forced to do so. In both cases, one thing is happening: the politicisation of media
coverage.
Hackett (2011) argues that depending on authorities and elites as the main sources of “facts” could sideline
millions of people who are suffering from poverty, labour exploitation and private-sector corruption.
Moreover, it encourages unauthorised groups to use “disruptive tactics in order to attract media attention”
(Bagdikian 2014). As observed in my analysis, giving prominence to political leaders makes it easy for
media to undermine their rivals, as was the case of the Pakistani authorities against Afghan refugees. The
news stories frequently quoted government officials, especially from the Interior Ministry, which is
responsible for internal affairs, public security, emergency management and civil registration. An examp le
is a story that quoted the ministry saying:

Pakistan could not be expected to certify who among the 3m Afghan refugees were peaceful or
involved in cross-border terrorism … Pakistan could only guarantee having no terrorists on its soil
when it did not have to look after foreign refugees who also had relationships across the border
(“Pakistan seeks US aid for refugees' return, says Ahsan Iqbal” – Dawn, 20 January 2018).

When information sources are credited to political and military elite, there is a strong tendency for audiences
to give credence to that information as it comes from a place of authority. Simultaneously, it may take away
credibility from the other side, in this case refugees. In such circumstances, there is a high likelihood of
creating propaganda and concealing the truth, because it then becomes the powerful vs. the powerless in
the conflict.

We saw this happen in the war in Ukraine in 2014, where the local mainstream media took a patriotic stance
and were accused of spreading disinformation and government/military propaganda (see for example:
Boyd-Barrett 2017; Khaldarova & Pantti 2016; Nygren et al. 2018). The “enemy” was almost invisible, and
only a few articles mentioned the rebels in eastern Ukraine (Nygren et al. 2018). Hackett (2011) further
argues that elites can utilise their space in media coverage to deflect and distract the audience from their
violations and the deadly implications of their policies. This can manipulate and misinform the readers,
who start giving credibility only to officials’ claims (Lynch 2013). Both Dawn and ET reported extensively
on the KP bus bomb attack, consistently highlighting elite sources from the Pakistani government linking
Afghan refugees with terrorism in Pakistan. One of the most commonly quoted officials was KP’s chief
minister Pervez Khattak, who had been vocal against settlement and rehabilitation of Afghan refugees in
Pakistan and had been pushing for their early repatriation. A Dawn news story focused on his statements,
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alleging that “funding of terrorists from across the border was the basic cause of terrorism [in Pakistan]”
(“Traders, govt vow to jointly fight terrorism” – Dawn, 19 March 2016).

The widespread references, without legitimate sources, to Afghan refugees as terrorists or as facilitating
terrorism creates a (non) reality that I see as beyond bland stereotyping. In Pakistan, Afghan refugees
inarguably constitute the most marginalised groups of the population – both financially and due to the lack
of access to public services, including housing, health and education. It would take a lot more effort,
mobilisation, coordination and intelligence for vulnerable groups such as Afghan refugees to create
terrorism in the host country, an argument Wing and McGonigal (2015) also make for Syrian refugees
accused of terrorism in Europe. However, my analysis suggests that framing Afghan refugees as terrorists
or potential terrorists could make them terrorists in the minds of the readers. This is also evident from the
post-APS attack arrests across Pakistan. The CTD had arrested 480 men (criminals and militants) during
2014 and 2015 and processed their data under a new system called Evidence-Based Policing. The results
showed that of these men, 437 were locals (Pakistani citizens) and only 23 were Afghan refugees. Among
all these men, 35 had received formal jihad training to become militants. Only one of them was a militan t
trained in Afghanistan. This information was largely missing from coverage, thus distorting the perception
of Afghan refugees for the Pakistani reader, especially when there is such a huge discrepancy in the
proportion of reality and representation that informs perceptions and then action.

Lynch and Galtung (2010) argue that peace-orientation in framing stems from a balanced coverage, and
can be accomplished by a) focusing on all conflict phases (before, during and after), b) explaining the
background of why a conflict was formed in the first place, and c) giving voice to ordinary people as well
as elites. However, instead of this approach, the two publications  in particular Dawn  took the position
that it was because of Afghan refugees that terrorism in Pakistan was impossible to eliminate (“‘Negligence
of Pakhtuns led to murder of Dr Najib’ – Dawn, 27 September 2016). This was further reinforced by the
choice of sources quoted in their stories. Journalists often marginalise activists whose opinions are outside
the mainstream (Hooks 1992; Van Dijk 1996) or against the interest of political elites and policy makers,
as media tend to favour elites over political challengers or weaker groups (Reese 1991). I noted that quotes
from rights activists were generally missing from the coverage. In this respect, journalists play a particularly
strong role, as they need sources “to ﬁll news holes, meet deadlines, provide drama and add issue balance”
(Terkildsen et al. 1998, p. 48) but they also have the unique ability to “choose who speaks (or does not
speak) in news coverage” enabling them “to frame news without appearing to do so” (Schneider 2012, p.
72).

3.3 Afghan refugee as the “enemy” of the State
In January 2018, the curriculum taught to Afghan children at refugee camps in Pakistan became the centre
of a regional controversy after the Pakistani government accused the UNHCR of teaching anti-Pakistan
curriculum to grade 16 students. The government stated that the UNHCR had made some changes to the
English language and Social Studies curriculum without any approval from the provincial and federal
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education departments. The UNHCR refuted the accusations and stated that the syllabi were being taught
at schools across Afghanistan, and that teaching the same curriculum at refugee camps would help prepare
pupils for their integration into the schooling system in Afghanistan, when or if they decided to return.
Pakistani government’s “great concern” was about the visibility of the Afghan flag on every page of the
English books, India being presented as a friendly country (to Afghanistan), disputed Kashmir being shown
as part of India, and the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan being referred to as the Durand Line
(Siddiqui 2018). The dispute was picked up by all Pakistani media, including Dawn and ET, who reported
the changes as “anti-state propaganda”, “anti-Pakistan” and an “agenda of anti-state elements” (Liaquat
2018; Siddiqui 2018). Instead of clarifying that the children were being taught the same curriculum as those
at schools in Afghanistan, the media reported that these changes were for an “enemy in the making”. As
ET reported, “Following the appearance of anti-Pakistan posters on public transport buses in London, this
is another instance where education has been used to promote the agenda of enemy elements” (Liaquat
2018), referring to Afghanistan.

The enemy frame emerged as the second most prominent frame in my analysis of media coverage. As the
name suggests, this frame represents Afghan refugees as the “enemy” of the State and of the Pakistani
nation at large. This political stance is common across the country an d already a cause of collective
uncertainty among Pakistani citizens regarding Afghan refugees, who are seen as a potential threat. It is
also evident from my analysis: 36% of the news stories used the word “enemy” or “anti-state” for Afghan
refugees, directly framing them in a negative light. Concurrently, over half of the news stories (57%) made
indirect references to Afghan refugees using terms such as “enemy”, “threat”, “alien”, “illegal”,
“uncertainty”, “suspicious”, “snake(s)”, and “friends with the enemy” (referring to Afghanistan’s growing
friendly terms with India). Additionally, a large number of news stories (56%) that primarily referred to
Afghan refugees as terrorists also referred to them as the enemy of Pakistan, indicating multiple non-peace
frames in a single story. Such targeted, frequent and, at times, saturated media framing representing Afghan
refugees as the “enemy” can cause Pakistan citizens to be suspicious about refugees, in particular
developing a suspicion about their presence and movement inside Pakistan. This type of framing highlights
refugees as a potential threat, and becomes one of the main ways through which media dehumanise refugees
(Esses, Medianu & Lawson 2013; Henry & Tator 2002).

The enemy frame dehumanises refugees and draws upon existing stereotypes that are embedded within a
society about individuals associated with an “out-group” (“them” or “other”). According to Halpern and
Weinstein (2004), out-groups often lose their identity and come to represent mere categories. This is
evidenced in the use of the words “illegal aliens” for Afghan refugees (“Murad voices concern over PM's
plan to grant nationality to ‘aliens’” – Dawn, 19 September 2018), noted 14 times in the corpus, and
Sheikh’s (2018) repeated reference to Afghan refugees as “dubious” and a “major security threat”. The
enemy framing occurs first on an individual level, where individual members of the Afghan refugee
community are singled out in reportage, and later shifts to a collective negative identity, which is part of
the dehumanisation process. According to Bahador (2012), the “us vs. them” discourse prevents members
of the in-group (“us” and “we”) from associating with the out-group. As a result, negatively perceived
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actions by an out-group, even if conducted by a few, are projected to the entire population, and this further
delegitimises all members, who thus become the enemy.
The process of “becoming the enemy” through negative media representations takes place over time and
may stretch from the pre-violent phase of the conflict to the post-conflict or cold war phase. Media can be
independently and deliberately biased, or politically motivated with added pressures from the State or
military establishment to align with State policy towards a particular group or event. This is where the State
enters the war/conflict using soft power. The biggest proof of a State entering a war/conflict or committin g
atrocities against a marginalised group lies in its use of media to mobilise the public to stand with the
government and amplify its stance (Bahador 2012). This process includes creating images through media
framing. For instance, during the pre-violent phase, enemy images created and reinforced with the help of
framing, metaphors, narratives, ideas, myths and images in reporting can delegitimise a particular group
for political purposes. This process of creating enemy images of the target groups can strip them off “their
human qualities so that their destruction becomes justifiable and even desirable” (Bahador 2012, p. 195)
both in the pre-violent phase and during the conflict.

In 2015 and 2016, public attitudes towards Afghan refugees deteriorated dramatically as a result of the
government crackdown against Afghans, in which 350,000 refugees were forcibly rep atriated in 2016 alone
(HRW 2017). Simultaneously, negative media coverage that resonated the political stance and dehumanised
the refugees was on the rise. Discourses that dehumanise or demonise subjects make certain policy options
more, or less, appropriate for the public and the government, such as policies on refugee settlement or
humanised voluntary repatriation. These discourses narrow down the possibilities for peace, resettlement
and integration, while making other policies feasible (Jackson 2019), such as the State -led forced exodus
of Afghan refugees from Pakistan.
Stories with the enemy frame generally featured a protagonist, who represented “the enemy”, but lacked
quotes from the affected people. One of the major stories in ET reported the induction of an Afghan refugee
into the National Database Registration Authority (NADRA) as a data-entry operator (Shehzad 2016) and
used the enemy frame. The story covered the alleged involvement of two local KP parliamentarians who
facilitated the hiring. According to the story, an Afghan refugee named Roohullah obtained a domicile
certificate by the “misrepresentation and concealment of facts and also managed to get a computerized
national identity card for himself and his family members” (Shehzad 2016). The news story notes that
Roohollah’s father had migrated from Afghanistan in the ’80s, and focuses on the “forgery” accusation.
However, it fails to mention why Roohollah still had refugee status, decades after his family had arrived in
Pakistan and sought refuge and PoR cards. In fact, the story does not mention whether Roohollah also
arrived in Pakistan with his parents as a child or was born there. This is crucial information that, if included,
would have challenged authority’s treatment of the Afghan refugee’s pending residency status, and could
have caused an investigation to be initiated.
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The journalist omits this angle, consequently removing the opportunity for readers to comprehend and
reflect, and thus for it to be included in the mainstream narrative. In doing so, the journalist is limiting the
readers’ interpretation options to refugees being “unfaithful”, “liars”, “cheats”, “frauds”, and thus the
“enemy”. The story also states, “it had emerged that some top officers of the NADRA helped terrorists and
other miscreants in obtaining fake national identity cards,” though no background evidence on the source
of this information is given (note the casual and unrelated reference to terrorism). The story does not quote
Roohullah; rather, it marginalises him, and deprives him of a voice. Several other arrests of Afghan refugees
over obtaining fake Pakistani passports were also reported, for instance by ET (“Afghan national arrested
with fake Pakistani passport” – ET, 10 April 2016). The news story, yet again, lacked any background
information, any details of how NADRA officials were involved in the issuance of fake documents or if
any officials’ arrests were made. The incomplete coverage of 137-words leaves the readers with only one
piece of information: Afghan refugees are illegal and illegal residents are the enemy of the State and its
people. This is a trait of conflict-oriented and elite-oriented journalism.
According to veteran American political scientist Harold Lasswell, presenting the “enemy” as the
troublemaker is crucial for generating hate against them, and the best tool for this mass mobilisation is the
media. He states, “For mobilization of national hatred the enemy must be represented as a menacing,
murderous aggressor, a satanic violator of the moral and conventional standards , an obstacle to the
cherished aims and ideals to the nation as a whole and of each constituent part” (cited in Merskin 2004, p.
162). The use of such problematic interpretative repertoire in framing misrepresents the image of the group
in question and triggers a collective hostility and uncertainty towards them from the host country (Merskin
2004), potentially breeding anger, hatred, and resentment toward them (Rodriguez 2000). I noted that the
vocabulary used to describe Afghan refugees adopted the language of panic and uncertainty, coupled with
a sense of invasion by a foreign enemy (see also: Esses et al. 2013; Fleras 2011; Hier & Greenberg 2002).
This is evidenced in Akram’s (2018) story for Dawn where he states, “Pakistan's agencies must be equipped
with the most advanced surveillance and data collection techniques to detect future Jadhevs or Osamas 9 and
neutralise any ‘black ops’, ‘false-flag’ or infiltration operations planned by enemy agencies”, referring to
India, Afghanistan and the growing partnership between the two countries.
Due to the fear and threats from the “enemy”, there was an increase in a public demand for stern scrutiny
of Afghan refugees by police throughout the year. I noted that a small portion of news stories (7%) reported
the people’s demand for extreme vetting procedures for Afghan refugees in Pakistan. An ET news story
that covered a protest reported the demonstrators demanded a set timeframe for the return of Afghan
refugees living in different parts the country “instead of initiating a long process of rechecking and blocking
Computerised National Identity Cards” (“Protesting traders demand expulsion of Afghans”, 2016). By
March 2016, in addition to KP, the Sindh and Balochistan provinces had also started making similar
demands for early repatriation of Afghan refugees. However, what most journalists did not report was that
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Osama here refers to Al Qaeda’s former leader, Osama bin Laden, while Kulbhushan Jadhev is an Indian national
who was convicted for espionage by a Pakistani military court in 2017. At the time of this research, he is currently on
a death row in a Pakistani prison.
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most of these demands were coming from the business sector, who said their businesses had been affected
by Afghan traders. Since narratives that represent Afghan refugees as “terrorists” dominate the media, such
incomplete reporting can only leave readers to rely on their preconceived notions and believe that these
demands may be connected to terrorism-related insecurities rather than economic impacts. These
representational forces were also starkly demonstrated in the aftermath of the delay in the national census
in 2016, reportedly because of the “presence of Afghan refugees” (Shah and Rizvi 2016). The political
quandaries thrown up due to what was actually an official delay were smoothed over by placing the onus
on to the presence of Afghan refugees in the country, which further fuelled the calls for swift repatriation
in the name of a nationalist cause.

With increasing demands across the country for their early repatriation, the first repatriation deadline of
2016 was set to be 30 June. As the date drew closer, framing patterns in both Dawn and ET highlighted
Pakistan’s positive role in the process but reported “no reciprocity from the Afghan side”. In July, another
campaign was launched in KP called Go Afghani Go (“‘Go Afghani Go’ campaign launched in Haripur”,
2016). Within hours, it was top of the Twitter trending list in the country (Ali 2017). A digital mob emerged
in support of a slew of xenophobic hashtags. This concerted effort on social media can be seen as part of
the feedback loop caused by anti-Afghan-refugee coverage in mainstream media that has been part of such
media discourse in Pakistan, and emerged especially after the 2014 terrorist attack o n APS (Ali 2017).

In my analysis I made three major observations: 1) from 20162018, there was a visible increase in the
frequency of news stories that referred to Afghan refugees as enemies or anti-State and linked them with
terrorism and militancy, among other crimes, thus reinforcing the public’s perception of them as a threat;
2) Pakistani government officials, including the military establishment, were heavily quoted and were very
clear on the need for a reverse mass exodus of Afghan refugees by the end of 2020 for “security” reasons;
and 3) the framing of the coverage and the high frequency of news stories on the Afghan refugee crisis
amplified the level and scale of the conflict in the mind of the reader. Thiel and Kempf (2014) argue that
escalatory and de-escalatory frames can directly affect the way the recipients understand the content and
their prior position towards the conflict. Thus these three factors could strongly influence audience
responses to Afghan refugees as the “enemy”. The creation and maintenance of the enemy images, such as
those of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, are used to justify and in some cases even encourage aggression, hate
and violence against groups identified as the enemy.

3.4 Afghanistan as the “bad neighbour”
Pakistan and Afghanistan share a history of incalculably hostile relations. Both sides have often accused
the other of non-cooperation in the peace process and facilitating, protecting or providing safe haven to
Taliban groups and other terrorist groups. The Afghan refugee crisis further increased political tensions,
human suffering due to conflict, and the political blame-game. My analysis revealed that the blame frame,
as I refer to it, was very common in the media coverage. In 61% of the news stories, Afghan refugees and
the Afghan government were blamed for non-cooperation or situational escalation. Journalists in these
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stories blamed Afghanistan for hampering the peace process in the region, referring to th eir attitude as
“child-like”, “immature” and “unpredictable”. The stories framed Afghan refugees as the “burden” from
the “bad” neighbour, who is “thankless”, a “user” and a “traitor”.

Three accusations against the Afghan government were recurrent in the coverage. First that the Afghan
government was deliberately not taking back Afghan refugees, despite peace in their home country and
Pakistan having hosted over three million Afghan refugees for over four decades. The second most common
way the blame frame was used in coverage was by accusing Afghanistan of aligning with India against
Pakistan. Stories that incorporated this focused on the growing relations between Afghanistan and India
and how the Indian government and intelligence services were using Afghan refugees in Pakistan for
spying, terrorism and other criminal activities in Pakistan. Thirdly, stories claimed that the Afghan
government was insecure about Pakistan’s relations with the Taliban and wanted Pakistan out of the
TalibanAfghan peace process. These stories focused on how peace in the region was impossible without
including Pakistan in the process and blamed Afghanistan for delaying the process and consequently the
complete repatriation of Afghan refugees.

Like the terrorist frame and the enemy frame, I noted that the blame frame is also commonly employed in
nationalistic media coverage. The blame frame is also triggered mostly by blatant propaganda, bias and
selectivity. This is an ideal application of what Herman and Chomsky (2010) call “dual standard” or
propaganda-orientated coverage. Jowett and O’Donnell (1999) define propaganda as “the deliberate and
systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions and direct behaviour to achieve a response
that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist” (as cited in Lynch 2010, p. 72). Lynch’s (2010) study
also adopts Herman and Chomsky’s explanation of propaganda in which “the media serve, and
propagandise on behalf of, the powerful societal interests that control and finance them” (p.72). For
instance, both Dawn and ET were remarkably critical of Kabul’s disapproval of Pakistan’s contacts with
the Afghan Taliban, but also mentioned the silence of President Ghani’s administration over the Iranian
ambassador’s visit to Kabul in December 2016, knowing that Iran had contacts with the Taliban. Similarly ,
both Dawn and ET also mentioned the Afghan government’s silence when Russia admitted their contacts
with the Taliban, stating “that did not enrage the Afghan government” even after Amir Kabulov, Russia’s
special envoy to Afghanistan stated, “Taliban interests objectively coincide with ours” (Khan, T 2016). A
few months later, both newspapers also mentioned the American “duplicity” in dealing with the Afghan
Taliban, stating “they directly contact/deal with the Afghan Taliban in times of need, whereas they
continuously pressure Pakistan to take punitive actions against the Afghan Taliban” (Jaspal 2017). These
are examples of media coverage where political statements have been framed as a tug -of-war between
countries (Pakistan, Afghanistan, Russia, US, and so on) and their hyp ocrisy in terms of accepting certain
situations for themselves but blaming the other country for being in the same situation. These are negative
connotations that a common citizen may miss, but a reader may not. By employing the blame frame with
such high frequency, journalists are creating propaganda by using their influence over the reader. In such a
hostile environment, peaceful coexistence and conflict resolution becomes difficult or nearly impossible.
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Dawn and ET were also quick to criticise the Afghan president’s dealing with Pakistan and present him in
a negative light, accusing him of showing disinterest in resolving the Afghan refugee crisis and leaving
refugees as a “burden” on Pakistan. This is demonstrated in the way the Heart of Asia conferenc e was
covered, for instance the following story opener: “You rarely get to see a participating country being
humiliated at a multilateral conference like what happened” during this conference where “Afghan
President Ashraf Ghani embarrassed our foreign policy adviser” (Mohammad 2016). The news story also
stated:

The Afghan president has perhaps forgotten which neighbouring country helped the Afghans
during the Soviet occupation and which neighbour supported the Soviets. Mr Ghani has also
forgotten that Pakistanis opened their hearts and homes to give shelter to more than three millio n
Afghan refugees for more than three decades which led to the “terrorism” he mentioned.

What this story and other coverage of the conference (see for example: Akram 2016) omit s is that it was
President Ghani who first reached out to Pakistan, which suffered a huge setback when the Murree talks in
July earlier that year failed. Pakistan had promised the Afghan president that it would bring the Taliban
leaders to the negotiating table, but the last-minute confirmation of the death of Haqqani/Taliban leader
Mullah Akhtar Mansoor not only derailed the talks but raised serious doubts about Pakistan’s intentions.
The Haqqani/Taliban leader was killed in a US drone strike in Pakistan’s Balochistan province on 21 May
2016. Pakistan took days to confirm his death, bringing the country under international fire for serving as
a safe haven for Taliban and other militants – a concern the Afghan government demonstrated when a
Taliban delegation visited Pakistan in April 2016. However, instead of including the background and
formation of this conflict in their coverage, Dawn and ET deviated their framing focus to the US drone
attack “undermining the Afghan peace process” (Yousuf 2016). Instead, the news story mentioned how this
use of force by the US “will further destabilise Afghanistan, which will have negative implications on the
region, especially due to the presence of large numbers of terrorist groups in in the country”. Mullah
Mansour’s body was sent to Afghanistan on 30 May. Because he had been focusing on Afghan refugees in
his speeches and using them as a reason behind making frequent visits to Pakistan, Afghan refugees
naturally beared the brunt of his killing and were once again targeted in media coverage.

After the withdrawal of the Taliban from the Murree Peace Talks in July 2015, the 2016 conference gave
both Pakistan and Afghanistan an opportunity to work out their differences and negotiate a settlement on
Afghan refugees. However, President Ghani’s political affiliation soon started tilting towards India,
triggering unhappiness from Pakistan that was visibly represented in media coverage. The coverage began
to employ more blame framing after President Ghani refused the 500 million USD financial assistance
Pakistan offered at the conference to expedite refugee repatriation. Instead, he inaugurated the Salma Dam,
a hydro-power station in Herat province, along with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Pakistan’s
unhappiness was translated into open hostility towards Afghan refugees, and the media reflected this. A
sharp rise in refugee returns was seen in the second half of the year. Bjelica (2016) states that as “returning
Afghan refugees traced the upsurge in enmity to the inauguration of the Salma Dam; after that, they said
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Pakistani police started to insult them, calling them ‘sons of Hindus’ and ‘nieces of Narendra Modi’”
(Bjelica 2016, p. 7). Both newspapers reported the refusal as an insult to Pakistan. I found that for the next
six months, both Dawn and ET actively referred to this as a “humiliation” and blamed the Afghan
government for their “immaturity” and “non-seriousness” in resolving the Afghan refugee conflict. When
President Ghani refused the offer of financial help he suggested the Pakistani government should spend the
money eradicating terrorism from their own country. Dawn and ET were quick to frame this as President
Ghani mocking Pakistan and highlighting its failure to curb terrorism. Furthermore, media coverage
suggested that Afghanistan had refused the offer on India’s behest. An implication of such lexical choices
in framing can be that readers get angry and blame Afghanistan  and Afghan refugees  for their
ingratitude and for the humiliation on an international s tage. As Akram (2016) reported for ET:
It was sad to witness the humiliation of Pakistan’s adviser on foreign affairs, Sartaj Aziz, by his
Indian hosts and the Afghan president in Amritsar… The conference was misused by India, the
rotational host, to promote its single agenda of portraying Pakistan as a “terrorist” state in order to
“isolate” it…The hostility and insults which should have been expected from India and
Afghanistan’s president… Mr Aziz’s display of self-restraint is no doubt admirable. But the Indian
and Afghan insults were not merely to his person; these were insults to the national dignity of
Pakistan and, as such, they ought not to have been tolerated.

These negative sentiments were also indirectly legitimised by the widespread coverage of an Afghan
Taliban delegation’s visit to Pakistan in April 2016 to “discuss the Afghan refugee crisis”. Instead of
reporting the subject or outcome of the talks between the Taliban delegation and the Pakistani government,
there was an unusual emphasis on the unrelated news of President Ghani’s recent refusal to accept “any
help” from Pakistan (in AfPak peace talks). I understand this detour from a very important meeting
between the Pakistani officials and the Taliban as a demonstration of what Gamson (1992) refers to as the
feuding neighbours frame. A few days after the Taliban delegation left Pakistan, Kabul suffered a deadly
attack leaving 64 people dead. In the aftermath of the attack, President Ghani said his country will no longer
seek Pakistan’s help for peace talks.

Over the next few weeks, Ghani and his spokesmen continued to express their disappointment with the
Pakistani government for letting terrorists into Pakistan, referring to the Taliban delegation. At this time,
there were intelligence reports in Afghanistan that insurgents from the Haqqani and Taliban networks were
planning attacks on the Afghan people in the northeast provinces of Parwan, Kabul, Logar, Khost, Paktia,
and Paktika (greater Paktia region) (Gul 2016). ET’s Tahir Khan (2016) referred to President Ghani’s
statement as “anger” and that dismissing Pakistan’s help was his response to the talks between the Taliban
delegation and Pakistani government. However, inviting the Taliban delegation was a step Pakistan had
taken without taking the Afghan government in confidence or on board – a move expected from Pakistan
in matters of mutual concern to the governments in both countries, especially after a recent speech by the
Haqqani leader hinting towards jihad against the Afghan government . Readers are deprived of this piece of
crucial information; instead, the news story frames President Ghani’s response as angrily denouncing
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Pakistan for failing to rein in the Taliban and sheltering terrorists – an allegation that, according to the news
story, “Pakistan rubbished”. The omission of background information and context can generate hate and
hostility for Afghanistan and Afghan refugees in Pakistan, who are at the mercy of Pakistan’s government
and people. Instead of focusing on de-escalating the conflict, the framing and lexical choices draw the
readers’ attention to Afghanistan’s allegations against Pakistan making alliance with the Taliban, thus
presenting the other as the “bad” neighbour.
Many other stories presented the Afghan government in a negative light. By using words such as “angrily
denounced” and “Pakistan rubbishes the allegations”, the reporter/editor creates a narrative that lacks
context and strengthens stereotypes. Youngblood (2017) states that framing and word choice are th e key
elements of peace journalism. He explains that traditional journalists often carelessly use many words that
add emotion but no substance. He further explains: “framing theory is significant for all journalists, but
especially so for peace journalists , who often speak of narratives, which can be defined as the interpretation
and presentation of a story” (Youngblood 2017, p. 10). Conversely, peace journalism “seeks to offer
counter-narratives, and to frame stories in such a way as to encourage a more nu anced, thorough, and
constructive societal conversation” (Youngblood 2017, p. 10). As per the tenets of peace journalism, it is
not appropriate to use anger-inducing, misleading or divisive words that put the blame on the other
party/weaker group, which can further escalate the conflict.
Both newspapers continued to employ the blame frame in their coverage of the Afghan Taliban delegation’s
visit throughout the rest of the year. News stories highlighted the Afghan government’s “ire” and their
messages to Islamabad “warning” the Pakistani government to stay away from the reconciliation process
and possibilities between the Taliban and the Afghan government, and to not use Afghan refugees as a
weapon. The stories also focused on the Afghan government’s insecurity about Pakistan’s relations with
the Taliban. While there wasn’t a single story that mentioned the Taliban’s refusal to sit with the Afghan
government for peace talks, calling the government a puppet government (Khan. I 2016), the newspapers
noticeably reported how an Afghan delegation walked out of the UN General Assembly after a Pakistani
delegate began his speech (Khan. T 2016). Ghani’s frustration was genuine because Pakistani political
leadership has a limited role over Afghan policy. This is a fact that the Pakistani government and its media,
which mostly speaks for the government, are omitting.

In 2017, when the conflict seemed to be escalating beyond normalcy and causing ripple effects on the way
Afghan refugees were represented in media and treated by the government, the US Defence Secretary at
the time, James Mattis, visited Pakistan to find “common ground” in promoting peace in the region. During
the trip, Pakistani government officials told Mattis that Pakistan had been prepared to look into the
possibility of “miscreants” exploiting Islamabad’s hospitality to Afghan refugees. On his part, Ma ttis agreed
to look into Pakistan’s “legitimate concerns”, including India’s growing footprint in Afghanistan (Dagia
2017). However, only the Pakistani government’s concern was reported in the media.
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By the end of the year, Pakistan and Afghanistan agreed to have a comprehensive bilateral engagement
agenda, and the AfghanistanPakistan Action Plan for Solidarity (APAPS) was created for constructive
and meaningful bilateral engagement in political, economic, military, intelligence domains through working
groups. The plan put resolving the Afghan refugee crisis as the priority. A front -page Dawn story that
reported on the APAPS at length presented the engagement plan as “Pakistan’s initiative”, stating, “Pakistan
shares plan but nothing happens as the fate of the refugees hangs in balance” (Syed 2017), suggesting noncooperation from the Afghan government. This framing is a binary coverage of the good and bad, where
the blame for any conflict escalation, political misunderstanding or failure to make peac e deals was
attributed to the Afghan government, while the credit for initiatives was given to Pakistan. This is also
evident from statements such as “Pakistan was the only country to have an interest in a peaceful and stable
Afghanistan” (“Pakistan lacks policy guideline to respond to US”, 2018). This type of negative coverage
saturated with blame frame can translate into the exclusion and marginalisation of Afghan refugees, and
generate a national-level resentment towards them.

News stories containing the blame frame also included propaganda-oriented framing that falls under the
truth/propaganda orientation (TPOC) in Galtung’s Peace and War Journalism Model. The blame frame falls
under both the classifications because this type of framing primarily focuses on exposing propaganda and
the “untruths” of all sides, not only the “other” side. A propaganda-oriented approach to framing presents
claims as facts and labels parties involved in the conflict as either “good” or “bad”. This labelling, as Lynch
(2008) argues, demonstrates partisan, emotive and demonising language. It was evident that the Pakistani
government and its military establishment used both the newspapers as a conduit to its own policies, politics
and propaganda, framing Afghan refugees and the A fghan government as the “bad” side/neighbour. To
make Afghan refugees and the Afghan government look “bad”, some facts had to be concealed. This, along
with negative propagation of their image, becomes central to propaganda -oriented coverage, which
excludes certain facts from media reportage. As argued by Nash (2016), the production of silence through
presenting claims as facts makes reporting vulnerable to propaganda. My analysis found that the
incorporation of the blame frame in media coverage and the Pakistani nationalism directed at Afghan
refugees (and Afghans in general) are interconnected. This frame also plays an effective role in presenting
Afghan refugees and the Afghan government as the “bad” neighbour.
Despite the largely non-peace framing, some coverage did focus on the two countries’ efforts to set and
reset mutual relations, especially after Mullah Mansour’s death and the political misunderstandings that
emerged from it. However, those stories also reported that all attempts failed and direct ed the blame for this
towards Afghanistan/Afghan refugees. The Pakistani government was, however, presented in a positive
light. For example, ET reported that one of the major reasons for these failures was that Afghan government
“always was and still is an island of the Afghan elite” (Qadir 2016). The news story made subtle hints
towards the Afghan government’s “disinterest in finding a solution to the refugee crisis” or taking them
back because of this elitism in the ruling party. Once again, I found that the trend of blame diversion was
more frequent in stories that had quoted the political or military elite.
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This is evident from how both Dawn and ET responded to a press statement by the Afghan consul general,
who was appointed in Pakistan in February 2016. The new consul general had expressed interest in
quadrilateral talks and suggested taking China and America on board to end terrorism in the region.
However, his press statement was responded to by Dawn and ET with scepticism that questioned the
motives behind his appointment by the Afghan government and his “so -called” interest in peace talks. One
of the major stories in Dawn on the appointment and press statement was an interview with a former
Pakistani ambassador to the US. She was quoted as saying, “I hope a political settlement for Afghanistan
is not just a bumper sticker, and that Pakistan will not be left with the fallout of this long war next door
again” (“Pakistan is fighting terror war alone, says Ms Rehman”, 2016). Not only is the choice of a former
Pakistani diplomat as the major source inappropriate here (as an elite), but also highlighting such
provocative statements in the media can be detrimental to the peace process and slow down conflict de escalation. They reflect an element of distrus t, uncertainty and, most importantly, nationalism. The
recurrent representation of Afghan refugees and the Afghan government in this untrustworthy light may
have a direct connection with the type of source quoted in the story.

I also observed that stories that had employed the blame frame were highly nationalistic and had heavily
quoted political and military elite sources. This overlap of non-peace orientations in framing can impact
the readers’ perception of the conflict, especially readers who take official sources more seriously than
unofficial sources. As noted above, sources play an important role in determining frames. In addition to the
presence (as well as the absence) of certain facts, keywords, phrases, ideas, context and sentences, sources
“provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or judgments” (Entman 1993, p. 52). News stories that
were dominated by government officials and other elite sources used certain terminologies drawn from
nationalistic narratives, such as blaming the Afghan government for not wanting to take the refugees back
or for showing a lack of seriousness towards a peace process. These conventions could produce “a bias in
favour of official sources, a bias in favour of event over process and a bias in favour of dualism in reporting
conflicts” (Lynch & McGoldrick 2005, p. 209). McGoldrick (2006) takes a different angle on elite-focused
sources in media coverage. According to her, these particular practices are in disagreement with the liberal
theory of press freedom in which media should act as a “civic tool” that is supposed to shed light on
problems and report “facts” without “fear or favour” (p. 4). After a bomb blast in KP’s capital city of
Peshawar in March 2016, I observed that as the use of elite sources increased across the coverage in both
the newspapers, the blame-oriented coverage also further intensified. Anti-Afghan coverage increased, and
stories accused Afghan refugees of facilitating terrorism in Pakistan. The traditional media’s systematic
practice of denying and covering-up was likely giving way to escalatory reactions and anti-Afghan
sentiments across the country. As usual, the onus of the attack was swiftly and very clearly put on Kabul’s
alleged disinterest and possible facilitation of illegal cross -border movement and terrorism in Pakistan. A
Dawn story (Akram 2016) reported:

While Pakistan has offered to help in promoting reconciliation between Kabul and the Afghan
Taliban, there is little evidence of reciprocal action by Kabul to eliminate the TTP s afe havens or
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to control cross-border infiltration. Kabul has refused to even revive the coordination mechanisms
for border monitoring that were created with the US-Nato command.
Ersoy (2016) calls this win lose framing. In his examination of Turkish newspaper coverage of Syria’s
downing of a Turkish jet in 2012 and Turkey’s downing of a Syrian jet in 2014, he found that a significant
proportion of the coverage accused, blamed and suspected the “other side” (Ersoy 2016). My analysis draws
on Ersoy’s attribution of win lose framing to political pressure on journalists. In the context of Afghan
refugees in Pakistan, such framing is one reason why media become a propaganda tool or a mouthpiece of
the government and the military establishment. After every terrorist attack or busting of a narcotics
operation, I noted that both Dawn and ET were quick to blame the Afghan refugees and remind readers of
the consequences of letting them stay for long. Dawn (“Khattak asks Nawaz to call APC on fresh wave of
terrorism”, 2016) reported:

The province was badly affected by the ongoing terrorist activities. The UN agencies, federal
government and government should fix [a] time for repatriation of Afghan refugees … [they were]
a burden on the province and [the] security condition was becoming worse owing to their presence,

Additionally, in another major story on repatriation that was published in Dawn, Pakistan was referred to
as the side/neighbour that “was trying to ensure implementation of international border laws at the
PakAfghan border” (“Govt plans to repatriate 3m Afghan refugees”, 2016). The same news story frames
Afghanistan as the side that focused on the blame game instead of abiding by international laws. What I
find problematic here is the long-term impact of such conflict-escalatory coverage. Pakistanis are now
displaying the same xenophobic tendencies towards Afghan refugees that many in the West display towards
refugees from the Middle East (see for example: Holzberg, Kolbe & Zaborowski 2018; Hovden, Mjelde &
Gripsrud 2018). This was evident after the Torkham border crossfire between Pakistani and Afghan soldiers
in June 2016 that was followed by a Twitter campaign with the hashtag #KickOutAllAfghans. This conflict escalatory journalism not only translated into a hate and smear campaign online, but also triggered an
increase in the harassment of Afghan refugees by Pakistani police (Borthakur 2017; Human Rights Watch
2015; Najafizada and Maroof 2015).

The Taliban, who are supported by Pakistan but also have a constituency among Afghan refugees, also
issued statements on 21 and 29 July 2016. They underlined that the Pakistani authorities should not treat
the Afghan refugees in a political way and that ordinary Afghan refugees s hould not become victims of
politics (Bjelica 2016). Calls for return from Kabul also started in mid-2016. In an interview with Pajhwok ,
Ghani’s Special Envoy and Ambassador to Pakistan, Omar Zakhelwal, said that the “newly launched
project ‘Khpal Watan Gul Watan’ aimed at encouraging refugees to repatriate had [yielded] positive
results” and that, “earlier the Afghani [sic] migrants in Pakistan did not feel for the country, but now they
had realised that they should live in dignity in their own country” (Hikmat 2016).
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While the ‘Khpal Watan Gul Watan’ (translated from Pashto language as: one’s own country is the most
beautiful and the dearest) campaign was a national-level initiative, it is rather surprising that neither Dawn
nor ET reported it once in their coverage throughout 2016 or 2017. Instead, there was an increase in
coverage that reminded the reader of Pakistan’s “greatness” and Afghanistan’s “thanklessness”, where the
refugees were blamed for draining the country’s funds, for taking over jobs, fo r an increase in crime, and
for terrorism (“Xenophobia towards refugees”, 2016). During this time (mid -2016 onwards) there were
more references to Afghan refugees’ involvement in the illegal drug trade, accusing them of bringing a drug
culture and Kalashnikov culture to the “already ailing economy” of Pakistan. Meanwhile, other news stories
framed Pakistan as helpless and reflected Pakistan’s nationalistic sentiments regarding Afghanistan and
India’s growing relations. For instance, (“Afghan refugees”, 2016):
The refugees’ stay in Pakistan will propagate the blame game and it is not in the supreme interest
of both countries. India is trying to fill the vacuum in PakAfghan relations, which is not in the
best interest of either country. It is brotherly advice to our Afghan brethren that Pakistan is not in
a position to serve you anymore. We have our own problems. We need space and time to solve
them. Our tolerance level should not be provoked anymore and it is time you respected our
sovereignty.

The most evident aspect of the blame frame was the removal of responsibility for certain actions from
Pakistan and explicitly shifting it towards Afghanistan. For instance, in August 2016, the US Department
of Defence stopped $300 million of military assis tance to Pakistan because of its alleged failure to prevent
the Haqqani network from using its land for cross -border attacks in Afghanistan. Pakistan, however, blamed
Afghanistan for its lack of intelligence cooperation with Pakistan to thwart cross -border attacks. In return,
Afghanistan blamed Islamabad’s poor plan to repatriate Afghan refugees.

Despite the termination of military assistance from the US, there was a constant denial from Pakistani
government that Pakistan facilitated the Haqqani/Taliban n etworks in Pakistan or Afghanistan. The
Pakistani media not only reported this denial, framing it as a clarification of the “truth” by the government,
but in doing so they also served as a propaganda tool in the hands of the State and military. There was a
clear lack,  and at many points, absence  of background and historical information to help the reader
understand the context of the conflict and be aware of both sides. Dawn reported, “Kabul showed ‘keen
interest’ in the proposal but later backed out when ‘elements within the Afghan government argued that it
would weaken their stance on the Durand Line’” and that the two countries also came close to an agreement
on intelligence cooperation “but similar political considerations in Kabul failed this effort too” (“More US
lawmakers likely to visit North Waziristan”, 2016). The Afghan refugees in Pakistan, however, argued that
they were not yet ready for such a large-scale repatriation, and Kabul feared that militants would also return
with the refugees.
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3.5 Conclusion
Pakistani media have explicitly taken a political and nationalistic stance in their framing of Afghan refugees
and AfPak political relations. The way media covered the refugee conflict between 2016 and 2018 further
escalated political misunderstandings between the two countries. It has also had a significant influence on
Pakistan’s stern policy on Afghan refugee repatriation, and contributed to the reservations around how safe
these refugees are for Pakistan. In my case study, Pakistani media can no longer be interpreted via the
framework of a simple “stimulusresponse model” (Lynch 2013). Both newspapers studies have served an
inflammatory role, especially in a crisis situation, such as after a terrorist attack, a cross -border skirmish,
an unsuccessful regional peace dialogue or a Taliban visit to Pakistan. Lynch (2013) further argues that
media must play the role of a mediator in war and conflict. To play the role of a mediator, it becomes
important for media not to distort reality, and ins tead to present real facts, and not claims in the guise of
facts. In this chapter, I have examined coverage by the two most -read English newspapers in Pakistan to
identify their role as either mediators or agents of conflict escalation.

I observed that the explicit and implicit use of non-peace framing in the representation of Afghan refugees
dehumanised and demonised them. To prevent conflicts from escalating, especially in a humanitarian crisis,
the media need to avoid unsubstantiated and damaging repres entations. Frames based on the
dehumanisation and demonisation of refugees as enemies were very common – a central element of
conflict-escalatory journalism. Dehumanisation can vary from animal metaphors to object metaphors
(objectification); for example, the use of the words “dogs” and “traitors”, respectively. These words,
consistently employed in the media narrative, could become part of general public speech about the enemy others. The use of such language presents the victim as the “enemy” or the “othe r”, based on characteristics
or behaviours that are 1) foreign (for instance, language and lifestyle), 2) socially unacceptable or negatively
associated with in the host country (for instance, education, work, public dealings), and 3) illegal or
detrimental to the national security (for instance, rogue/terrorists, as discussed in the preceding section).

Perhaps the most surprising interpretative repertoire was the use of analogy that referred to Afghan refugees
as animals (such as “dogs”) or non-believers/infidels (such as “sons of Hindus”) – both considered impure
in Islam. Steuter and Wills’ (2009) work on metaphors of the “war on terror” notes the tendency to represent
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq through the metaphor of “the hunt”, through expressions such as “lairs”,
“nests” and “swamps”, all connoting an animal’s life (p. 14). Similar animal metaphors were also noted in
media framing of the Rwandan genocide (1994), where the Tutsi ethnic community was widely referred to
as serpents and cockroaches (Kagwi-Ndungu 2007). Under the Nazi regime, Jews were dehumanised in
propaganda films with interspersed scenes of Jewish immigration with shots of teeming rats. Though less
frequent in framing by the two newspapers I studied for my research, the enemy -as-pest theme has the
tendency to emerge as a dominant frame of its own.

All these negative implicit and explicit representations in framing collectively construct the refugee image
as the “terrorist”, the “enemy” and the “bad neighbour”. The studies of suc h misrepresentations of refugees
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are not new to media scholarship. For instance, d’Haenens and de Lange (2001), who studied the depiction
of immigrants and refugees in Dutch newspapers, questioned if these depictions were aligned with who
these migrants were outside of the media. The authors found that the “dissatisfaction and negative attitude
was depersonalized, dramatized and emotionalized” (d’Haenens & de Lange 200, p. 856). They also found
that a newspaper that was published in a borough where there was a negative response to the arrival of an
asylum seekers’ centre made more use of a human-interest frame than expected. I would argue that their
findings suggest that peace-oriented reporting becomes even more necessary when negative sentiments
about refugees already prevail in the host society. However, the complete opposite was observed in the case
of Dawn’s and ET’s coverage of Afghan refugees and their forced repatriation from Pakistan. Both
newspapers demonstrated non-peace and conflict-escalatory coverage in the aftermath of the APS and
Bacha Khan University attacks, the alleged IS recruitments, Obama’s provocative statement about regional
instability, Mullah Mansour’s death, and so on. All of these were instances when peace -reporting was even
more essential to de-escalate the conflict. However, the saturation of these non-peace frames in media
reporting has resulted in the dominance of a narrative that’s oppressive, racist, and detrimental to the peace
process. Most importantly, it obscures public awareness about the conflict and its repercussions for Afghan
refugees and for one of Pakistan’s most geo-strategically, politically, economically and socio-culturally
important neighbours.
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Chapter 4
Critical Discourse Analysis: Unpacking Frames in Coverage of Herald
and Newsline Magazines
4.1 Introduction
On the surface, magazines and newspapers are distinct journalism types with different reporting and writing
styles. There is a difference in their publication frequency, topical and lexical choices, formatting and
sometimes genres. However, my analysis of the coverage in two Pakistani magazines of Afghan refugees
and their repatriation from Pakistan reveals a commonality with newspapers in their lack of adoption of
peace journalism frames.

In this chapter, I turn my analytical attention from newspapers to the way the two current affair magazines,
Herald and Newsline, framed the Afghan refugee conflict from 20162018 – the same three years as the
newspaper stories analysed in the previous chapter. This chapter is an extension of the media discourse
analysis I conducted in the preceding chapter. I argue that by employing more peace -oriented framing, both
magazines could have improved their coverage of the refugee conflict and the forced exodus. I do not intend
to draw a comparison between newspaper and magazine coverage of the conflict. Instead, by also including
magazine articles in my media corpus, I can map a wider and more accurate picture of peace journalis m
practice  or lack thereof  in mainstream Pakistani English media.

The magazine corpus comprises 61 articles (35 in 2016, 15 in 2017 and 11 in 2018). The average length of
the articles is 620 words. I identified two dominant frames on the basis of their frequent recurrence in the
coverage  the ethno-nationalist frame, and the blame frame, also dominant in newspaper coverage (as
discussed in Chapter 3). I classified the ethno-nationalist frame as elite-oriented coverage (PEOC), and the
blame frame primarily as conflict-oriented coverage (under PCOC) and secondarily as propaganda-oriented
coverage (under TPOC). Both the magazines employed the ethno-nationalist frame even when
reporting/investigating the terrorism aspect attached to the Afghan refugee identity in Pakistan. The articles
on terrorism focused more on the ethnicity of the refugees than on the event, the threat or the security
measures taken by law enforcement agencies. Thus, the emphasis was on the link between terrorism and
refugees.

Unlike the daily newspaper stories analysed, I found that magazine articles commonly carried more than
one frame. This could be due to the longer word count, which provides journalists with an opportunity to
explore either one topic from multiple angles, or more than one topic in an article. This also adds value to
the investigative and interpretative characteristics of magazine articles, which demonstrate a strong
voice/opinion of the journalist. Articles that did not meet the peace-orientation analytical criteria largely
employed the two dominant frames  the ethno-nationalist frame and/or the blame frame. However, articles
that were identified as peace-oriented under the analytical criteria had employed multiple frames. The
adoption of multiple frames was common in articles that covered varied social and political aspects of the
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conflict and highlighted different ideas at once. Such articles largely reported the challenges faced by these
refugees, and their discrimination and harassment by Pakistani State and/or law enforcement agencies.
These articles narrated personal stories of the affected refugees as a representation of what it is like being
an Afghan refugee in Pakistan, and what the implications of forced repatriation can be on their lives.
However, such articles were very rare, and those found in the corpus were published primarily in Herald
magazine. In these instances, I initially found it challenging to classify the text exclusively under one frame.
For instance, some articles incorporated the terrorist frame, the enemy frame, and the ethno-nationalist
frame. In those cases, I classified the article according to the dominant frame employed in the text.
Additionally, where needed, I also stated the secondary frame if it was incorporated more explicitly than
the rest of the frames in the s ame text.

4.2 Losing the “race” against Pakistani media
There are two distinct schools-of-thought in scholarship that study media representation of refugees. One
common idea is that refugees are misrepresented and portrayed through war-oriented framing, which
generates their alienation and “othering” by the host society (see for example: Abid et al. 2017; Chouliaraki
and Stolic 2017; Eastmond 1998; Kaye 1994; Shaw 2000). The other group, although rare, finds positive
media representations of refugees and asylum seekers, principally drawn on a victimisation frame in their
coverage (see for example: Al Dabbagh and Amro 2020; Sunata and Yıldız 2018; Venir 2016). The latter
body of work on positive media representations is infrequent, yet largely recent, possibly indicating a slow
positive change in media framing of refugees and asylum seekers. However, that is a hypothesis that will
require separate substantiation. My findings for this chapter align with the deductions of the former group
of studies – refugees as the “other”. I would argue that even if the Pakistani public is considerably aware
of the challenges of displacement and refugee life, Afghan refugees are generally not welcome in Pakistani
society, and their media representation is frequently drawn on the ethno-nationalist frame, encapsulating
the “terrorist” and “enemy” images .

Refugees have traditionally been framed negatively in media and are often represented as a threat (see for
example: Chavez 2008; Farris and Silber 2018; Gonzalez O’Brien 2018; Gonzalez O’Brien et al. 2019;
Parker 2017; Santa 2002). These representations further the marginalis ation of various minority groups as
the “other”. By clearly defining the “other”, countries develop and understand national identities. Dhamoon
(2009) argues that it is one way of national “meaning-making” (p. 69). The use of the ethno-nationalist
frame in coverage of Afghan refugees by the two magazines confirms many of the findings of earlier
research in the field. It can be argued that by “othering” refugees, Pakistani media exercise their power and
form a general public understanding of the dichotomies between the self and the “other”. The media
“othering” then contributes to the public justification of ethnocentric and racist attitudes towards refugees.
Borrowing from Fekete (2010), a large number of articles demonstrated “xeno-racist sentiments” in framin g
(discussed in Chapter 2). This type of framing responds to the second analytical criterion under the
people/elite-oriented frame, concerned with identifying themes of ethno -nationalism in the coverage of
Afghan refugees.
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Tribalism and ethno-nationalism are deeply rooted in Pakistani society. For most Pakistani citizens, their
tribal and ethnic identity gives them a sense of belonging to the country, serving as a collective social
identification. As a shared value, this identification involves emphasising “similarity” or commonalit y
within a group, and “differentiation” from others outside the group (Jenkins 2008). This furthers the
exclusion or inclusion of certain groups of people from the collective identification. Jenkins (2008) argues
that the process of “us vs. them” is so deeply entrenched in human existence, that “even when the matter is
expressed as superficially as this, it is possible to see an internalexternal dialectic of identification at work
collectively” (p. 105). In countries such as Pakistan, which was founded on the basis on ethnicities, tribes
and religion, the internalexternal belongingness is easily politicised. Tribalists and ethno -nationalists are
in a constant competition with Islamists to establish their social and political autonomy in the country (Kfir
2007). Even within various provinces, there is a strong tribal affinity among citizens.

My analysis exposes the ordinariness of ethno-nationalism and tribalism, even in the very limited coverage
of Afghan refugees by the two magazines in the three years (20162018). In the November 2018 edition of
Newsline, the journalist went to the extent of presenting Afghan refugees as a threat to the identity of the
Pakistani Pashtun. According to the article, “Should Afghan and Bengali refugees be given citizenship
status?” (Newsline, November 2018), claiming granting Afghan refugees Pakistani citizenship would make
Pakistani Pashtuns weak in Pashtun-dominated areas, such as KP province. The article suggests an
overpopulation of Afghan Pashtuns will trigger ethnic rivalry in the country. This type of inflammato ry
framing can generate a sense of hyped insecurity and social anxiety among the Pakistani audience. The
article is asking readers to view refugees as not only an economic threat, b ut also a threat to their
tribal/ethnic survival. What the journalist ignores is that a generation of Afghan refugees have been born in
Pakistan, and may have never visited their home country. By exaggerating the imagined consequences,
media are reflecting the State’s apathy towards refugees, who are largely living below the poverty line in
Pakistan. The article demonstrates the media’s propagandist coverage, where they are playing on public
emotions concerning their national and ethnic ideologies.

Media can appropriate ethnic ideologies and construct negative social representations of refugees through
certain repertoire. According to Van Dijk (2006), “ideologies consist of social representations that define
the social identity of a group, that is, its shared beliefs about its fundamental conditions and ways of
existence” (p. 116). He further argues that these ideologies and social representations serve as a guide for
social practices and how various groups interact with each other. Therefore, the way media frame a conflict
or a group of people can define, legitimise and manufacture consensus about them and how to interact with
them. Through ethnocentric framing, media can articulate ideologies of the “other”, which can directly or
indirectly contribute to the dominance of one group and the subordination of the other (Van Dijk 1993).
Through a conflict-escalatory approach in framing, the journalist becomes a contributor to the escalation of
the conflict. There is a significant probability that these frames may also represent a journalist’s ideology
(I have discussed the influence of journalists’ cultural background and political affiliation on their reporting
in Chapter 2). When these ideas are passed on to the readers, an “ideological square” is created. Insid e the
“ideological square”, a term introduced by Van Dijk (1998), stories are characterised by a “Positive Self-
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Presentation” and a simultaneous “Negative Other-Presentation”, emphasising the positive characteristics
of “us” and negative characteristics of the “other”. When journalists frame refugees as the “other” on the
basis of ethnicity, such as in the case of Afghan refugees, they reinforce and legitimise their “Negative
Other-Presentation” image as the outsider, who may pose a threat to the country – a theme explicit ly
recurrent across both the magazines and the two newspapers.

The anti-Afghan narrative that was reused over the three years highlights the differences between Pakistanis
and Afghans on the basis of ethnicity and nationality. The reinforcement of these differences can widen the
divide between refugees and the host society. While there are various reasons for repetition in media
coverage, some scholars believe it is due to a lack of investigation, resources and/or outreach. Neuendorf,
Armstrong and Brentar (1992) argue that the fact that there is generally a limited framing repertoire when
it comes to the debate about refugees and migration is perhaps due to time and resource constraints that
result in reporting that consciously or unconsciously reproduces and reinforces dominant frames. They
argue that since refugees are mostly covered through negative frames, the dominant narrative is
consequently negative too. This also risks perpetuating very similar and simplified storytelling about
refugees, asylum seekers, and immigration in general (Hooper 2014). Therefore, news stories will often
focus on existing myths, differences, and dissimilarities, potentially legitimising ethnocentric and
nationalist rhetoric. This may also undermine any policy efforts concerning rehabilitation and resettlement
of refugees (Grobet 2014; Staglianó 2014).

I found multiple examples of articles where the ethno -national differences between Pakistan and
Afghanistan were further amplified. These examples may not be targeting Afghan refugees directly;
however, they encourage a parochial perspective towards their acceptance and integration into the host
society. The reader is reminded that Pakistani and Afghan Pashtuns do not belong in the same place, despite
having thousands of years of shared history, culture and language. For example, in July 2016, a Newsline
article, “Now Friend, Now Enemy: PakAfghan Relations” (Newsline July 2016), reports the Afghan
president as telling a BBC interviewer that Pakistan and Afghanistan were not brotherly nations. Five
months later, in another Newsline article titled “Partners with Purpose” (Newsline December 2016),
journalist Kunwar Khuldune Shahid reminds the readers about the president’s remark. Shahid reports, “ The
Afghan president said that Pakistan and Afghanistan ‘weren’t brothers,’ but two states with ties dictated by
respective self-interests” (Newsline December 2016). Neither article provides any context for the
president’s remark  instead they highlight the political instability between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Passing references to the same remark by the Afghan president also appeared in a few other articles over
the next year.

To appreciate the impact of these words, and then their repetition in two major cover stories a few months
apart, it is crucial to first understand the concept of brotherhood in the PakAfghan shared cultural setup.
Calling a man “brother” in the Pashtun culture means that the relationship is unbreakable and that the
“brothers” will and must stand up for each other and have each other’s backs forever. Writing about the
Pashtun tribal culture, Rzehak (2011) explains that the idea of brotherhood is a consequence of the
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genealogical pyramid, leading back to a common ancestor that forms the tribal structure (p. 12; also see:
Karrer 2012). By saying that Pakistan and Afghanistan are not “brothers”, first the president and then the
journalist are implying that Afghanistan has “unbrotherly” sentiments for Pakistan, which can be inferred
as a threat to peace and clearly inciting hatred. In the context of this article, by highlighting the president’s
quote, the reader is interpellated into viewing Afghanistan as the “other”. On the other hand, Afghanistan
is also represented as viewing Pakistan as the “other” – thus reinforcing mutual hate for each other, when
in fact the Afghan president’s quote is taken out of context. The President had remarked that Pakistan and
Afghanistan were not two young brothers, but two states facing political and security challenges. He had
asked Pakistani government to maintain a consistent stance on terrorism to help Afghanist an achieve
regional peace. The President’s full remark was omitted from coverage and most newspapers, including
Dawn and ET only published part of it. “Pakistan, Afghanistan are not brothers: Ashraf Ghani” (Nation 28
September 2015), and “Afghanistan and Pakistan are not brothers, says Ghani” (Pakistan Today 28
September 2015) are some examples of the headlines on the front pages of some of Pakistan’s major English
newspapers the day after the interview. Both Newsline articles (Newsline July 2016; Newsline December
2016) mention President Ghani’s remarks months after they were made. Whether the inclusion of the
remarks in these articles is conscious or incidental, only part of the reality is presented to the readers. In
both cases reality is distorted by providing only a limited view of the statement. It can be argues that the
reminder primarily serves to further an “us vs them” interpretation.

As a whole, the media corpus reflects how acutely Pakistan mistrusts Afghan refugees. Media
predominantly speak for the government, who uses Afghan refugees to bear the brunt of political
misunderstandings and hostility between the two governments. It is a vicious cycle. A public suspicion
about refugees and other minorities can lead to their social isolation, legitimise their suffering and encourage
their marginalisation.
This is demonstrated in a Newsline article, “Identity crisis: NADRA under fire”, (Newsline July 2016). The
article reports the problems faced by NADRA in issuing computerised national identity cards (CNICs) to
citizens of the northern Pakistani province KP. As mentioned earlier, this Pashtun province not only shares
its western border with Afghanistan, it also shares hundreds of years of Pashtun cultural history, language
and lifestyle with the Afghan Pashtuns. The article heavily incorporates the ethno-nationalist frame and is
conflict-escalatory. It highlights how many local Pashtuns are mistaken for Afghan refugees and their
identity documents withheld or cancelled. While the article begins with a legitimate concern about the
mistaken identities of Pakistani Pashtun citizens and Afghan Pashtun refugees, it quickly moves to the
assumption that Afghan refugees are allegedly benefitting from this mistake to undertake illegal smuggling
and narcotics into Pakistan. The journalist aims, without evidence, that a Pakistani CNIC helps Afghan
refugees integrate into Pakistan. He reports, “It also helps human traffickers in getting people fro m
Afghanistan and Iran to enter Karachi, some of whom remain here in the city working petty jobs and joining
the narcotics or smuggling trade” (Newsline July 2016). The article, however, provides no evidence or
background information to support the claim that these refugees were joining the illegal narcotics trade.
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Nonetheless, the readers’ distrust is triggered, and omitting or underemphasising key facts creates further
distrust of the refugees.

Both magazines continue to demonise, vilify and diabolise Afghan refugees in their coverage. The two
newspapers also demonstrate this trend, as observed in the previous chapter. Comparing the two magazines,
Newsline incorporates the ethno-nationalist approach more than Herald. Rehana Hakim’s article for
Newsline (June 2016) is one of the many examples of escalation-oriented coverage by the magazine. In the
article, Hakim, the magazine’s editor-in-chief, consistently refers to Afghan refugees as “illegal settlers”.
She writes that Afghan refugees have taken Pakistan for granted for years. She also writes that because
Pakistan provided them with safety and security, they are free to settle anywhere in the country. She further
writes:

Additionally, we played the perfect hos t to three million plus Afghan refugees who crossed
the border. Instead of registering them at the entry point and confining them to special camps
like Iran did, we allowed them to spread their wings, set up businesses and acquire Pakistani
passports and ID cards … And now, 40 years later, Balochistan’s Home Minister Sarfaraz
Bugti threatens to throw out all illegal Afghan refugees. One is not quite sure how he
proposes to do that.
Through a sarcastic tone for the government’s “mismanagement” of refugees, Hakim is presenting refugees
as a group of people that the Pakistani government should have controlled since their arrival. She also
suggests that the “problem” has gotten out of hand. The strong opinions in Hakim’s article stem from a nonpeace approach, and can be seen as mongering hate for refugees. She is clearly isolating refugees as a
separate, “other” group. She claims that Pakistan had to “pay a hefty price” for hosting the refugees, but
does not explain or clearly suggest what she means by “a heft y price”. In failing to clearly explain what
hefty price Pakistan had to pay for hosting the refugees, Hakim is leaving the interpretation of the word to
the readers. However, the interpretative options that are available to the readers are largely drawn from the
dominant anti-Afghan media frames based on their representations as aliens/“other” and terrorists.
Hakim’s article was published in the same edition that carried a feature story on the killing of the Afghan
Taliban chief Mullah Mansour. He was killed in a US drone strike in Pakistan’s Balochistan province. Hours
after his killing, Pakistani and Afghan TV screens flashed pages of Mansour’s Pakistani passport. This was
followed by the Pakistani interior minister’s press conference, in which he denie d that Mansour was ever
granted Pakistani citizenship. This was years after the killing of Osama bin Ladin on Pakistani soil in 2011
– an incident that Pakistan takes as an embarrassment. Yet again, it was Mansour’s presence in Pakistan,
and not his killing, that raised questions about Pakistan’s relations with the Taliban and allegedly providing
safe haven for Afghan militant groups and individuals. The news sabotaged the ongoing peace talks between
the two countries. Pakistani and Afghan governments and media blamed the other side for their failure to
have detected Mansour’s cross -border movements and hiding earlier. Including these two articles in the
same edition promotes an inference that this was the “hefty price” that Hakim was referring to in her art icle.

98

Such framing in national media can further aggravate the socio -political complexities between Pakistan and
Afghanistan.

Media-fuelled negative images can be long-lasting and can change the ways people and groups are viewed.
People with less knowledge about an issue are more likely to be influenced by negative media coverage
than people who are well informed (Schemer 2012). In this case study, an ethnocentric interpretation is very
likely to command broad consensus due to two factors: first, becaus e people lack knowledge of the
fundamental realities of the conflict, the refugee crisis, and the role of the Pakistani State/military in
Afghanistan’s political instability; second, because of the anti-Afghan sentiments embedded in Pakistani
society. Amidst this, Pakistani media play a catalytic role. Many scholars believe that racial stereotypes that
are created by the media last longer in the public narrative than those created by unrelated media events (see
for example: Devine 1989; Power, Murphy and Coover 1996). These negative stereotypes not only form
and change the ways people view a certain group, they also have a tendency to become deeply cultivated in
people’s minds over time. Similarly, the overuse of the ethno-nationalist frame can encourage the
acceptance of the prototypical Afghan refugee as a terrorist, and the prototypical terrorist as an Afghan
refugee.

The representation of refugees as responsible for certain social and political problems in Pakistan creates
negative perceptions and controversies about them. Controversies are a part of the media cycle. They not
only evoke attention and emotions, they also sell. Gordon et al. (2011) argue that most media content is
generated, and sometimes reinforced, with an intention to manipulate the audience. In both the magazines
in this study, certain controversies around Afghan refugees are prevalent. Most of the controversies
surrounding Afghan refugees are related to their non -native identity  the “other”  and their alleged
involvement in terrorism. A strong reason for the recurrence of these controversies in media narratives could
be the journalists’ imitation of dominant framing patterns that were well-received by the public during
earlier reportage. Since representations inform perceptions, framing refugees as the “other” encourages
antagonistic public attitudes.
Media-generated controversies and constructed realties have a “contagion effect” – a term I borrow from
Midlarsky et al. (1980). The authors use this term to explain that when certain ideas remain in the public
narrative over a long periods, systematic patterns of recurrence are generated. They analyse worldwide
instances of terrorism and argue that some types of terrorism are more susceptible t o imitation, and are thus
“contagious”. They further state that the “contagion effect” can explain the regional and global spread in
terrorism. The idea of the “contagion effect” was later developed by Norris et al. (2003), who extends its
application to the role of journalists in encouraging certain ideas or incidents. They argue that journalists
can lend legitimacy or credibility to different parties in a conflict depending on who they rely on for
information sources; in any case, this can trigger a “contagion effect”. On one hand, over-reliance on public
officials and government press statements can lead to further misrepresentations of Afghan refugees. On the
other hand, empathising with the refugees can also generate a “contagion effect” that can challe nge negative
stereotypes and promote positive, harmless images of Afghan refugees. The concept of the contagion effect
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further strengthens the argument that dominant media frames are not just generated and then forgotten.
Instead, they can be powerful enough to influence public opinion when reinforced in coverage in different
contexts over longer periods.

The dominant narrative about Afghan refugees in the magazines is ill-informed and misleading. Both
Herald and Newsline largely omit important background information about the refugee conflict from their
coverage. If readers are under-informed, they are more likely to be misled. Misleading representation is not
only inaccurate but also highly subjective, and can create mis - and/or disinformation. Inaccurate
information generates and fuels controversies, and thus media can influence readers’ appetite for political
controversies through a frequent employment of the ethno-nationalistic frame.

In such a media environment, it becomes less likely that a counter-stereotype will emerge among readers.
An example of this is a special report published in Herald in April 2018 on Afghan refugees living in
Sohrab Goth 10 , an old suburb at the entrance of the southern port city of Karachi. The article focuses on the
love stories of three Afghan refugees, each of whom had married a Pakistani woman after meeting her in
the refugee camp. It also highlights the social challenges the couples faced because of their inter-national
marriages – a rare union in Pakistan. Zehra Nawab, one of the three journalists who worked on the special
report, and a friend, later told me (personal communication, 22 December 2020) that minutes after the
article was published online, the comments had to be turned off because of the significant anti-Afghan
refugee sentiments. The comments largely questioned the intentions, belongingness and political
allegiances of the Afghan refugee men who married the Pakistani women. Some readers deman ded that the
refugees be forced to return to Afghanistan. Most comments contained hate, and reflected a lack of empathy
for the plight of the three couples or Afghan refugees in general.

I later read the comments, and wondered if hate, ethno-nationalism and security issues were the only reasons
behind such negative sentiments shared by these Pakistani citizens for the refugees. I found most comments
to be ill-informed. I was confronted with an ethno-nationalist populist outrage that primarily blamed Afghan
refugees for terrorism in Pakistan, and doubted their genuine need for refuge. Overall, the comments clearly
reflected propagandist political ideas. I found nothing in the article that could have prompted this
antagonism and condemnation of refugees. However, I observed that like many other articles discussed
earlier, this article also did not present any information about the political and historical background of the
conflict that had driven the PakistaniAfghan couples into such precarious situations. Again, this could
leave the reader uninformed about the causes behind the crisis situation, and encourage them to maintain
their preconceived ideas of Afghan refugees, driven and shaped by a dominant anti-Afghan media narrative
and a lack of issue-specific knowledge. Schemer (2012) argues that issue-specific knowledge can moderate
media effects; for example, poorly informed individuals are more likely to rely on stereotypes activated by
media coverage. Similarly, in the case of Afghan refugees, the omission of background information creates
the potential for stereotypes to foster and for blame to be tossed around. Given the flexibility of word -count,
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The suburb was not originally part of the metropolitan area, but became one of its major suburbs through illegal
settlement on encroached public land built in 1970s. As of 2020, it is also home to nearly 250,000 Afghan refugees.
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relaxed deadlines and a chance for more investigative reporting, journalists can utilise magazine articles to
undertake detailed coverage of any issue. Magazines give journalists room to include background
information, which is one of the basic characteristics of peace journalism and crucial to the contextual
understanding of a topic.

A number of articles in the two magazines studied provide important information without sources or
evidence. This raises a question on the trustworthiness of the source, and also the validity of the journalist’s
statements. However, when certain narratives become dominant in media and reinforced more often, there
is a chance these ideas are less frequently contested  they are believed to be true because of their recurrence
and reuse. Koch and Peter (2017) argue that negatively framed media statements are often perceived as
more trustworthy than formally equivalent, positively framed statements (also see: Hilbig 2009, 2012). The
authors studied the framing effects of political communication on public opinion and found two dominant
frames: the emphasis framing (accentuation or concealment of facts), and the equivalence framing
(equivalent information) – positive and negative framing, respectively. They found that the effect of both
media messages and their sources on the recipient’s “truth rating” could be enha nced by framing a certain
situation/event negatively. The effect was further heightened if the statement was linked to a well-known
politician commenting on an issue of political importance. I found more unnamed sources in Newsline than
in Herald. Where sources are named, journalists are depending heavily on the political and/or military elite
as their major information source. Journalists can increase the news and truth values of their article by
attributing statements to elites, such as well-known politicians. Even if a source is presented without a name,
overall, a reader is less likely to question supporting facts as long as they are attributed to an authority. It is
plausible that by doing so, a journalist may be consciously omitting/concealing certain information from the
text without the readers noticing. Moreover, in many articles, the information is incomplete or scattered
throughout the text. This can disrupt the flow of information, especially facts, and affect a reader’s general
or accumulated interpretation.

The dominant patterns of ethno-nationalist framing in both Newsline and Herald contradict their image as
progressive publications. Their coverage primarily presents the State policies on forced repatriation as
legitimate and necessary for national security. Both magazines normalised reporting of the “other”. The
coverage not only omits the refugee narrative to a great extent, it also avoids reportage or opinion on
suggestions for refugee settlement, or deadline waivers.

4.3 Too “crook” to be true
The Pakistani media seems to be at war with the Afghan refugees. The antagonistic framing of refugees
continues its dominance in magazine coverage. According to Newsline, Afghanistan is nasty”,
“irresponsible” and “non-serious”, while the refugees are a “burden”, “traitors” and a “threat”. Both the
Afghan government and Afghan refugees are thus susceptible to blame and denunciation. Although the
coverage in Herald is also primarily non-peace, there is some relief in several articles (discussed in Chapter
5). Overall, the dominance of the blame frame in both magazines repeats similar framing patterns found in
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the two newspapers in the previous chapter.
The blame frame emerges from the narratives of the “other”. This othering of the refugees makes them
more vulnerable to blame and responsibility. Hanson and Hanson (2006) argue that the blame frame is a
way of justifying inequalities across groups. In their study of racial inju stices in America, they explain that
inequalities are legitimised through the presumptions of “choicism”, in which “the victims are blamed and
non-victims are excused” (p. 447). They divide the dominant blame frame into three dichotomous
categories – god vs. devil, evolution vs. nature, and markets vs. personality. These categories are exclusive
to the American context. However, the authors use the following illustration to explain what a blame frame
generally manifests as, especially in reportage (p. 426):
“We,” who should be advantaged, are acting, if at all, through good intentions, exemplary
dispositions, and in accordance with situational forces larger than us. “They,” because of their
aberrant dispositions interacting with or resulting from those same forces, should suffer or be
further disadvantaged or separated from us and should not receive our assistance.
The frequent employment of the blame frame in the two magazines suggests negative “choicism” on the
part of Pakistani journalists and editors. However, “choicism” can be challenged if journalists ensure that
the powerful interests have no influence over how oppressed groups are represented in media coverage.

The magazines also oversimplified the underlying causes of the Afghan refugee repatriat ion crisis and the
conflict with Afghanistan. Articles largely lacked background information of the humanitarian crisis and
the political conflict. Where present, some details were highly sensationalised. A lot of scholarly criticis m
has been directed towards the ways journalists can create a limited or distorted view of a conflict,
sensationalise coverage, and misrepresent the oppressed groups (Carruthers 2011; Lynch and Galtung 2010;
Rodny-Gumede 2015). With limited prior knowledge or exposure to sensatio nal coverage, readers become
more prone to adopting the frames offered by journalists (Rodny -Gumede 2015) and think along the same
lines as the journalist. The incorporation of the blame frame thus becomes easier. Rodny-Gumede (2015),
who studied South African news media coverage of the fatal violence against miners in Marikana, found
dominant blame-oriented framing patterns in the coverage. She argues that the media sensationalised the
violence instead of focusing on the fundamental problems of the mining community. Her analysis shows
that the media not only lacked a proper understanding of the background of the conflict, they also neglected
the basic journalistic principles of fairness, balance, truth and ethics.
This is demonstrated by the Newsline article “Still in the Anger Mode” (Newsline, December 2016), in
which the journalist lists several reasons behind the failure of peace negotiations between Pakistan and
Afghanistan. It was one of the many articles in the magazine where Afghan refugees were directly or
indirectly blamed for the failure of peace talks between Pakistan and Afghanistan. In perpetuating this idea,
the media are not only making the already vulnerable refugees responsible for political diplomacy, but also
relieving Pakistan of any responsibility. He writes, “Peace in Afghanistan would immensely benefit
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Pakistan, but it cannot make it happen alone. The Afghan government has the primary responsibility on this
score” (Newsline, December 2016). Pakistan and Afghanistan have been in a political conflict over the last
40 years. During this time, the Pakistani military first trained the Taliban to fight the Soviet army, and later
gave safe haven to militants who fled the country after the US announc ed the “war on terror”. However,
the journalist’s use of the word “primary” in the article implies that Afghanistan alone is responsible for
the conflict and must resolve it alone. In an attempt to oversimplify the conflict, the journalist is removing
the causal and problem-solving responsibilities from Pakistan and attributing them to Afghanistan. Ideally,
journalists must question and criticise oppressive State policies, report accurately without bias, highlight
injustices, inform and educate the public, and advocate peace when needed. An ethical media would ask
the government to do more, instead of brushing away problems. In democratic countries, media are
expected to represent the people, rather than the political/military elite. However, Newsline seems to
highlight non-issues or less-important issues rather than highlighting the fundamental concerns of the
Afghan refugees and of other parties involved in the conflict.
Another example is also a Newsline article. “Parked for Good? Afghan Repatriation” (Newsline August
2016) was the only report of the year that exclusively covered the refugee repatriation conflict. At the
beginning of the article, journalist Rahimullah Yusufzai makes some passing references to the vulnerability
of Afghan refugees in Pakistan and their harassment at the hands of the Pakistani law enforcement agencies.
However, the tone quickly changes to a blame orientation. The journalist criticises the Afghan government
for their non-cooperation in resolving the refugee conflict. He shifts from, “In fact, they [refugees] are also
the most vulnerable to harassment and abuse at the hands of unscrupulous personnel of the law-enforcement
agencies”, to “[Pakistan] is still doubtful of Kabul taking any real initiative to bring back its citizens fro m
Pakistan”. He then adds an ultimatum, “[Pakistan] has done enough to host them since 1979”.

The article fails to make a single point that could contribute towards breaking down stereotypes against
Afghan refugees, or counter-propaganda. In fact, even though it was a cover story, it omits many
fundamental issues that were causing and further instigating the conflict at the time. For instance, there is
no mention of the skirmishes between Pakistan and Afghanistan’s armed forces on the Durand Line that
occurred in June 2016 – at least two months before the edition was published. The online version also
contained no updates on the clashes that continued for three days. Security forces on both sides exchanged
gunfire. Artillery and heavy weaponry were still moving into position at the time the edition came out. The
border skirmishes had been widely reported in media around the world; however, the Newsline cover story
ignored it entirely. Global media, including The Diplomat, The New York Times, and Al Jazeera referred to
the time as the lowest point in the relationship between the two countries, where soldiers were dying on
both sides. Border tensions had led to the explosion of hostilities.

Remarkably, the cover story (and the rest of the edition) also omitted any coverage of the June 2016 Warsaw
Summit of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which was also widely covered by global
media. The summit discussions had focused on peace and stability in conflict zones in the East and South,
and on Afghanistan. The Afghan president had addressed the summit, where he was reported to have singled
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out Pakistan as obstructing regional progress. President Ghani remarked that Pakistan’s dangerous
distinction between “good and bad terrorists” was being maintained in practice. Yusufzai acknowledges the
state of political and social turmoil in Afghanistan and an increase in frequent attacks by Daesh (ISIS) and
the Taliban. It also reminds the readers that most refugees were choosing to stay in Pakistan, inst ead of
returning to Afghanistan. Despite this, Yusufzai’s suggestion for quicker refugee repatriation demonstrates
apathy, dehumanisation of refugees and indifference to their genuine challenges and, most importantly, an
over-simplification of a major regional conflict.

Additionally, the way media frame a refugee crisis can affect public attitude towards their integration. A
positive frame will lead to more acceptance, while blame-oriented coverage will prompt racist, ethnonationalist sentiments towards refugees. Harteveld et al. (2018), who studied the European media’s
coverage of the refugee crisis, argues that public attitude towards refugee integration changed dramatically
due to the way the crisis was framed. They found that media were fuelling the p ublic’s fear and anxiety
around refugees and asylum seekers, thus encouraging their alienation. A similar trend was also observed
after the 20152016 New Year’s Eve sexual attacks on non-migrant women in several German cities. The
accused were identified as male migrants from the North African region. The events, and then the way
German and other European media covered them, served as a turning point in the refugee debate across
Europe. Major magazines capitalised on the story with an “unambiguous imagery” (Boulila and Carri
2017). For instance, the Süddeutsche Zeitung cover carried a white female silhouette and a black arm
groping for the pubic region. Focus magazine used a photograph of a faceless naked white woman, with
black handprints plastering her body. The general coverage echoed an institutional anti-Muslim racist
framing that largely signified a moral panic. Scholars who studied the media coverage of the attacks found
an increased racialising of Muslim men, especially those of Middle Eastern descent (Vieten 2018).

The examples above demonstrate that media can assist the public in comprehending the saliency or
insignificance of events and the role of various parties in a conflict. According to Hobolt (2014), citizens
decide who to blame in a crisis or a conflict based on who is generally held accountable. She argues that
the task of assigning responsibility to a party in a conflict can be co mplicated, because “citizens have to
navigate a system with multiple levels” (p. 3). In Pakistan, Afghan refugees and the Afghan government
are an easy target because the explicit conflict-escalatory and blame-orientated media framing makes the
task straightforward. For example, a Herald article, “How death stalks policemen in Quetta” (Herald April
2018), investigates the cross-border movement of outlawed militant organisations across the Durand Line,
and the consequent security issues. According to the article, militants are primarily taking shelter in KP and
Balochistan – the two provinces with the largest Afghan refugee population. It reports, “There are
possibilities that terrorists are finding help from some of the refugees,” and “terrorist organisation s are
running their camps in Afghan areas close to the Pakistan border. The Afghan government has no writ in
these areas.” When media recurrently holds Afghan refugees and the Afghan government responsible for
the conflict and worsening security issues in Pakistan, a collective public attitude is generated where blame
is instinctively directed at refugees and the Afghan government.
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Afghan President Ashraf Ghani is a constant target of the Pakistani media’s blame -oriented framing. The
way the magazines have largely portrayed Afghan President Ashraf Ghani is not only negative, but also
dismissive of his efforts towards peace initiatives. Despite the international media’s appreciation of him for
adopting a rapprochement policy towards Pakistan (Sial 2016), Newsline portrays him in a negative light.
Political analysts have made clear distinctions between Ghani and his predecessor, Hamid Karzai, whose
policies were referred to as weak and conflict-escalatory. Since coming to power in 2014, Ghani not only
delayed the implementation of the strategic partnership agreement with India to keep Pakistan happy, he
also sought close ties with Pakistan’s security establishment. He instituted specific initiatives to alleviate
Pakistani concerns over cross -border terrorism. But Newsline’s coverage continues to applaud Pakistan for
its “genuine” efforts, and attribute problems to the other side of the Durand Line. Despite international
recognition of Ghani for working towards peace in the region, Newsline wrongly reports the Afghan
president as one “who had been very critical of Islamabad” and calls Pakistan the “perfect host” for Afghan
refugees (Newsline January 2016)  a claim the UNHCR openly challenges. The negative portrayal of
President Ghani has also furthered Afghan distrust of Pakistan and its media.
The Pakistani media’s frequent blaming of the Afghan government and refugees has caused acute distrust
between the two countries. These accusations have been made primarily through the national media, and
are worsening the already strained relationship between the two countries. Both magazines have used a
certain interpretative repertoire for Afghan refugees and the government to such an extent that it has become
obvious over time. The application of certain concepts to a group of people or nations in general allocates
the group/nation with negative qualities, leading to suspicion and paranoia about them (Hopcke 1989, cited
in Merskin 2004). When reinforced, these suspicions and distrust can become part of the collective
unconscious mind (Spillmann and Spillmann 1997), and can manifest as viewing other groups as either
enemies or the “other”, both of whom are untrustworthy.

This is demonstrated in the article “Now Friend, Now Enemy: PakAfghan Relations” (Newsline July
2016), which I also discussed earlier for its employment of the ethno-nationalist frame. The article also
employs the blame frame to report the long-unresolved conflict and the failing peace process between the
two countries. The article seems to be a deliberate attempt to highlight the distrust between Pakistan and
Afghanistan. It raises suspicion and scepticism about Afghanistan’s intent and role in the failure of the two
countries to reach political peace, or a mutual consensus over the refugee crisis. Despite presenting some
historical background of the PakAfghan conflict, and the consequences of the conflict for both countries,
the article primarily employs the blame frame with a conflict-escalatory and hatred-inciting tone. For
instance, at one point, the journalist reports, “Pakistan is seen as an enemy in Afghanistan, particularly by
the Afghan ruling elite” (Newsline July 2016). At another point, the journalist claims that the credit for
“subsequent elaborate border management measures” goes to Pakistan, suggesting Afghanistan’s
inefficiency or lack of interest in managing cross -border terrorism and illegal refugee movement. He reports
on a cross-border firing at one of the checkpoints at the Durand Line and writes, “when the firing stopped,
Pakistan had lost Major Ali Jawad Changezi and Afghanistan counted a soldier and a civilian dead” – note
here, the certainty for the Pakistani loss (lost) and doubt over the Afghan losses (counted). Furthermore,
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the journalist not only presents the Afghan government as inept, he also directly accuses them of sending
bombers to Pakistan. The article (Newsline July 2016) states:

One of the major challenges would be to stop infiltration from Afghanistan, where the militants
seem to be having a free run due to the unwillingness or inability of the thinly stretched and
beleaguered Afghan security forces to monitor the long and porous PakAfghan border.
The words “unwillingness or inability” and “thinly stretched and beleaguered” demonstrate a conflict escalatory approach at two levels. First, these words present the Afghan security forces as incompetent or
inefficient. Second, they imply that the Afghan government is disinterested in investing time and money in
resolving cross-border terrorism and unmonitored refugee movement. The journalist frames the issue in a
way that blames the Afghan government for the turbulence on the border, and inside Pakistan. The journalist
reinforces the blame frame by bringing the readers’ attention to Afghanistan again by writing ,
“[Afghanistan] continues to pose a threat to Pakistan”. He also writes (Newsline March 2016):

The ability of the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and its splinter groups to send young men on
suicide missions to strike at both hard and soft targets in Pakistan is a matter of concern and not
easy to fully counter unless the Afghan government agrees to take action against them and gathers
the strength to do this.
The journalist also suggests that the Afghan media run a state-managed narrative that blames Pakistan for
the Afghans’ woes. He writes that Afghanistan’s carelessness will “widen the gulf between the two
countries”. Just as the article (Newsline July 2016) starts with a negative reminder about the Afghan
President’s remark, it also ends with a non-peace tone that is sarcastic and contemptuous:

The unusually tougher line on the question of the repatriation of Afghan refugees could be
Islamabad’s answer to the Afghan President’s stance, as Pakistan was no longer a brotherly
country and, therefore, under no compulsion to behave as a brother to Afghanistan .
Frequent media reference to the Afghan government’s “disinterest” in securing the Durand Lin e, and
conflict-escalatory coverage of border clashes between security forces, prompted a public debate about the
safety of Pakistani citizens. This may have led to Pakistan’s unilateral construction of a fence along the
border – a decision the Afghan government did not take well. Through the blame frame, Pakistan media
thus preserves the country’s favourable self-image, while projecting a negative image of Afghanistan.

Another example of framing that can contribute to the distrust between two countries is a Newsline cover
story, “Heart of Darkness” (Newsline January 2016). The article covers the Heart of Asia Conference
(HOA)11 , one of the major political events of the year. The conference was held in the Pakistani capital in

11

The HOA Conference started in 2011. It was formed to enhance cooperation between Asian countries in order to
counter security threats in the region and promote connectivity among members.
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December 2015. The article headline demonstrates the journalist’s play with words to represent the distrust
between Pakistan and Afghanistan. He frames Pakistan as the peace initiator, and Afghanistan as the one
hampering the peace process. The cover story opens with the notion that Pakistan had been initiating and
remaking efforts to make Afghanistan a peaceful country; however, Afghanistan had resorted to antiPakistan sentiments full of “distrust”. The journalist implies that Afghanistan needs Pakistan to “facilitate”
peace in the region, and writes, “President Ashraf Ghani’s willingness to again seek Pakistan’s support to
facilitate peace talks with the Afghan Taliban.” The use of the word “again” when referring to the Afghan
president’s need to seek Pakistan support highlights Pakistan’s authority (as the facilitator) and the Afghan
government’s dependence and failure – suggesting Pakistan is the good neighbour. Pakistan’s role in the
Soviet War (19701989) can explain the interpretation of the word “again” in the article. Pakistan was one
of America’s major allies in the SovietAfghan War. The Pakistani army recruited and trained the
mujahideen (freedom fighters), and later also served as a base for the Saudi-American alliance in the 1980s .
Today, Pakistan serves as a safe haven for the Taliban and other militants, who were earlier recruited to
oust the Soviet army. The journalist further claims that President Ghani “didn’t have much of a choice
except seeking Pakistan’s help to persuade the inflexible Afghan Taliban” to join the p eace and
reconciliation process. By using such an inflammatory interpretative repertoire, he frames Afghanistan as
weak and helpless. This can be interpreted as implying that the country is in need of another intervention,
and is blatantly propagandist.

In addition to the explicit blame orientation in framing, there is also a significant factual problem in this
statement  President Ghani had never asked Pakistan to “facilitate” the talks. Instead, he had been asking
Pakistan to stay out of Afghanistan’s internal issues (see for example: AP 2015; Reuters 2016). However,
the Newsline article frames Pakistan as the only saviour of Afghanistan and regional peace. The HOA
Conference was an opportunity for Pakistan and Afghanistan to reduce political friction, and move towards
regional peace and stability. The way it was going to be framed in the media for the general public could
have largely responded to the trust issues between the two countries and their citizens. However, when one
of the major current affairs magazines in the country reports an international event with a conflict -escalatory
approach, by calling it ‘heart of darkness’, it reinforces the hostility and suspicion already prevalent in the
country. The article (Newsline January 2016) ends with a strongly opinionated statement that explicit ly
employs the blame frame:

The so-called unity government headed by President Ghani and Chief Executive Officer Dr
Abdullah Abdullah believe Pakistan is responsible for all the troubles Afghanistan is facing a nd is
therefore an enemy.

The death of the Afghan Taliban supreme leader Mullah Omar in Pakistan already served as a catalyst for
the deteriorating relations between the two countries. The escalatory coverage of the HOA Conference
furthered the mutual distrust. Ghani went ahead with the inauguration of the Salma Dam, officially declaring
AfghanIndia friendship and sidelining Pakistan. India announced it would stay committed to the Afghan
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cause. Pakistan and India share mutual hostility towards each oth er and have entered into multiple wars
since their independence in 1947.

Moreover, at the conference, Pakistan, Afghanistan, the US and China also formed the Quadrilateral
Monitoring Committee with the purpose of facilitating and supporting the Afghan re conciliation process.
The formation of the committee indicated a form of agreement among these countries on the roadmap for
peace talks. The first meeting of the committee was held in Islamabad on 11 January 2016, during which
representatives of the four member nations stressed the need for an immediate resumption of peace talks
between the Afghan government and the Taliban. Despite its high importance for PakAfghan relations and
the refugee conflict, this information is missing from Newsline’s and Herald’s coverage of the HOA
Conference. In fact, there is no mention of the refugee crisis that has been central to the AfPak political
conflict of over 40 years.

This combination of limited coverage and misinformation by the magazine implies two possible me anings.
First, that media are oversimplifying a major conflict by presenting it as a non -issue and omitting
fundamental problems. It is demonstrated that the more the media highlight an issue, the more importance
audiences attach to it (Harteveld et al. 2014). Similarly, whether Pakistani citizens will see the refugee issue
as a security threat or a humanitarian crisis may depend on how media represent it, and to what extent.
Second, that blame-oriented coverage justifies intervention. By taking the focus away from refugees and
putting it on the “follies” of Afghanistan, media are reinvigorating the State/military establishment’s stance
that is fixed on finding excuses to hold a share of power in Afghanistan.

The coverage puts Pakistan in a safe position, suggesting two important things: first, that when no one else
could, Pakistan acted and took responsibility for bringing peace in the region. Second, that Pakistan is only
party to the conflict and the future of the peace process is dependent on Afghanista n. This demonstrates the
employment of the “good/bad” neighbour duality, discussed in Chapter 3. It is important to remember that
the two countries have had multiple instances where one accused the other of non -cooperation and/or lack
of interest in taking the initiative to resolve conflicts and political misunderstandings (Gul 2018; S. Khan
2018; Schmitt 2018). The recurrent narrative from 20162018 was that Pakistan does all the strenuous work
of negotiating with the Taliban, while Afghanistan ruins the p rocess. Geo-political motives of both the
countries are at the forefront of this historical blame-game. However, framing the article in a way that makes
only one country look interested in the peace initiative can be detrimental to a peace process that is already
referred to as “phony” and “fruitless” (The Diplomat, 6 December 2016).

4.4 Conclusion
This chapter has five key findings: 1) the debate about the settlement and repatriation of Afghan refugees
is broadly missing from the two magazines. The overall coverage in the three-year period I studied ignores
the need for reform and peaceful resolution of the conflict; 2) the coverage repeatedly suggests that Pakistan
has made endless efforts to resolve the refugee crisis and the political conflict stemming from it, while
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Afghanistan’s reciprocal efforts are missing or inadequate. Arguably, the reinforcement of such a narrative
may have created a general acceptance for the forced and speedy repatriation of refugees; 3) there is a
substantial marginalisation of refugee voices, more specifically in Newsline. It also omits information that
is fundamental to understanding the conflict, and how forced repatriation to an unprepared Afghanistan will
impact the refugees; 4) both magazines frequently use Pakistani political elites and other authorities as their
major information sources. I found that 88% of the time, journalists quoted Pakistani political elites and
other authorities, including security agencies; and 5) the Afghan refugee crisis and political
misunderstandings between Pakistan and Afghanistan are generally represented as a national security issue.

Frames help journalists and editors organise the presentation of facts and opinion (Nelson, Clawson & Oxley
1997). By incorporating the ethno-nationalist and blame frames so explicitly in media coverage, it is
plausible that both magazines organised and compiled the projected threats and doubts, and presented them
as facts under security issues. According to Hussain (2016), Pakistani media predominant ly report Taliban,
terrorism and other related issues in escalatory terms with a high preponderance of war journalism. He finds
that the coverage also lacks independent sources, and categorises the form of framing that heavily relies on
elite sources under the “securitisation” aspect of conflict-escalatory reporting. According to Husain (2016),
it is a way of framing where conflicts are only presented through the security lens, highlighting threats and
dangers to the host nation. He explains (p. 36):

Conflicts are securitized; they are discussed in terms of threats, dangers and occupations. Police
force, army personnel and elites get the limelight. Conspiracies, issues of national sovereignty,
independence and patriotism are related with the conflict. The system, culture and social values are
securitized and feared to be lost if the enemy prevails.
Most of the coverage in the magazines is done from a national security perspective. The “securitisation”
element can amplify patriotism and nationalism among readers, reducing the possibility of the acceptance
and integration of Afghan refugees. The ethno-nationalist frame is explicitly dominant in articles that lin k
the refugee repatriation or the conflict with Afghanistan to national security issues. The frame can further
the dehumanisation of the “enemy”.
Hussain (2016) goes on to suggest “humanisation” as an alternative under “conflict de -escalating reporting”.
Under the humanisation frame, he argues (p. 36):

Conflicts are humanized, individual sufferings are highlighted and trials and tribulation of commo n
people get maximu m coverage. The plight of women and children and other vulnerable groups is
discussed. Conflict is covered from the perspective of common people. Loss to the social
institutions and local culture is counted and steps urged for their recovery.

Security issues are at the centre of the conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan. However, the solution
equally involves peace with the Taliban, and bringing an end to terrorism, for which refuge es are mostly
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blamed. However, sustaining a peace initiative and peacemaking process in Pakistan has its own challenges.
There is historical evidence that shows resuming peace talks between Pakistan and Afghanistan can take
time. In 2014, Mullah Omar’s death in Pakistan halted the peace talks between the two governments and
the Taliban. Mullah Omar’s son, Mullah Yaqoob, was inducted into the new leadership council, but the
Taliban demanded more time to complete the transition. While the Taliban were busy re cruiting their new
head, the relationship between the two governments deteriorated, as Afghanistan believed that Pakistan was
providing safe haven to the Taliban. Peace talks could not go ahead without a representative from each side.
It took two years of cold silence and fruitless international and national efforts to bring the parties back to
the table for peace talks. Reuters reported that although the planned leadership meeting was made possible
after two years of political efforts from both Pakistan and Afghanistan, the prospects for peace were
“cloudy” because of the public sentiments for Afghanistan and Afghan refugees in Pakistan. However, as
the analysis demonstrates, the Pakistani media consider Afghan refugees insignificant in terms of the
resolution of the conflict with Afghanistan. Throughout 20162018, Newsline presented Afghan refugees
more as a nuisance than a vulnerable group, selecting certain aspects of information about them over others.

The omission of important information from reportage leads to the marginalisation of certain people or
issues. On the other hand, emphasis on certain people or issues may also affect balanced reporting. Both
can equally downgrade the structural and systemic discrimination and abuse of refugees, dep ending on the
context in which they are practiced. Those willing to return to their home country are equally affected.
Lynch and Galtung (2010) argue that conscious omission or emphasis creates imbalance. They suggest that
any imbalances in the conflict between the powerful group and the weaker group must be reported by the
media, instead of pointing fingers at either side. Word choices and the interpretative repertoire in coverage
represent which side the magazine is inclining towards ; for example, word choices such as “cloudy” and
“hefty price” used to describe the peace process and repatriation of Afghan refugees, respectively. These
words, in this context, demonstrate a subtle reference to bland optimism for non -violent solutions to the
conflict. They imply that the peace-process is “stalled” because its future is unclear and uncertain, and hence
it is not a working solution. Such framing echoes Machin’s and Mayr’s (2012) argument that the choices
media make are primarily to supress certain meanings and focus on others. They write that journalists’
choices are never neutral as they would mostly like readers and viewers to believe a certain truth. Journalists,
they argue, select lexicons based on “the way they wish to signpost what kind of person they are
representing, or how they wish to represent them as social actors engaged in action” (Machin & Mayr 2012,
p. 103). By using suggestive adjectives, journalists may take the reader on a single -lane path, blinded to
other options.

Frames in conflict coverage speak differently to people from varied political ideologies. In Pakistan, the
ethno-nationalist and blame frames in the coverage of Afghanistan and Afghan refugees speak to the general
population. These frames are more relatable to readers with anti-Afghan, extremist/right-wing political
beliefs, as they conform to their ideas and sentiments. Additionally, t he Pakistani media narrative also
reflects the State and the military stance on the refugee crisis. These frames suggest the political conflict
will resolve itself once the refugees are repatriated to Afghanistan. However, by becoming a mouthpiece for
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State propaganda, the media are ignoring that Pakistan’s forced exodus of Afghan refugees and the
consequent tensions “are symptoms, rather than root causes” (Asian Foundation 2016, p. 16) of the conflict
between the two countries. Conflicts create refugees, not the other way round. My analysis has shown what
non-peace framing looks like in media narrative, and what detrimental effects and consequences it ca n have
for resolution of a conflict. In the next chapter, I highlight and discuss what peace framing looks like. I also
discuss the significance of peace journalism in providing journalists with options for framing a counter
narrative to the dominant escalatory discourse in the Pakistani English media.
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Chapter 5
Discussion  The road to peace journalism
5.1 Introduction
Johan Galtung introduced the idea of peace journalism in the 1970s as a counter-narrative to the war and
conflict-escalatory journalism that was given more preference by mainstream med ia around the world at
the time (Galtung 2000; Shinar 2009). Though not a lot has changed in the way media cover war and
conflict, in the last two decades peace journalism studies have advocated a change in attitudes and
behaviours in the way journalists and editors frame war and peace (see for example: Lee & Maslog 2005;
Lynch & McGoldrick 2005; Tehranian 2009; Hussain 2014, 2015, 2017). Studies have shown that peace
journalism can contain an escalation process, lead audiences to think and feel differently, consider and
value nonviolent responses to war and conflict, and empathise with the personal stories of the affected
people (McGoldrick 2014; Peleg 2007). In this chapter, I reflect on whether the four publications that I
studied for my thesis employed peace frames during the three years under study, and if they did, then what
extent. I pay particular attention to emerging frames, even if used rarely in the coverage of Afghan refugees
and their ongoing repatriation from Pakistan. I distil three emerging frames: the justice delivery frame, the
admission/confession frame, and the empathysympathy frame. However, before discussing them, I draw
on an instructive international example to emphasise the power and impact of peace journalism. This
example will help demonstrate the role peace-oriented coverage can play in stimulating audience attention
towards human rights violations, oppression and social injustices, and at the same time maximising their
prudence and judgement ability in challenging inflammatory and conflict -escalatory coverage.

In September 2015, Turkish photojournalist Nilüfer Demir immortalised the tragedy of the refugee crisis
by tweeting a photo of Aylan Kurdi, a Syrian toddler who drowned crossing the Mediterranean to Turkey,
alongside the hashtag #KiyiyaVuranInsanlik, which translates into English as “humanity washe d ashore”
(Reuters, 3 September 2015). The photograph went viral and media around the world emphasised Europe’s
poor treatment of Syrian refugees and mishandling of the crisis. International media and the UNHCR
referred to 2015 as “the year of Europe’s refugee crisis”. Journalists around the world presented the
harrowing image of the toddler’s body as the epitome of human vulnerability and western shame, and called
for the need to address the humanitarian crisis where millions of people were displaced by war and in search
of a new home. Though the publishing of the photograph received some criticism (see for example:
Kjeldsen 2017; Mortensen, Allan & Peters 2017) over media ethics and morality, and whether the
photograph represented the reality of all refugees, nonetheless, the overall media coverage of the crisis
suddenly became global, and universalised the refugee experience. The photograph triggered empathy and
solidarity with refugees as media consumers imagined the toddler as their son or brother (see for example:
Langdon 2018; Smith, McGarty & Thomas 2018). A Google news search for “Syrian child beach body”
produced 1.8 million hits within the 24 hours after the photo went viral. The same s earch three months later
produced over 8 million hits. Observing the framing in the coverage and the international debate that it
generated about humanising the refugee crisis, I do believe that this is the power of peace journalism and
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demonstrates the political and ethical choices journalists and editors can make to represent a humanitarian
crisis.
Aylan Kurdi’s photo drew both political and public attention to the crisis. It is argued that his image
triggered empathetic emotions on a global scale and caused a discursive shift (Sunata & Yildiz 2018) in the
way refugees were situated and depicted in global media coverage and among societies around the world.
However, his drowning was not the only death at sea that year. In the summer of 2015, hundreds of Syrian,
Iraqi and Afghan refugees drowned in the Aegean Sea. All of these refugees were making an attempt to get
to Turkey and then onto Europe, fleeing militant terrorist control back home. However, in the case of Baby
Aylan – the name later used to refer to the little boy – he became a phenomenon because of widespread
media coverage (New York Daily News, Metro Toronto, Buenos Aires Herald, Haber Express Turkey, The
Washington Post to name a few). Peace journalism asks that a voice be given to the voicele ss in our
societies, and Baby Aylan’s image did that. The photograph of his little body washed ashore and the
consequent media coverage of the 3,695 refugee deaths on the sea in 2015 alone not only spoke for the
people affected by the conflicts, but also s poke to the people more broadly. The effects of this media
coverage demonstrates that the way messages are framed can orientate the public’s emotional responses,
fan public debates (Thussu and Freedman 2003) and sway public opinion, eventually turning into a new
culture of journalism (Peleg 2007). Furthermore, peace journalism asks media to consider the consequences
of their reporting (Youngblood 2017, p. 153), and consider what impacts their stories can have, especially
on refugees and asylum seekers who are at the centre of the media coverage.

As mentioned earlier, the photograph also generated some academic critique by scholars who disapprove
of media’s ‘humanitarian’ role in coverage of the vulnerable. For instance, Anna Szorenyi (2018), discusses
the publishing of the photograph under colonial structures of representation. She argues that media have an
ethics of responsibility towards distant suffering, which was missing in the coverage of Aylan Kurdi’s case.
Chouliaraki and Stolic (2017) also examine the publishing of the photograph through ethics and morality .
They argue that media have a certain moral responsibility towards the sufferings of refugees and other
migrants. They call for a radical transformation in media’s understanding and responsibility towards
vulnerable groups.
Baby Aylan’s photo also generated an ethical divide among journalists over the decision to publish his
photograph. After the UK’s Independent newspaper decided to go ahead with publication, their editorial
reminded the audience of the significance and consequence of telling his story to the world. The editorial
(Independent, 3 September 2015) stated:

They are extraordinary images and serve as a stark reminder that, as European leaders
increasingly try to prevent refugees from settling in the continent, more and more refugees
are dying in their desperation to flee persecution and reach safety. The Independent has
taken the decision to publish these images because, among the often glib words about the
“ongoing migrant crisis”, it is all too easy to forget the reality of the desperate situation
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facing many refugees.

The overall evidence leads our understating towards the positive influence of the photograph on the ways
refugees were framed in media at the time, and the public debate it generated across the world. Therefore,
it can be argued that the publishing of the toddler’s photograph and the resulting peace-oriented coverage
of thousands of refugee deaths at sea may have humanised the media’s representation of the crisis for the
rest of the world. It not only reminded readers and viewers about the need for non-violent responses to the
conflict and delivery of justice, but also this peace-oriented coverage also turned numbers back into humans
– children, fathers and mothers.

5.2 Fragmented peace
In Pakistan, peace journalism lies somewhere between the dormant and emerging stages. I use the word
“emerging” consciously as the overall results from my analysis reveal a sporadic application of peace oriented framing in the three years of coverage. My analysis and existing research demonstrate that
Pakistani media predominantly serve national interests, and are highly nationalistic when covering cross border conflicts, terrorism and security issues (see also: Hussain 2016; Hussain & Munawar 2017; Hussain,
Siraj & Mahmood 2019; Zaheer 2020). Peace journalism is an emerging concept and approach in Pakistan
– one that has not fully become part of the multiple ways conflicts are covered by the national media.
Likewise, emerging frames, as the name suggests, are frames that have not yet b ecome part of a dominant
media narrative. Nonetheless, these frames carry the potential to be widely applied in media coverage.
According to Hellsten et al. (2010), when certain issues are frequently and widely reported in a certain way,
over time they become media frames. These frames are not only recurrently applied in reportage, they can
also construct and feed dominant narratives and discourses about specific groups: their ethics, morality ,
race, and intentions. More so, these frames can become modes of representation not only in the media
environment, but also in the social and political environment.

It is promising that despite the conflict-escalatory approach dominating media framing in Pakistan, I found
traces of peace journalism dispersed across the media texts; however, based on the findings of my discourse
analysis, this presence could make little to no effective contribution to the overall peace -orientation of the
coverage of the conflict. Similarly, the low presence of peace-orientation in the coverage can easily go
unnoticed by readers, and mean it is ineffective in changing the Pakistani public perception of Afghan
refugees. Nonetheless, however discreet, these peace journalism traces enabled me identify some
embryonic orientations in framing, which I propose as three emerging peace frames. While these emerging
frames were implicit in some news stories and articles in the four publications, the findings of my analysis
develop a strong case for more recurrent and explicit use of these frames in Pakistani journalism practice.
These frames are exclusive to the coverage of the Afghan refugee repatriation conflict in Pakistan but could
be applied, with some modification, to the coverage of other similar conflicts. All three frames are based
on the interpretive repertoires of equity, sentiments of harmony, inclusion, acceptance and association. I
categorise the three frames under their master frame  the peace frame.
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My analysis of the four publications indicates that overall, Herald (53%) used peace frames more
than Newsline (21%), Dawn (21%), and ET (22%) (See Table 5.1). Yet, Herald’s coverage cannot be
exclusively classified as peace journalism due to the implicit and sporadic use of these peace frames.
Herald’s coverage included more stories where Afghan refugees were identified by their names, and the
focus remained on their suffering (64% people-oriented coverage). There were more instances
where Herald had used individual stories to represent the plight of Afghan refugees at large. The issues that
were most highlighted included the challenges of family separation across the border, lack of access to
health and education, infant mortality in refugee camps, harassment at border crossings, and illegal
detention. There were happy stories of love and union across the border as well. These stories tend to give
the reader a different view of Afghan refugees – a perspective that contrasts with the otherwise dominant
representation of them as terrorists or the enemy. For a moment, the Afghan refugee is not a threat, but a
vulnerable individual who is separated from family, exploited by security agencies, police, and the State,
and misrepresented by the mainstream nationalistic media. The refugee is humanised. While it is evident
from my analysis that, among the four publications, Herald humanised the refugees to a larger extent, it
was still not enough to challenge or influence the dominant conflict -escalatory narrative in the media in
general.

Table 5.1: Percentage of peace journalism frames in Newsline, Herald, Dawn and ET
Peace-

Truth-

People-

Solution-

Peace

oriented

oriented

oriented

oriented

Journalism

coverage

coverage

coverage

coverage

framing

Newsline

28%

21%

14%

19%

21%

Herald

55%

50%

64%

43%

53%

Dawn

19%

21%

28%

14%

21%

ET

21%

17%

34%

17%

22%

Average

37%

22%

Herald and Dawn are both widely read in Pakistan, and appreciated for their “fearless and investigative
reporting” (Hussain J. 2020), but my findings raise concerns about their progressive and inclusive image.
In fact, my findings not only challenge the mainstream public image of these publications as progressive,
they also diverge from some recent studies that found some of these publications to be peace -oriented (see
for example: Memon et al. 2020; Qazi and Shah 2018). Memon et al. (2020) studied the coverage of various
global conflicts by two major Pakistani English newspapers, one of which was Dawn. The conflicts
included the 2019 Hong Kong protests, the IsraelPalestine Conflict, and the Kashmir conflict between
Pakistan and India. They found Dawn’s peace-oriented coverage to be on the higher end (55%), arguing
that the framing was people-oriented and favourable towards the protesters and the affected parties in the
conflict. In another study, Qazi and Shah (2018) also found that Dawn employed more peace frames in its
coverage of the aftermath of a Taliban attack on Malala Yousafzai, who later became world’s youngest
Nobel laureate. The researchers found that Dawn was unequivocally sympathetic to Malala and opposed
the Taliban. I found that the coverage in all four publications, primarily Dawn, ET and Newsline, was
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dominated by conflict-escalatory framing.

Arguably it could be the difference in the ways media cover high -intensity conflicts (such as Taliban or
terrorism) versus low-intensity conflicts (such as internal displacement or missing persons in Pakistan). I
observed that Pakistani media tend to employ conflict-escalatory frames more often when covering highintensity conflicts. In this type of coverage, the framing is highly inflammatory and nationalist ic (see for
example: Hussain 2014; Iqbal and Hussain 2017). The Afghan refugee repatriation conflict is one of the
high-intensity conflicts Pakistan is engaged in with a neighbouring country. This conflict has had an
augmented attention from the State and military establishment, both of whom are interested in regional
political power. Consequently, they put pressure on the media to align their narrative with the government
and the military. In addition to this, most journalists also depend on security force s for information through
press releases (Jan & Hussain 2020), which links back to an excessive and recurrent use of political and
military elites as sources in reporting. Therefore, while these publications may have demonstrated peace oriented framing in some low-intensity national conflicts, their coverage of the Afghan refugee repatriation
was highly conflict-escalatory.

Arguably, the Herald scoring relatively high on peace-orientation in framing compared to the other three
publications could also be due to the limited number of articles published on the conflict – 36 articles in
three years. Though this makes a story per month on average, it is important to note that there were some
consecutive months in the three years where the magazine did not feat ure the refugee repatriation or the
overall conflict with Afghanistan (over refugees). This is less coverage compared to a daily newspaper, but
for a monthly magazine it means that the conflict remained part of the narrative throughout the year. During
the same period, Dawn and ET both published 1,489 news stories about the conflict. On average, that is 11
stories a week and more than one story a day. This demonstrates that Pakistani news readers were
bombarded with stories about Afghan refugees on almost a daily basis. Most of this coverage was
dominated by non-peace, highly escalatory framing. Only 22% of these stories had some element of peace
journalism. Those that applied peace-orientation did so sporadically, which means that while it was present
to an extent, it was still not prevalent enough to challenge the dominant anti-Afghan narrative in the media
and the public debate. In other words, peace framing was fragmented to an extent that it was negligible.

5.3 Emerging frames
Although rare in frequency, the news stories and articles that demonstrated a strong peace journalism
approach used justice and accountability as their predominant themes. While media attention towards
justice and accountability was largely absent, some stories and articles used these themes implicitly. In this
section, I explore two of the three emerging frames that emphasise the aspects of justice and accountability.

The justice delivery frame addresses a broad spectrum of peace journalism properties. Justice as a frame
has previously been used by many scholars who have used the nexus between media and justice as an
analytical framework to study media representations in varied cases (see for example: Austin and Farrell
2017; Askanius and Hartley 2019; Čapek 1993; Dreher and Voyer 2015). For instance, Austin and Farrell
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(2017), who studied the American media’s framing of human trafficking, argue that policymakers and
legislators are less likely to adopt helpful anti-trafficking responses due to the incorrect framing of human
trafficking in popular media. They proposed the use of criminal justice frame in media representation of
traffickers, whom they argued were mostly depicted as male and part of larger organised criminal cells ,
when in fact they were not necessarily that. The scholars argue that this incorrect framing encouraged
specific interpretations to an issue and reinforced cultural stereotypes and beliefs.

In 2017, Askanius and Hartley (2019) conducted a qualitative framing analysis of 109 news articles
published in Danish and Swedish newspapers. Focusing on gender (in)justice and the role of media, they
identified multiple dominant frames that either legitimised or de-legitimised the #metoo campaign. In
another example, scholars such as Čapek (1993) and Dreher and Voyer (2015) have studied justice-oriented
framing in the context of environment and climate change. Dreher and Voyer (2015), for instance, found
that climate justice frames were rarely used in Australian mainstream media coverage of climate change
issues. They proposed alternative frames that look at climate change as a social justice and human rights
issue. Čapek (1993) draws from a social constructionist perspective, arguing that an environmental justice
frame was linked to the social change mobilisation of a local community that had been struggling over toxic
contamination in the United States. In addition to climate, crime and gender, justice orientation in media
coverage has been studied with links to politics, democracy, and refugees, but rarely as an emerging or
dominant frame. In the context of peace journalism, justice orientation in framing has been largely analysed
under (de)humanisation frames. In my thesis, I treat justice as an independent frame and discu ss its use in
coverage in relation to empathy, impartiality, complexity of the conflict, and human suffering.

The justice delivery frame speaks for refugees who are victims of oppression, exploitation, and human
rights abuse and violation. Reporters and editors who employ this frame focus on balance and accuracy,
human-angle stories, non-violence, rehabilitation and facilitation and, most importantly, delivery of justice.
The frame indicates a push for peace dialogue for the resolution of the conflict, which has left million s
deprived of their rights. The justice delivery frame simultaneously falls under each of the four majo r
classifications of Galtung’s Peace and War Journalism Model (See Table 1.1), selecting peace over conflict,
truth over propaganda, people over the elite and solutions over victory. By employing the justice delivery
frame in conflict coverage, journalists contribute to a public debate about the injustices and the role of
media in advocating for the marginalised and oppressed, and those exploited by the system. This frame is
based on Galtung’s notion of positive peace, “the integration of human society” and the “prevalence of
justice, harmony and equality” (Galtung 1964, p. 2). As an analytical frame, justice delivery refers to greater
equality in both the resettlement and rehabilitation of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, and immunity from
forced repatriation.

The absence of violence does not automatically deliver justice. Awareness -led action is crucial to the
prevalence of peace and justice in a non-violent conflict. Callaghan and Martin (2004) argue that while
injustices in a non-violent conflict do not always backfire, if publicised widely and audience support is
gathered they can sometime backfire on the perpetrators. To generate audience attention on justice, they
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argue that journalists must expose official cover-ups, the devaluation of the target, mis- and reinterpretation
of the action (by the perpetrators), and intimidation and bribery. In Pakistan, the treatment of Afghan
refugees is an obvious injustice that warrants action. Drawing on Callaghan and Martin’s (2004) study of
refugee injustice and the role of the media, I would argue that through the use of the justice delivery frame
in their coverage, journalists in Pakistan can prompt official action , and audience attention and interest in
the repatriation conflict. If peace journalists want to generate a debate on justice, they must highlight the
“cooperation and integration between human groups, with less emphasis on the absence of violence”
(Galtung 1967, p. 14).

Justice delivery equates to positive peace, which Galtung associates with the existence of positive relations
at both a national and international level. This includes cooperation, freedom from fear, freedom from want,
economic growth and development, equality, freedom of action, pluralism, dynamism, and the absence of
exploitation (Galtung 1967, p. 14). The justice delivery frame responds to Galtung’s call for justice and
positive peace, and does more than simply humanise the victims. By employing this frame, journalists can
not only bring, what some scholars refer to as “Galtunic” values of positive relations into journalis m
practice, they can also contribute to the discussion on the unfair treatment of victims  in this case the
Afghan refugees. The justice delivery frame positions conflict-preventive measures and social reforms
together with an emphasis on humans, not State powers.
Examples of justice-oriented framing include a 2016 Herald article, “Closing the gates of Lahore” (Herald
18 August 2016), uncovering the unfair treatment of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. The way the article has
been framed not only humanises the refugees, the journalist also highlights the State’s ethnocentric and
prejudiced treatment of the Afghan refugees. The primary source in the article is an employee of the Human
Rights Commission of Pakistan, who is quoted as saying: “there is a word in the dictionary to describe the
treatment of Afghan refugees in Pakistan and that word is ‘xenophobia’.” The article indicates the Pakistani
State’s animosity towards the refugees, and draws audience attention towards the impact of such treatment
on the conflict. It also addresses the State-driven ethnocentricity as a humanitarian and social justice
concern. Taking guidance from Fekete’s (2010) research on media portrayal of refugees and asylum
seekers, and Shabbir Hussain’s argument about media coverage of high and low-intensity conflicts
(discussed in previous chapters), I would argue that the irregular/episodic use of the justice delivery frame
in media coverage may have generated the xeno-racist and antagonistic public sentiment against Afghan
refugees. Media attention to justice delivery and humanisation of these people, therefore, is a vital
counteractive peace journalism practice compared to dominant parochial, ethno-nationalist narratives.

One of the ways that the justice delivery frame in the coverage humanised refugees was by giving
prominence to stories of refugees’ struggles that had directly affected their intimate lives. For example, in
2016 a news story appeared in ET under the title “Call for justice: Pakistani women married to Afghan men
protest” (ET 5 September 2016). The story detailed the challenges facing Pakistani women who had married
Afghan men from among the refugees and were asking the government to stop forcefully repatriating the
Afghan refugees. It quoted one of the women saying: “Our families have divided … They have sent my
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husband to Afghanistan, who has also taken my sons along with him.” Portraying the women’s struggles
through their vulnerability and concerns for their relationships individualises them as a casualty of State
policy on forced repatriation, and may provoke compassion among the audience. It also draws attention to
the repercussions of repatriation on helpless families, stranded on both sides of the Durand Line. The news
story also triggers empathy, which is a significant characteristic of a society where justice prevails.

Peace journalism instils an empathetic conception of the moral responsibility of humanity (Langdon 2018).
It is inclusive and serves as a counter-narrative to media frames that are based on “othering” of the
marginalised. It focuses on solidarity rather than apathy and distance. Moral ethics demand transparency
and self-accountability from both the government and the public. For justice to prevail, authorities must
admit their mistakes and ensure transparency and safety of the public, including migrants and refugees.
Accountability becomes even more crucial to justice in rehabilitating and resettlement in post-war and postconflict phases, and equally important in ongoing cold conflicts , such as the one between Pakistan and
Afghanistan. A journalism practice that contributes to peace and dialogue by highlighting issues of social
and human rights injustices, and questions the authorities through evidence (stories of victims and other
affected groups), is more likely to promote empathy and a culture of accountability among State officials
than a coverage that is focused on conflict escalation.

One way in which the four publications were practicing this form of journalism was by employing frames
that can foster the admission and confession of human rights violations by the State and other law
enforcement agencies. I identified this type of framing as the admission/confession frame. Though present
in only three per cent of the news stories and magazine articles in the three years under study, this frame
illustrated the oppressive and exploitative treatment of Afghan refugees by the Pakistani government . The
admission/confession frame creates a narrative in which the democratised media make the government
accountable for decisions that affect marginalised groups, especially refugees and other migrants. Through
calls for transparency and accountability, the media must not only ask ‘who is responsible?’, but also answer
the question. Taking an agentive role, the media indexes the power relations between the weak and the
powerful by raising important issues around State accountability for exploiting and manipulating the
refugee crisis. By employing the admission/confession frame, media not only ask questions and find
answers, but also exercise their independence and power in democracies (Bennett et al. 2007). The truthand solution-oriented framing in the Galtunic Peace and War Journalism Model focus on exposing “untruths
and cover-ups”, and supporting “resolution, reconstruction, and reconciliation” respectively. Although, the
model does not explicitly mention admission and confession as criteria for peace -oriented coverage, I place
the admission/confession frame under the two orientations because of its focus on transparency and nonviolent responses to a conflict. This frame was used rarely not only in the corpus I studied, but I also
observed that this theme has received nominal attention in scholarly research on media framing of global
political conflicts.

Governments often suppress media and public debates in the name of national security, peace and
democracy, causing an ideological polarisation (Payne 2008). The admission/confession frame highlights
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such attempts by the State and/or military establishment and aims to make authorities take responsibility
for their policy decisions and actions. It starts by exposing cover-ups about human rights violations, and
dispelling propaganda. One prominent example of the admission/confession frame is a 2016 Herald article
with the title “Why should I care about Afghan refugees?” (Herald 20 August 2016). The article is highly
opinionated, and commences with an account of what the journalist saw on the streets of Kabul. The
journalist reports:
We – the citizens of a state which collaborated with the Central Intelligence Agency to
destroy their country – enjoyed the ethnic jewelry and antique fabrics which were sold
across the country in expensive boutiques  the last bits of an old life sold off to finance
another life in the misery of refugee camps huddled amidst dust and despair.

It is a strongly written article in which the journalist provides three important reasons behind the AfPak
political conflict, and the deteriorating refugee crisis s ituation: 1) Pakistan’s military assistance to America
to create the Taliban, 2) the plundering of Afghan land, culture and resources by Pakistan, and 3) the
mistreatment and exploitation of Afghan refugees in camps in Pakistan, referring to the exodus as “largely
forcible repatriation”. She also reminds the readers about the Naturalization Act of 1926, under which the
Pakistani State grants citizenship to those born in the country. She writes, “a birthright enshrined in the
Naturalization Act of 1926 – that citizenship cannot be denied.” In doing so, while she makes a strong case
for the Pakistani government to consider granting citizenship to refugees born in Pakistan, she is also
educating the readers about a law that is missing from mainstream public deb ate and knowledge. The
Naturalization Act of 1926 grants citizenship to babies born in Pakistan after 1926. To confirm how many
people around me knew about this Act, I asked a few friends in Pakistan, during personal communicatio n
in 2019, if they were familiar with it. Unsurprisingly, only one of them knew about the Act. By bringing
the readers’ attention to the law, the journalist is highlighting what has been widely missing from media
and public narrative.

Besides other rights, citizenship can also provide stateless refugees with a sense of belonging to the country
that they have been living in most of their lives without agency. The article incorporates a solution -oriented
and truth-oriented framing to a large extent by suggesting peace and conflict resolution. She poses a series
of rhetorical questions, such as “Why don’t you care?”, “Why do I care about this midnight movement of
people I may have never met, never chanced to know?”, and “Why is it important that the political,
humanitarian, and legal aspects of this new executive order be deconstructed?” While she later follows up
with strong historical evidence of Pakistani State’s and military involvement in Afghan politics, she leaves
the interpretation of these questions to the reader, who  if well-informed  will take notice of the points
she is making. The following excerpt from the article (Herald 20 August 2016) demonstrates an explicit
employment of the admission/confession frame:
Because the involvement of Pakistan’s agencies in the 10-year war to defeat the Soviet
Union in Afghanistan cannot be denied. Because the aggrandisement of Pakistan’s generals
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through the sharing of billions of US dollars cannot be denied. Because the movement of
thousands of tons of armaments through the National Logistics Cell cannot be denied.
Because the victims of the blast that destroyed evidence of the sale of missiles from Ojhri
Camp cannot be denied. Because the human tragedy of those who own little and are forced
to give up their homes, their fields, their livestock because of global agendas, cannot be
denied. Because the loss of dignity when forced to live in a refugee camp, living on handouts
cannot be denied. Because the sheer strength of will it takes to rebuild lives in a strange land
cannot be denied.

Not every journalist used the admission/confession frame as overtly as observed in the example above.
Most stories and articles employed the frame through a latent manifestation, which may make it difficult
for readers to infer its meaning (Baran 2001, p.10). A newspaper story or a magazine article is a “media
package” of metaphors, and defines the master frame in the text. According to Baran (2001), the dominant
frame is sometimes hard to detect in the interpretative repertoire, especially because of the implicit language
and tone used in the text. While the text is open to readers’ interpretation and perception, the implicit
application of frame(s) or constant switching between frames can result in the meaning and context of the
interpretative repertoire not reaching the readers.

I observed that the implicit application of frame(s) and constant switching between frames was common in
stories and articles in which the journalist had suggested that States must be held accountable for their
actions, as evidenced by Mohsin Hamid’s article for Herald. In the article “What is wrong with repatriating
Afghan refugees?” (Herald 1 February 2017), Hamid highlights Pakistan and Afghanistan’s handling of
the refugee crisis and the consequent political conflict between the two countries . Throughout the article,
he shifts his stance from a pro-Pakistan one to a pro-Afghanistan, and back. The article begins with Hamid
subtly criticising Pakistan for creating and supporting conditions that led to s o many people fleeing
Afghanistan. He then suddenly shifts to applauding Pakistan’s morality in treating these refugees. He
writes, “In its acceptance of refugees, Pakistan has behaved morally.” However, a few sentences later, he
again shifts and writes that the step to repatriate Afghan refugees was a “misguided one”, arguing that it
will create a narrative that will be detrimental to Pakistan’s future humanitarian image. He also suggests
that Pakistan must find other ways to improve its internal security and needs to open its mind and “behave
decently” by letting refugees stay. He writes: “We must let them stay not only for their sake, but for ours,
because in letting them stay we are staking a claim to the kind of country we rightly dream that Pakistan
becomes”.
Hamid seems to be making an attempt to broaden the reader’s understanding of the pros and cons of the
process of immediate repatriation, asking them to measure both sides and all angles of Pakistan’s decision
to repatriate refugees. He adds that “catastrophic harm threatens to befall these three million refugees”,
once again sketching their plight. He uses words such as “suspicion, “antipathy” and “condemnation” for
Pakistan’s treatment of Afghan refugees , and implicitly focuses on solution-oriented framing. He also
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subtly discusses the need for Pakistan to admit its wrongdoings of the past and to now rethink by “beginning
to march in a different direction” (a trace of admission/confession frame).
Observing the constant frame switching, I’d argue that Hamid’s article is either a victim of the dogma of
neutrality, or intermittent self-correction due to fear of State censorship. Since every frame has its own
theme, it is interpreted differently as well. The biggest disadvantage of frequent shifts in stance within one
text is that the common reader, who is bombarded with multiple ideas, may as a result be left confused over
which side to take. The readers are also switching their interpretation with every frame. For example, I
noted that when Hamid (Herald 1 February 2017) takes the pro-Afghanistan stance, he does it very
cautiously, and immediately proceeds with a stronger pro -Pakistan statement, highlighting the favours it
has done for Afghan refugees in the past 40 years. For instance, “We have backed insurgencies in
neighbouring countries, harboured terrorists and extremists, allowed sectarian killers to slaughter our fellow
citizens, refused to embrace the principle that all are equal before the law”, but followed by “Pakistan has
also performed a deeply decent act on the world stage. For decades, it has provided a haven to some three
million Afghan refugees”. Such shifts are not incidental, and as mentioned above, I would argue that they
could be curated to avoid State censorship. In Pakistan, the State and the military establishment control
media (and the Internet) through “draconian” laws (Khilji 2020; Uddin 2017), that have “gradually and
systematically strengthened a tyrannical grip over freedom of expression” (Uddin 2017). Due to the
deteriorating situation of journalists’ safety in Pakistan 12 , increased military control of free speech, and low
State tolerance towards dissent, journalists sometimes choose to tone down framing in the coverage of
regional political conflicts, especially those with direct military involvement, such as the one with
Afghanistan.

5.4 The line of fire
A pro-Afghan stance in the Pakistani media can be detrimental to a journalist’s career, and also to their
lives. It is the line of fire that many journalists work close to, but not many are willing to cross. This is
probably one of the strongest findings of my analysis: the tendency towards cautious peace journalism. The
military establishment perceives any coverage that questions Pakistan’s policy on the refugee conflict as
dissenting and treasonous, and a threat to safety and security of the country. Due to this, many Pakistani
journalists face security threats by powerful but corrupt state institutions, dictatorial government, a fragile
democracy and powerful religious extremist groups (Mahmood 2020). One such journalist is Taha Siddiqi,
a close friend of mine and an award-winning journalist who is currently living in exile in France. Siddiqi is
a vocal critic of the Pakistani military establishment and their interference in the democratic political system
(Abbass and Safi 2018). He was beaten and threatened with death by at least 10 armed men who belonged
to the military establishment. Siddiqi argues that his work can easily be classified as peace journalis m
(personal communication), as he had been uncovering the army -induced forced disappearances in
Balochistan and KP, and criticising heavy fund allocations from the federal budget to defence and army

12

The 2017 World Press Freedom Index placed Pakistan among the most dangerous countries for journalists.
Pakistan was ranked 139th out of 180 countries on the list.
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housing. In Pakistan, peace journalists who question the Pakistani military’s role in regional and internal
conflicts are likely to meet the same fate as Siddiqi. Questioning the military establishment’s role in
Afghanistan and the State’s mishandling of the Afghan refugee crisis can be dangerous for the journalist.
It can be argued that journalists’ fears for their safety may be contributing to such a limited and sporadic
application of the admission/confession frame, and the overall infrequent practice of peace journalism in
the Pakistani media.

Pakistan is one of 12 countries on the Global Impunity Index 2020 with a hig h number of journalist killing s
that were never investigated by the authorities. The report, which is published by the Committee to Protect
Journalists (CPJ), found that one of the main reasons the Pakistani government did not order a police
investigation into these murders was a lack of political will. As of 2020, there are 15 unsolved murder cases
of journalists in Pakistan. The most recent is the killing of Pakistani journalist Sajid Hussain, whose body
was discovered in a river in Sweden in 2020. Hussain had fled Pakistan in 2012 after getting in trouble with
the military establishment and the State over his reporting on forced disappearances and human rights
violations in the Balochistan region (Ellis-Peterson 2020). He had been active on social media and had been
receiving death threats. Other journalists who have been arrested over criticising the military include Bilal
Farooqi, Matiullah Jan and Gul Bukhari, among others. Pakistan is ranked 139th on the list of 180 countries
where freedom of press exists. In an article written for the Washington Post, Hameed Haroon, the chief
executive of the Dawn Media Group and president of the All Pakistan Newspapers Society, wrote that
journalists in Pakistan were facing a “dirty war on the freedom of the press” (Haroon 2018). At the forefront
of the journalists’ safety situation in Pakistan, Haroon seems to be self-censoring, arguably playing it safe
by presenting conflicting arguments in subsequent paragraphs. Even when writing for an international
publication, he is very careful with his words. He makes a ‘confession’ on behalf of the Pakistan for their
contribution to regional conflicts, internal political instability and attacks on free speech. However, he
immediately aligns his association with the Pakistani State and the military by propagating national interest
as the reason behind the State control of media. Such fear-related concerns from journalists and editors
explains a limited use of the admission/confession frame in the coverage of the conflict by the four
publications  in turn making media a less democratised industry in Pakistan.

The democratisation of media is an important aspect of its political economy, and primarily deals with
power relations between politics and media in the communication of information to the public. Free speech
is crucial to the democratisation of media, and for journalists to safely practice peace journalism, especially
in war and conflict. As noted earlier, public narrative can inform media frames and vice-versa. Both can be
shaped by politics (See Figure: 5.2.1 on page 124). Transparency, accountability, truth and an equitable
distribution of power is central to a democratic system or process. Therefore, the democratisation of media
can make coverage less constrained, and journalists freer to make lexical choices in the interpretative
repertoire. This means that media would not be forcibly politicised by the status quo or the State, and would
not be used as a propaganda tool or mouthpiece for government or the military esta blishment.

123

Ideally, an unpoliticised media must inform public narrative through peace journalism practice. A well informed public narrative should contribute to political policies in a democratic system (Figure: 5.2.1). In
Pakistan, I argue that the lack of media democratisation may have been the reason behind: 1) the very low
extent of the use of the admission/confession frame in coverage of Afghan refugees and the repatriation
conflict, and 2) the highly nationalistic framing incorporated through a propagandist and elitist approach.
In turn, these two factors also reduced the truth orientation in coverage as recorded in my findings.

Politicisation of a conflict can cause a shift in the coverage of the crisis from a humanitarian framing to a
hostile framing (Consterdine 2018). Similarly, in Pakistan, the politicisation of media by the State and
military establishment may have led to the nationalistic coverage of the Afghan refugee repatriation crisis.
The political debate on forced repatriation of refugees back to Afghanistan started in late 2013, and
intensified in 2015 and onwards after the APS terrorist attack (noted in chapter 3). A prominent Pakistani
politician who favoured the forced exodus was former States and Frontier Regions minister Abdul Qadir
Baloch. He was reappointed to the role in 2013, and was adamant about Pakistan’s increasing inability to
afford to host Afghan refugees. Baloch had started making frequent media appearances to publicise his
standpoint. He had also served as the head of the military regime in Balochistan province from 20012003
as the Martial Law Administrator under General Pervez Musharraf’s government. According to Baloch,
Afghan refugees had cost Pakistan more than $200 billion over the last 30 years. Around 2015, the Pakistani
media started reporting on the proposals to repatriate Afghan refugees, who were framed as a burden on
Pakistan’s failing economy. It took the media less than a year to pick up the political stance on repatriation
and adopt it in its narrative. This adoption led to the construction of frames that re presented a very political
view on a humanitarian crisis.
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By 2016, media frames that represented Afghan refugees as a threat and an enemy of the State had become
dominant in the coverage. This may have prompted a more serious concern among the nation, wh o were
still grieving the targeted killing of over 100 school children in the APS attack, leading to anger and
antagonism for the refugees. I would argue that this was an example of public debate crafted by the
government and conveyed to the public by the media. The political account of forcibly repatriating Afghan
refugees back to Afghanistan became a hot topic for television talk shows and opinion columns in
newspapers. The public became more likely to see the political world as personally relevant (McLau ghlin
& Velez 2019), which was dangerous in this context given the State allegations of terrorism against Afghan
refugees. This in turn made the public more likely to commit to supporting the government, who was
publicising its anti-Afghan and pro-repatriation policies more frequently in 2016 and onwards.

In this way, the refugee conflict was successfully politicised throughout Pakistani society, facilitated by
national and private media. Headlines such as “Pakistan looks forward to repatriation of Afghan refugees”
(News 26 June 2016), and “Pakistan calls for early return of Afghan refugees” (Nation 22 April 2016)
started to appear more frequently on the front pages of the top English newspapers in the country. Some
government officials and parliamentarians had even proposed non-renewal of expired PoR cards, which are
issued by the Pakistani government and are mandatory for Afghan refugees to live and work in the country
legally. In 2016 the government first set the 31 December as an official deadline for mass exodus of Afghan
refugees from Pakistan. Comparing numbers at the start and end of the year, UNHCR reported an 830 per
cent rise in forced repatriation. Meanwhile, a toxic combination of deportation threats and police abuses
pushed out nearly 365,000 of the country’s 1.5 million registered Afghan refugees, as well as just over
200,000 of the country’s estimated 1 million undocumented Afghans (Human Rights Watch 2017).

5.5 Lack of empathy and social closeness
I found that the media coverage of Afghan refugees in the three years under my study lacked empathy,
despite the common perception that media reports referring to refugees tend to be empathy -framed
(Robinson 2000). Empathy-oriented framing does not necessarily imply that journalists must take an antiState stance in their reporting. In fact, the three main elements that play an important part in the process of
developing a cognitive empathy towards other people are shared values, beliefs and norms (Stephan &
Finlay 1999), which were mostly missing from the coverage. Empathy-oriented coverage prompts the
readers to imagine themselves in the place of the marginalised groups and perceive the situation from their
point of view.

Empathy orientation in the coverage of the crisis can be seen as a conflict intervention and a powerful
means of influencing community attitudes (Gitlin 2003; Entman 1993; Cottle 2000; Lester 2010). However,
some scholars, such as Khorana (2018), have presented a critique of the conventional use of ‘empathy’ in
media coverage of refugees, and other humanisation discourses in media. She argues that certain refugee themed discourses in media can generate selective empathy, and is problematic. While I partly agree with
Khorana’s arguments of selective empathy in media coverage, and the ethical media representation of the
“distant and proximate other” (p. 143), in the context of my case study, it is noteworthy that Afghan refugees
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are not a distant crisis for Pakistan and its media, and thus the need for empathy in media coverage. In fact,
the rare employment of the empathysympathy frame in the coverage may explain why Pakistani
community attitudes towards Afghan refugees have been antagonistic since their mass arrival into the
country after the Taliban took power in Afghanistan. I found that 86 per cent of media stories lacked the
empathysympathy frame, which is based on an important element of peace journalism: compassion. I see
this frame as sensitising the reader to the plight of Afghan refugees. Only a limited number of news stories
and features (216 out of the total 1,582) employed the empathysympathy frame. A high number of stories
were framed in a way that is likely to be insensitive towards Afghan refugees and their socio -economic
challenges, as well as horrors such as police harassment and threats, uncertainty of livelihood and
permanent or temporary separation from family. The empathysympathy frame universalises human
experience based on shared values. It falls under the peace frame master frame and can be grouped under
people-oriented framing in Galtung’s model. Many scholars who have studied contemporary media
representations of refugees have used the word “empathy” (see for example: Evans 2010; Langdon 2018;
Triandafyllidou 2018). However, it was Robinson (2000) who first used the term “empathy framing” in his
study of media coverage that was critical of the government in two cases: 1) the US intervention in Bosnia
in 1995 in order to defend the Gorazde “safe area”, and 2) the Operation Allied Force in Kosovo in 1999.
He, however, exclusively used the term referring to the media’s “implicit or explicit criticism of a
government opposed to [international] intervention” (Robinson 2000, p. 616).
In my present discussion, I extend Robinson’s use and meaning of the term “empathy” to media framing
that generates a deeper public understanding of the issue in a way that prompts a compassionate response
without politicising the crisis. The empathysympathy frame gives the reader an opportunity to view the
refugee crisis as a regional conflict between two governments, and not as a person al threat. In that way, the
frame helps in the depoliticisation of the public, the humanitarian crisis, and the administration of justice,
thereby making coverage more pluralistic and universal. The frame has been used by some other media
scholars under a different name. For instance, Langdon (2018) refers to such framing as a “cosmopolitan
frame” (p. 6), which emphasises a shared understanding of morality and the universality of humanity.
Rather than perceiving those displaced as a threat, the empathysympathy frame identifies with their
vulnerabilities, and may also provoke calls for some form of official assistance to alleviate the suffering of
the affected group. As argued by Langdon (2018), in recognising the universality of human experience,
media can draw the “other” closer in our consciousness so that we are viewing from a position of morality ,
empathy and solidarity rather than fear, distance and apathy.

The empathy-sympathy frame, however, is a separate strand of humanisation and legitimisation of the group
of people most affected in a conflict. In addition to humanising refugees, this frame stimulates a
compassionate response and community acceptance, and is likely to garner public support. An example to
demonstrate the application of the empathysympathy frame is Taimoor Khan’s article “Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa and FATA’s citizens of nowhere” (Herald 26 July 2017), in which he humanises a 15-yearold unidentified Afghan refugee by sketching his daily routine to the readers. The journalist also uses the
young boy’s story as a representation of the hundreds of thousands of “undocumented” children born to
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Afghan refugees in Pakistan. The article opens with the following sentence: “Emphasis on travel documents
and the precarious law and order situation has not only restricted their mobility, but has also forced them
to live with no identity” (Herald 26 July 2017). In so doing, Khan brings the reader’s attention to how the
lack of identity documents in a system that already discriminates against Afghan refugees hinders their
work and freedom of movement.

Khan has probably left the 15-year-old unidentified on purpose, and even avoided giving him a pseudonym
to generate a sense of curiosity or frustration among the readers, as anonymity makes us uncomfortable. He
may be trying to evoke a collective empathy among the readers over how it feels when people have no
official “identity” or “belonging”, and end up “stateless” and “soft targets” of the system, despite living in
Pakistan for years. With each paragraph, the writer humanises the boy more explicitly to the reader and,
along with him, many other children born to Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Khan also notes several important
problems and challenges the refugees face regarding documentation, such as the blocking of identity cards
by the Pakistani public authority that is in charge of issuing residence, citizenship and other identity
documents. Phrases such as “unbearable winters”, “forced them to live with no identity”, “live in a squatter
settlement”, and “there is no one that these people can go to for help” are significant in activating reader
sentiments of closeness and association to truth and understanding, and distancing from propaganda.

Fairclough (1995) argues that language articulates a relationship between social structures and ideologies.
The way refugees and other minority groups are recurrently portrayed in media texts constructs dominant
representations, socially shared understandings and social and ideological structures. Thus, public
sentiments and attitudes towards refugees may change depending on the language media use to represent
and portray them. Peace journalism gives an opportunity to build an alternative, counter-hegemonic
narrative about marginalised groups, and is selective and cautious in its language use.
An example of such peace-oriented framing is a 2017 article in Herald called “In Problems with controlling
movement across the PakAfghan border” (Herald 5 September 2017), in which the journalist investigates
the challenges around cross-border refugee movement. He presents a scene at the Torkham border post on
the PakistanAfghanistan border, where half a dozen women and some children are sitting in an office
compound out in the open while it rains. He writes that the security official “wants them to move to the
Afghan side of the border. They all request him to let them remain on the Pakistani side.” His use of the
word want for the Pakistani security official, and the word request for the Afghan women and children
refugees illustrates the use of force and oppression by the former, and submission by the latter. The use of
these words demonstrates the power relationships between the Pakistani authorities and the Afghan
refugees, and how the State imposes power over the powerless. The framing of the group of Afghan
refugees as vulnerable and helpless contests the largely negative and hegemonic media narrative about them
in the mainstream Pakistani media – both English and Urdu (Mustafa et al. 2017; Malik & Iqbal 2010;
Kronenfeld 2008).
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Empathy-provoking frames in media coverage can identify and fill the fissures created by a conflict escalatory approach. These fissures manifest as the mistreatment and forced exodus of Afghan refugees by
Pakistan, which has been widely covered by international media and confirmed by human rights
organisations, including Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the UNHCR. Alternatively, an accurate
representation of these refugees by Pakistani media could have generated positive stories, images and
debates not only in Pakistan, but also globally. However, despite the conflict being almost half a century
old, Pakistani media have failed to generate a national debate in favour of the refugees or create a single
positive image/story from among the millions of Afghan refug ees stranded in Pakistani refugee camps.

After the application of the analytical criteria (developed and explained in chapter 2) to the corpus, I found
that less than five per cent of the news stories and articles were framed in a way that could prompt empathy
for the Afghan refugees and generate an understanding of their struggles. In fact, the way the Pakistani
media framed the Afghan refugees had instead damaged the one famous image and story that had emerged
from a refugee camp in Pakistan in 2002, after National Geographic’s Steve McCurry re-photographed the
famous “Afghan Girl”. McCurry had first photographed “The Afghan Girl” in 1985 in Afghanistan. The
portrait of a young girl with sharp green eyes had become an iconic image of the plight of the Afghan people
during the AfghanSoviet war (19791989). However, her representation in the Pakistani media in 2016
was far from compassionate. “The Afghan Girl” (later identified as Sharbat Gula) made headlines in the
Pakistani media in 2016 after she was arrested for illegally obtaining a Pakistani ID and accused of spying
for Afghan intelligence services (Simpson 2016). The latter narrative disappeared from media within a few
days after no solid evidence of espionage was found. However, when I mentioned her name in private
discussions with friends and former colleagues from the media industry in Pakistan, they still attached
espionage allegations with her name. Both Dawn and ET reported Gula’s arrest, focusing on her “living in
the country with fraudulent identity papers” (ET 26 October 2016), and charges against her of “fraud”
(Dawn 27 October 2016), and who (for the ID) “shed her burqa but didn’t change her first name” (ET 27
October 2016). All the reports highlighted the likelihood of any Afghan refugee spying for Afghan
intelligence services and the threat they posed to Pakistan’s national security. Such framing of a simple
arrest could result in readers perceiving every other Afghan refugee as a terrorist or spy, thus minimisin g
their chances of developing empathy and a sense of shared values.

The lack of empathy-provoking framing was also demonstrated by the absence of important background
information in most news stories. Without context, it can be hard to generate empathy among the readership.
For instance, the reports gave few details of Sharbat Gula’s deceased husband and child, her other sick
children, her unstable source of very low income and other challenges, and most importantly the over 35
years she has spent in a refugee camp in Pakistan. Even though this information was covered by most
international media, such as the BBC, National Geographic Magazine and The New York Times. In addition
to important context being absent in Sharbat Gula’s coverage, Dawn and ET’s stories did not mention how
terrible life as a refugee was  even more so for women refugees, who are extremely vulnerable to sexual
assault and exploitation. These women become the heads of vulnerable households when male family
members are missing or dead, and they struggle with finding adequate food or healthcare for their children.
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Access to adequate reproductive healthcare is minimal, especially in war zones, and being pregnant or
having to give birth as a refugee is a significantly more difficult than it is for a normal citizen.

The omission of important context and background by Dawn and ET, whether it was intentional or
coincidental, diminishes the chances of generating empathy towards Sharbat Gula’s plight and the
miserable conditions that Afghan refugees are forced to live in. The negative representation and
disinformation in Sharbat Gula’s case demonstrates how a story of global interest was highly politicised in
the Pakistani media. One of the most prominent reasons behind this politicisation was the in volvement of
the military establishment behind her arrest, since she was initially accused of espionage. Portraying her as
a victim of the State meant going against the authorities and therefore dissent, which the Pakistani
government and establishment have very little tolerance for. The media are thus politicised and covered the
arrests and the overall refugee crisis from a nationalistic angle, either willingly or forcibly becoming a
mouthpiece for political propaganda.

5.6 In the midst of things
The three emerging peace frames that I have identified in this chapter employ language that has the power
to develop and generate peace-oriented sentiments among the readers. As argued by Strömbäck (2001),
media can change the readers’ perception of reality. However, it is not about if, but to what extent media
exercise this power and how this impacts upon the realities of refugees’ lives. In my research, I found that
the four major publications I examined used this power largely to provoke sentiments of antagonism and
nationalism towards Afghan refugees. But what I did not understand at the start of my research was the
reason behind this predominantly negative media representation of a crisis that is over four decades old
now. Therefore, I also focused on identifying the possible reasons behind the lack of empathetic framing
of a protracted situation that the UNHCR has described as a “humanitarian emergency” and Amnesty
International as “40 years of dispossession”. I asked: Why is the Pakistani media’s coverage of the crisis
and the conflict so dominantly non-peace and conflict-escalatory? To answer my own question, I draw on
the work of Wright (2002), who studied refugees and their representation in the US media.
I concluded that the Afghan refugees may be the Pakistani media’s collateral damage. Refugees, who have
been victims of a humanitarian crisis that has existed for years, are caught “in the midst of things” (Wright
2002, p. 2), and the negative media representation of Afghan refugees is neither entirely accidental, nor
purely intentional. The recurrent framing of Afghan refugees as the enemy or the “other” by Pakistani media
is a product of the ongoing PakAfghan political conflict, in which refugees in Pakistan are the “collateral”.
The hostility between the two governments has politicised the refugee crisis and the repatriation process,
where refugees are caught in the midst of two cold neighbours who have been in a conflict state
intermittently throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, and to the present day. The ongoing refugee conflict
started during the Soviet War (19791989), but intensified under the Taliban rule in the mid-1990s. In turn,
this has resulted in the hegemonic, negative media representation of refugees. The threat, enemy and
terrorist images were thus constructed from a variety of negative portrayals, stereotypes, fallacious
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attachments to acts of criminality or terrorism and a questioning of refugees’ authenticity because of the
absence or scarce use of the three emerging frames identified in my analysis. Since A fghan refugees were
marginalised and could easily be targeted, they became collateral damage for the State and the media in
Pakistan. I would argue that they are, in fact, in most need of peace-oriented media framing to represent
their suffering and challenges.

The need to rethink the media narrative in Pakistan cannot be denied. I observed that the Pakistani media
coverage of Afghan refugees and the PakAfghan conflict explicitly denies the refugees or the Afghan
authorities any voice in the discourse. Not only are their voices and perspectives missing or alarmingly
underreported, there is an exaggerated level of nationalism, propaganda and conflict provocation in the
interpretative repertoire. The problems related to the Afghan refugee crisis cannot be resolved unless the
Afghan government and its people, including the refugees in Pakistan, are given a voice by the Pakistani
media. The media have the power and ability to bring the narrative of the oppressed and the marginalised
to light and become a catalyst for social and political change (see for example: Happer and Philo 2013;
Joseph 2012; Wolfsfeld and Gadi 1997). However, to do that without fear of censorship and prosecution,
the Pakistani media needs to be de-politicised.

The way the Pakistani media have covered the Afghan refugee crisis over the years has established their
role as a catalyst for the conflict and antagonism between the two countries. Through peace journalism,
media can become a facilitator and an advocate for positive change. Peace-oriented coverage is likely to
help avoid further escalation of the conflict between the two neighbours and its citizens, and generate
sentiments of tolerance and understanding. This could consequently open doors for peace dialogue, or at
least alleviate the suffering of the Afghan refugees in Pakistan, mainly due to mistreatment and
ethnocentrism. This has already been proven to be true in various parts of the world in peace journalism
scholarship (see for example: Keeble, Tulloch and Zollman 2010; Lynch and McGoldrick 2007; Peleg
2007), and there is no reason to believe that it will not work in Pakistan and Afghanistan’s conflict.

5.7 Conclusion
My findings sketch a gloomy overall picture of peace journalism in Pakistan, a conclusion evidenced and
supported by the discourse analysis conducted in chapters 3 and 4. Galtung’s imperative for a wider and
more frequent practice of peace journalism in war and conflict coverage is unlikely to translate into a peace oriented media in Pakistan without the de-politicisation of the conflict. There is a higher probability for
peace journalism to be effectively practiced in countries with less political influence on media agencies and
higher levels of political and media freedoms (Atanesyan 2020). In Pakistan, due to the heavy political
influence and control of the media by the State, issues that were already part of the mainstream public
debate  such as refugees as a threat  gained wider prominence in the mass media than others  such as
refugees as vulnerable. Pakistan has been under a military rule for over half of its existence since 1947, and
there has been indirect military involvement in the democratically elected governments over this time. The
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political and military influence and pressures on the media in dustry continue to date, which affects the
capacity of the national media to employ peace journalism.

Additionally, I found few distinctions in how the conflict was covered between the magazines and the
newspapers. Newspapers have a greater publication frequency than magazines and are more focused on
daily news than investigative pieces. The length of stories in a newspaper is shorter, and there isn’t much
room for analysis, opinion or extra background information most of the time. Although these reasons do
not justify the conflict-escalatory approach in their coverage, they may have played a role in the
newspapers’ contribution to the dominant non-peace media narrative. Both the magazines and newspapers
sporadically employed traces of peace framing. Another significant difference between newspaper
reportage and magazine coverage is that magazines target a selected audience. Therefore, the framin g
process (selection and omission) in magazine coverage may vary, and reflect a specific editorial perspect ive
that appeals to the magazine’s audience. It is, therefore, plausible that with their particular target audiences
and focus on special content, magazines might frame an event entirely differently to how newspapers would
frame the same event to their generalised readership. Magazines represent an important niche, providing
analysis of and commentary on a variety of topics to broad audiences on a weekly or monthly basis (see for
example: Danesi 2009; Greenwood and Jenkins 2013). In case of Herald and Newsline, both offer
investigative hard news and feature more interpretive and analytical content than daily newspapers. This
not only adds to the interpretive value of their content, but also makes them more specialised, reflecting the
political and cultural atmosphere in which they are created (Abrahamson 2009), and reaching out to
“increasingly narrow audiences” (Sumner 2012, p. 8). Moreover, with both the news magazines turning to
web-based publications in the last decade, more national and international aud iences gained access to their
content. The concern about their conflict-escalatory framing of the refugee conflict thus becomes even
bigger.

Initially, I found myself agreeing with divergent scholarship that argued media framing is a process of either
conscious or subconscious decision-making. However, after my analysis, I find myself aligned with
scholarly evidence that shows that framing is a result of the conscious choices journalists and editors make.
My personal experience in field reporting and desk journalism also contributed to this conceptual
association. In turn, this led me to understanding the need to incorporate explicit peace -oriented framing in
the Pakistani media coverage of the Afghan refugees and their repatriation. This does not mean loc king
horns with the military establishment and the State. In fact, it paves the way for developing an environment
for a more paradigmatic practice of peace journalism – a call Jake Lynch, Shabbir Hussain and Rukhsana
Amjad (2011) have also made in their work on peace journalism and journalism training. Peace journalis m
is a conscious practice in which peace-oriented framing serves as a counter narrative to consciously
employed conflict-escalatory frames in media coverage. It needs a long-term commitment. One simple way
this can be done is by following up on news stories and events for a “continuity factor” (Galtung and Ruge
1965), even if there are no significant developments. The continuity aspect of follow-up reporting can give
visibility to stories that may have been missed by the public in the first instance. Moreover, it can also
develop the public’s in-depth interest and understanding of the issue, event or the conflict. The news media
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cycle is swift and urgency–centric. The continuity aspect keeps information in front of a reader’s mind, and
may save it from obscurity. Otherwise, despite hitting eight million Google searches per day, even Baby
Aylan was forgotten by the world after a few months.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion  The missing “piece”
6.1 A recap
Forty years ago, Afghan refugees started fleeing war and violence in their homeland to seek shelter and
safety. They mostly poured into the neighbouring Pakistan and Iran, while some made successful journeys
as far as Europe. Arguably, their suffering had just began. Afghan refugees continue to seek a safe place to
call home as the war, conflict and violence in their homeland continues. In 2019, Afghanistan replaced
Syria as the world’s least peaceful country, according to the Global Peace Index (2020). Amnesty
International (2019) states that as of 2019, there are 2.6 million registered Afghan refugees across the world.
Pakistan is hosting 1.5 million, and another 1 million unregistered refugees. However, the refugees who
were earlier accepted, during the Soviet War and the Taliban rule, are now being forced to return to their
homeland. Pakistan is the world’s largest host country for Afghan refugees, who frequently receive hate
and rejection from the host society.

In the last few years, the public sentiment towards Afghan refugees has seen a paradigm shift. While before
2014 the refugees were still largely viewed as a burden on Pakistan’s weak economy, they were not hated.
However, this changed after the December 2014 APS massacre in Peshawar, where terrorists killed over
100 schoolchildren. Since then, Afghan refugees have been primarily viewed as a security threat to the
country, generating antagonism towards them. The State and the media have played significant roles in this
changing public perception. A few weeks after the APS massacre, Pakistani law enforcement agencies
shifted the responsibility for the attack onto Afghan refugees, accusing them of providing terrorists a cover
in refugee camps. In 2015, under the National Action Plan (NAP), the government launched a country-wide
crackdown on Afghan refugee camps. The government also started asking Afghanistan to take back the
refugees. By 2016, the Pakistani government had announced the first deadline for mass repatriation of
Afghan refugees to their homeland. The general public concurred with the government, triggering a rise in
the harassment, abuse and mistreatment of Afghan refugees in Pakistan.

Media representations of Afghan refugees have also played a significant role in shaping public a ttitude
towards them. They are now primarily viewed as “terrorists” or as allegedly facilitating terrorism in
Pakistan. The government, general public, and media were aligned, possibly for the first time in the history
of the country, in wanting the forcible repatriation of over 2.5 million registered and unregistered Afghan
refugees. Pakistan set arbitrary and unfeasible deadlines for voluntary repatriation that could not be met.
Pakistan’s policies attracted much attention from international humanitarian groups, who referred to the
exodus as “the world’s largest unlawful mass forced return of refugees in recent times” (Amnesty
International 2019). Since 2014, Afghan refugees have been a target of Pakistani media’s hate -mongering
and negative representations. One after another, print, online and television media called for a speedy
repatriation of refugees and the shutting down of refugee camps. The media have largely presented Afghan
refugees as the “other”, who are shown as not belonging in Pakistan. The way media have framed refugees
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has arguably also affected the public’s acceptance of refugees, even on temporary basis. Pakistan’s shift
from the “generous host” to the “inhumane neighbour” has been forceful, to an extent that the word
“Afghani” or “refugee” has become a social slur, used in the contexts of terrorism, fraud, deception and the
illegal narcotics trade.

6.2 Key findings and contribution to scholarship
Afghan refugees have been a focus of academic attention in Pakistan and internationally in the disciplines
of politics, security and defence studies, refugee studies, criminology, psychology, and medicine (see for
example: Grare and Maley 2011; Kronenfeld 2008; Quddus et al. 2006; Rostami-Povey 2007). Media
scholars have studied representations of the overall political conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan,
terrorism and Taliban in Pakistan, and the army operations in conflict zones in Pakistan (see for example:
Hussain & Munawar 2017; Mushtaq and Baig 2015; Rahman and Eijaz 2014). However, t he media framin g
of Afghan refugees in Pakistan and their forced repatriation remains unexplored.

I started my research as a scholarly intervention into the role of media in the coverage of the refugee crisis
post-APS. I analysed four major English-language media publications in Pakistan to identify dominant
frames used in reportage between 2016 and 2018. These frames inform the media discourse  and
consequently the public discourse  on Afghan refugees and the repatriation conflict with Afghanistan. The
four publications serve as an illustrative sample and represent the narrative of the mainstream English media
in Pakistan. My thesis is motivated by the need to articulate the role Pakistani media are playing in the
coverage and representation of Afghan refugees and the AfPak conflict over refugee repatriation. In doing
so, it also recognises the dire need for peace journalism practice in conflict coverage. Johan Galtung’s Peace
and War Journalism Model (Table 1.1), and Jake Lynch’s analytical/evaluative criteria inform the discourse
analysis of my thesis. Drawing from Lynch, I have developed an analytical criteria comprising 12 questions
(see Appendix 2), all based on the four peace/war orientations in Galtung’s model – peace/conflict,
truth/propaganda, people/elite, and solution/victory. I have previously discussed my reservations about the
binary divisions in Galtung’s Model (Chapter 2), and its tendency to exclude some significant peace
orientations in conflict coverage. Therefore, I have categorised all the dominant and emerging frames under
their master frame: either the peace frame or the non-peace frame (also discussed in Chapter 2).

I have identified four dominant non-peace frames in the media corpus that demonstrate conflict-escalatory
coverage – the terrorist frame, the enemy frame, the blame frame, and the ethno-nationalist frame. Chapters
3 and 4 present my analysis of the newspaper stories and magazine articles. Around 80% of the newspaper
stories and over 60% of magazine articles reveal the employment of at least one of the dominant non-peace
frames (see Table 5.1). Although the analysis draws a grim picture of peace journalism practice in Pakistan,
there is a sporadic employment of peace frames as well. Lynch argues that “peace, therefore, cannot be the
absence of conflict, but the absence of violence” (Lynch 2015, p. 29). I extend his argument to include that
peace is not just the absence of violence, it is also the delivery of justice. The first step toward peace is the
acknowledgement of the absence of justice, which can be initiated through journalistic coverage that
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focuses on empathy and accountability. I have identified three emerging peace frames: the justice delivery
frame, the admission/confession frame, and the empathysympathy frame (discussed in Chapter 5). All
three frames are based on the interpretive repertoires of equity, sentiments of harmony, inclusion,
acceptance and association. Among all the publications, only Herald represents Afghan refugees through
largely peace frames (53%). However, these peace frames have been primarily employed implicitly in the
coverage.

My findings align with the existing scholarship of dominant media frames in war and conflict (see for
example: Ersoy and Miller; Fong 2009; Hussain 2016, 2017; Hussain and Munawar 2017; Lee and Maslog
2005; Rodny-Gumede 2015). I found that Pakistani media’s framing of Afghan refugees, their repatriation
and the subsequent conflict with Afghanistan is highly conflict -escalatory. The overall coverage is
nationalistic and reflects State and military establishment stance on refugees and their repatriation. The
State and military establishment extensively control and influence media narrative about Afghan refugees
and Afghanistan, leaving the coverage heavily politicised and victory -oriented. All four publications make
alarmist assertions about the “threat” refugees pose to Pakistan, and recurrently quote political and military
elite. The coverage consistently portrays the Afghan government as weak, perhaps to legitimise the direct
interests of Pakistani military in Afghan politics, and to justify intervention. It also portrays Afghanistan as
the biggest impediment to regional peace, and Pakistan as the “peacemaker”.

Moreover, Afghan refugees are demonised and dehumanised in media coverage, which largely repeats
stereotypes. In doing so, the coverage reinforces problematic, dominant media narratives that further the
Pakistani public’s antagonism towards Afghan refugees. The media repeatedly represent Afghan refugees
as “terrorists”, the “enemy”, and “traitors”. These representations have arguably reinforced the image of
Afghan refugees as the “other”, and provoked Pakistani people’s hate and hostility, and a collective public
insecurity towards Afghan refugees. The #KickOutAllAfghans and #GoAfghaniGo campaigns, which went
viral on Twitter in 2016 and 2017 respectively, evidence the hatred Pakistanis share for Afghan refugees.
There have been multiple other protests and online smear campaigns against Afghan refugees across
Pakistan that illustrate the level of invective. The news stories and Newsline articles commonly attribute
insecurity, fear, and anxiety to the general public, presenting Afghan refugees in Pakistan as the trigger.
Frames are heavily rooted in judgment, dehumanisation of Afghan refugees, the “incompetence” of the
Afghan government, and the “inefficiency” of Afghan border-security forces in controlling refugee
movement into Pakistan.

6.3 Road to peace: limitations and the way forward
Conflict de-escalatory frames are rarely used in the coverage  their presence is insignificant. Coverage
broadly lacks accuracy, rarely challenges propaganda, marginalises Afghan refugee voices and trivialises
their suffering. Interpretative repertoire that counters war and conflict narratives are given too little
attention. As a counter narrative, peace journalism offers solutions to all types of escalatory reporting that
displays “patterns of omission and distortion” (Lynch and McGoldrick 2005, p. 5) in conflict coverage.
When journalists omit or modify important information, they not only deprive the audience of truth, they
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also contribute to propaganda. This can contribute to a reporting environment where media take sides,
choosing who to give voice to and who to marginalise. Peace journalism highlights truth and uncovers the
lies of all sides. Galtung (2003, p. 179) argues:
Peace journalism stands for truth as opposed to propaganda and lies, but is not “investigative
journalism” in the sense of uncovering lies only on “our” side. Truth holds for all sides, just
like exploration of the conflict formation and giving voice (glasnost) to all.

Peace journalism has developed a different ethos for reporting in various contexts and circumstances. As
Galtung (2003) argues, the focus is not on investigation, but on empowering the readers with accurate and
complete information. Therefore, peace journalism is expansive, and can be practiced in the coverage of
various journalism genres, as long as journalists practice ethical reporting. Peace journalism aims to shift
the emphasis from the proliferation of war propaganda and the politicisation of media to collaborative
engagement, common goals, shared values, and social rehabilitation. It creates opportunities for political
reconciliation, which is broadly missing from war and conflict coverage.

Since the mid-90s, peace journalism has emerged as a counter narrative to a war-escalatory approach in
media coverage. In some parts of the world, it is emerging as an important journalism practice. These
journalists are emphasising the need for reconciliation between conflicting groups as a long -term, nonviolent solution to conflicts. Hoffman (2014) calls for post-conflict media interventions, and suggests that
rather than just covering wars, the media should examine efforts at conflict resolution and find ways to
support reconciliation and peace. Researchers have also frequently argued the “expansiveness” element of
peace journalism (see for example: Alankuş 2018; Ers oy and Miller 2020; Shaw, Lynch and Hackett 2011)
that embraces contributions made to media coverage from their perspectives. Additionally, its outreach has
extended due to the opportunities the Internet has provided for peace journalists and others intere sted in the
conflictmedia nexus. Peace journalism is an intervention in some media and communication spaces that
were increasingly viewed by militaries as an extension of the battleground. For example, during the world
wars and the 1991 Gulf War (Lynch 2008, pp. 193), the media were extensively used for propaganda.
Additionally, responsible journalism can also offer opportunities for proper victim reparation processes.

Yet despite this, there is a gap between the aims/ideals of peace journalism and its implementation. In the
context of Pakistan, the wider practice of peace journalism faces some key challenges. Therefore, in this
thesis, I have not only demonstrated the problem, but also developed suggestions for finding a pragmatic
and long-term solution to the problem of conflict-escalatory and hate-mongering journalism. I have
primarily drawn on the works of Jake Lynch and Shabbir Hussain, who have developed peace journalis m
strategies for the international and Pakistani media, respectively. Amid many structural limitations such as
lack of journalism training, public and private funding and free access to conflict zones, t he most significant
factor impeding peace journalism practice in the context of my case study is the Pakistani State and military
establishment’s control of the media, and their interference in how the Afghan conflict must be framed .
This control has politicised a humanitarian crisis and its media coverage, creating barriers for peace
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journalism implementation. In Pakistan, peace journalism is more than an ethical choice. In his book Peace
Journalism Principles and Practices, Steven Youngblood (2017) shares an email exchange with Jake Lynch
in which Lynch explains that when a country’s media align themselves with the State and the military, they
become “tough nuts to crack” for peace journalism (Youngblood 2017, p. 223). In Pakistan, media are
widely aligned with the State and military establishment, by choice or by force, resulting in intense
politicisation of media coverage. This raises concerns about the duty of journalists, whose irresponsible
journalism can turn volatile conflicts into a full-blown war (Rawan and Hussain 2017).

Additionally, the State and military establishment have also punished media organisations for employing
journalists who speak against them. Most recently, this abuse of power by the State manifested in the form
of a broadcast license suspension. A Columbia Journalism Review article (Bennett and Naim 2015) features
several governments around the world who use “stealthy strategies” to manipulate the media. It states:

In Pakistan, the state regulatory authority suspended the license of Geo TV, the most popular
channel in the country, after a defamation claim against it was made by the intelligence services
following a shooting of one of the station’s best-known journalists. The channel was off the air for
15 days starting in June 2014.

The lack of safety and security for journalists in Pakistan, which is an increasingly widespread problem for
the media and consequently for the public as well, is another important impediment for peace journalis m
practice in the country. This is intertwined with the issue of State and military control, especially in
Pakistan, where the two institutions have been directly attacking journalists for questioning and criticising
the status quo and their misuse of power. In Pakistan, journalists covering military and political co nflicts
confront potentially fatal safety risks from not only the State and military establishment, but also from
extremist religious groups, who have resorted to terrorist attacks on media companies in the past.
One such incident occurred in 2013, when ET’s headquarters in Karachi was attacked by a group of
terrorists. ET was widely covering religious terrorists and their safe havens in Pakistan, after Al Qaeda
leader Osama bin Laden’s killing in Pakistan. As part of the editorial team, I received an ema il from Kamal
Siddiqi, the newspaper’s editor at the time. In the email, sent to all editors and reporters, Siddiqi clearly
outlined the paper’s new policy on framing militant organisations and the Taliban, and their relationship
with the Pakistani government. He had directed the staff to avoid any content about the attacking militan t
organisation and its allies (including the political party that has been in power since 2018). The staff was
also strictly directed not to publish anything condemning any terrorist attack, militancy, or the military
operations in KP. Siddiqi now tells me that the coverage was radically pared down to appease the military
(personal communication). Since the Pakistani State and military have vested interests in political power in
Afghanistan and direct relations with the Taliban, the threats to Pakistani journalists may partly explain the
lack of peace journalism and the absence of academic exploration of media discourse on Afghan refugees
and their forced repatriation.
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Furthermore, the vernacular aspect of coverage is a research locus that has been mainly ignored in peace
journalism theorisation. As mentioned earlier in this thesis, Pakistan is a nation of multiple ethnic
languages, including Pashto – also the native language of most Afghan refugees. This may present language
barriers for non-Pashto speaking journalists and the way events are covered and framed through peace and
conflict de-escalatory lens. While this may not significantly affect stories with hard facts s uch as terrorist
activities, statistics and political events, these language barriers between the journalists and the affected
people may tone down their personal anecdotes of challenges and suffering in coverage. For instance, this
is also noted in the case of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, whose coverage largely lacks human angle, and as
also evident from the findings of my thesis. Moreover, journalists working for English -language media in
Pakistan are mainly Western-trained or trained through Western normative frameworks of conflict
reporting, and may be more likely to subscribe to Western models and values in their coverage than their
vernacular counterparts.

Amidst these obstacles and limitations, the significant question here is: how then do journalists in Pakistan
practice peace journalism? Or how can peace journalism be defined in the Pakistani context? The problem
is a gap between the concept and the practice of peace journalism. Galtung’s Peace and War Journalism
Model is a template for peace journalism coverage. It is a guide, but not a toolkit. Peace journalism is
gradually evolving in theory to cover various aspects of the ways war, conflict and violence are covered in
reportage  its practice also needs expansion to become more diverse. A case for theorisation of peace
journalism in a local/regional context thus becomes stronger – almost inevitable. In arguing so, I make three
suggestions for narrowing the gap between concept and practice in the Pakistani context.

First, there is a need to redefine peace journalism to make it more inclusive of countries and regions with
authoritarian governments/systems and censorship. Scholars have previously argued the need to open new
avenues in peace journalism and include international and intercultural understanding in its practice (see
for example: Hackett 2011; Shinar 2007; Tehranian 2002). Jake Lynch tested the flexibilit ies of Galtung’s
model and expanded it to include various war and conflict zones. Together with Annabel McGoldrick, he
developed a 17-point list of the dos and don’ts of peace journalism (McGoldrick and Lynch 2000, pp.
3033). His theoretical experiments with peace and war journalism can be extended to countries that may
not have an active conflict, but have, for instance, stringent State/military control of media, such as Pakistan.
To limit peace journalism to active war, conflict and violence coverage risks limiting its conceptualisation
and practice. Its practice needs to be more inclusive of passive conflicts, indirect violence, and other
fundamental problems in a society.

Peace journalism characteristics need to be extended to all genres and cover all forms of social and political
injustices, oppression, inequality, structural abuse, and human rights exploitation and violations. In this
context, I find Benn’s (2015) definitions of “active and passive” peace journalism inspiring and relevant to
my argument. He argues that the current definition of peace journalism is vague. He suggests categorising
it into two variants. He defines “active” peace journalism as revolutionary, interventionist, participatory
and advocacy-oriented. On the other hand, he conceptualises “passive” peace journalism as implicit,
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traditional (truth, objectivity, neutrality), reflective and non -interventionist. He puts the two options on the
peace journalism spectrum. However, yet again, the spectrum has two extreme ends that promote an
exclusion of countries and journalism genres that fall somewhere between them. Instead of narrower
dualities such as peace/war, good/bad, and active/passive peace journalism, I argue for a wider, more
inclusive definition along the peace and non-peace framing categories proposed in my thesis. This can then
extend to cover diverse issues of human right abuse and subjects such as activism, racism, feminis m,
gendered violence, environment, animal rights, freedom of speech and dissent, and political extradition, to
name a few.

Secondly, there is a dearth of peace journalism education and professional training opportunities in
Pakistan. Some local civil society organisations have offered media training on various issues. These
include Media Matters for Democracy 13 (MMfD) and the Center for Excellence in Journalism14 (CEJ) in
Pakistan. However, none of these have exclusively focused on peace journalism. Instead, most training
focuses on objectivity, accuracy and transparency in journalism. Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) argue that
the characteristics of objectivity and neutrality in conventional media cannot offer young and aspiring
journalists an antidote to the polarisation effect of media, especially in war and conflict zones. These
conventions, though essential to overall “good” journalism, do not necessarily offer a counter narrative to
war- and conflict-escalatory coverage, strengthening the case for properly designed peace journalism
training. However, the authors challenge the acquisition of effective skills from training in “poor countries”
unless it is combined with “western-style professional methods” (p. 229) of peace journalism.

There is no doubt that western scholarship in peace journalism has created a platform for research, and the
broadening and exploration of peace journalism. However, I would argue it can genuinely benefit media in
a non-western context through collaboration with local research. One of the key arguments that I made at
the start of this thesis is the need to de-westernise peace journalism scholarship. The imposition of western style methods could ignore the historical and contemporary socio -political frameworks of high-context
countries such as Pakistan. In the case of Pakistan, engagement with local research and case studies may
promote a better understanding and a clearer pathway for the implementation of peace journalism. Peace
journalism education can equip journalists with knowledge of not only how to focus on peace, truth, people
and solutions, it can also prepare them to practice safe journalism in their country. This is especially useful
for journalists reporting from conflict zones inside the country, to which foreig n/western journalists have
no or very limited access. Training will generate awareness about what is and is not included in peace
journalism practice. In Pakistan, for instance, reporting on conflicts does not mean explicitly confronting
the State or military establishment. Peace journalism practice does not necessarily have to be risky, anarchic
or destructively critical of the authorities. Instead, it excludes escalation -oriented language, and highlights
shared values and common ground – somewhere between the “active” and “passive” definitions on the
spectrum.

According to M M fD, they are “an organisation of journalists geared towards media development, digital
democracy and rights, M edia and Information Literacy, and Internet governance” https://mediamatters.pk/.
14 CEJ is an initiative for the professional development, training and networking of Pakistani journalists and other
media professions https://cej.iba.edu.pk/.
13
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Finally, the expansion of the scope and definition of peace journalism, as well as professional learning
opportunities, also require more peace journalism research, particularly into the ways Pakistani media frame
the Afghan refugee conflict, and other ethnic and religious minorities. Such research will draw a clearer
picture of peace journalism in Pakistan, and encourage improvement and an unbiased scrutiny of media
practices. Research develops an understanding of loopholes and can initiate a debate for ch ange and
improvement. It can also mobilise society to demand public policy changes. Most importantly, it provides
content for teaching and training purposes. Aslam (2011) argues for the incorporation of peace journalis m
studies in university education. She explains that studying research-based content over a longer period “can
more easily develop the students’ sense of social responsibility and also help prepare them to face
challenges in the field” (p. 130).

As argued earlier, normative expectations of a Western peace journalism model largely shape how
journalists, covering war and conflict around the world, ask questions and frame information into answers.
This has been noted to an extent where W estern journalism “may even undermine the cultural code of the
field” (Hanitzsch and Vos 2017, p. 117) due to the remarkable differences in socio-political and cultural
contexts between Western and non-western settings. This facilitates my arguments for a broader
conceptualisation and application of peace journalism, which is the most feasible way forward, especially
in countries like Pakistan, where multiple underlying factors undermine its uninterrupted practice. In
addition to the feasibility of its application in the Pakistani content, the model’s ethical obligations and
normative expectations by and large make its practice more viable in the coverage of war and conflict and
the sufferings of oppressed and marginalised communities such as the Afghan refugees affected by the
Afghan war, displaced on both sides of the border.

In a more digitally connected world, the definition of war, conflict and violence is changing. Therefore, as
a counter-narrative to war, conflict and violence, peace journalism will also need to continue evolving.
Peace journalism is ethical journalism that focuses on justice, and justice must speak for all kinds of
oppressions, without hierarchal prioritisation between active and passive conflicts.
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Appendices
Appendix 1
Analytical criteria
Analytical criteria for the analysis of media coverage of Afghan refugees and their repatriation from
Pakistan – Adapted from Galtung’s Peace and War Journalism Model (1986, 1998, and Jake Lynch’s
analytical criteria.
Peace/Conflict
1- Does the story/article give background information on the Af-Pak conflict, their
(PCOC)
historical and current political relationship, and also (briefly) the reasons behind the
Afghan refugee crisis in Pakistan?
2- Does the story/article give voice to both the Pakistani and Afghan people/refugees
and authorities, providing a more balanced coverage?
3- Is the news report/article suggesting peaceful and non -violent solutions to the
conflict between the two countries over repatriation of Afghan refugees (plau sible
regional peace and harmony between the governments and the people of the two
countries), the contrary, or nothing at all?

Truth/Propaganda
(TPOC)

4- How are the issues of Afghan refugees in Pakistan  vis-à-vis arrival, challenges,
settlement and repatriation  framed in the text? Does it urge for their facilitation and
rehabilitation, or instead stress their forced and quick repatriation on set deadlines?
1- Does the news report/article demonstrate evidence about any of the sides in the
conflict with facts and figures, where needed?
2- Does the news report/article generate or dispel propaganda around Afghan refugees
or the Afghan government?

People/Elites (PEOC)

3- Does the news report/article mention any human rights violations committed by the
Pakistani authorities or by the border forces against Afghan refugees in Pakistan or
those crossing the border?
1- Does the news report/article report the marginalisation of the Afghan refugee
groups: their sufferings, challenges and the atrocities they face?
2- Does the news report/article mention any racist/ethnocentric statements/comments
about the Afghan refugees in Pakistan?

Solutions/Victory
(SVOC)

3- How are Afghan refugees referred to/represented in the text? Could the way they
are framed trigger empathy/sympathy and thoughtfulness among the readers for the
people suffering in the conflict?
1- Does the news report/article mention any attempts/successes at peacemaking and
reconciliation between the two countries?
2- Does the news report/article suggest resolution and reconstruction strategies,
independent of the State and military, for a peaceful end to the refugee conflict?
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Appendix 2
Analytical criteria – Frames Classification Table – Sample
Peace/Conflict Oriented criteria (PCOC)

Yes (Y)

Historical background
Balanced voices
Non-violent response
Facilitation and rehabilitation
Truth/Propaganda Oriented criteria (TPOC)
Facts and figures
Highlights human rights violation
Refutes propaganda
People/Elite Oriented criteria (PEOC)
Mentions refugee suffering & challenges
Highlights ethno-nationalism
Solution/Victory Oriented criteria (SVOC)
Focuses on peace and reconciliation
Reconstruction & resettlement
Justice delivery

Dominant Frame
Emerging frame
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No (N)

